

**VANECK VIP TRUST
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION**

Dated May 1, 2024

**VANECK VIP EMERGING MARKETS BOND FUND
VANECK VIP EMERGING MARKETS FUND
VANECK VIP GLOBAL GOLD FUND
VANECK VIP GLOBAL RESOURCES FUND**

INITIAL CLASS / CLASS S

This statement of additional information (“SAI”) is not a prospectus. It should be read in conjunction with the prospectuses dated May 1, 2024 (each, a “Prospectus”) for VanEck VIP Trust (the “Trust”), relating to VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund, VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund, VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund and VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund (each, a “Fund” and collectively, the “Funds”), as each may be revised from time to time. The [audited financial statements of the Funds for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023](#) are hereby incorporated by reference from the Funds’ Annual Reports to shareholders. A copy of the Prospectuses and Annual and Semi-Annual Reports for the Trust, relating to the Funds, may be obtained without charge by visiting the VanEck website at vaneck.com, by calling toll-free 800.826.2333 or by writing to the Trust or Van Eck Securities Corporation, the Funds’ distributor (the “Distributor”). The Trust’s and the Distributor’s address is 666 Third Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, New York 10017. Capitalized terms used herein that are not defined have the same meaning as in the Prospectuses, unless otherwise noted.

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STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

May 1, 2024

GENERAL INFORMATION

The Trust is an open-end management investment company organized as a business trust under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on January 7, 1987 with the name Van Eck Investment Trust. The Trust commenced operations on September 7, 1989. On April 12, 1995, Van Eck Investment Trust changed its name to Van Eck Worldwide Insurance Trust. On May 1, 2010, Van Eck Worldwide Insurance Trust changed its name to Van Eck VIP Trust. On May 1, 2017, Van Eck VIP Trust changed its name to VanEck VIP Trust.

The Trust currently consists of four separate series: VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund, which currently offers Initial Class shares; VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund which currently offers Class S shares; and VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund and VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund, both of which currently offer Initial Class and Class S shares. VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund has registered Class S shares and VanEck VIP Global Gold has registered Initial Class shares, but as of the date of this SAI are not being offered.

The Board of Trustees of the Trust (the “Board”) has authority, without the necessity of a shareholder vote, to create additional series or funds, each of which may issue separate classes of shares.

Van Eck Associates Corporation serves as investment adviser (the “Adviser”) to the Funds. Shares of the Funds are offered only to separate accounts of various insurance companies to fund the benefits of variable life insurance and variable annuity policies.

VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund and VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund are classified as a non-diversified funds under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “1940 Act”). VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund and VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund are classified as diversified funds under the 1940 Act.

INVESTMENT POLICIES AND RISKS

The following is additional information regarding the investment policies and strategies used by the Funds in attempting to achieve their respective objectives, and should be read with the sections of the Funds’ Prospectuses titled Summary Information - Principal Investment Strategies”, Summary Information - Principal Risks” and “Investment Objective, Strategies, Policies, Risks and Other Information”. The Funds may take temporary defensive positions in anticipation of or in an attempt to respond to adverse market, economic, political or other conditions. Such a position could have the effect of reducing any benefit a Fund may receive from a market increase. When taking a temporary defensive position, a Fund may invest all or a substantial portion of its total assets in cash or cash equivalents, government securities, short-term or medium-term fixed income securities, which may include, but not be limited to, shares of other mutual funds, U.S. Treasury bills, commercial paper or repurchase agreements. A Fund may not achieve its investment objective while it is investing defensively. The VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund may engage in active and frequent trading of portfolio securities.

ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES

The Funds may invest in asset-backed securities. Asset-backed securities, directly or indirectly, represent interests in, or are secured by and payable from, pools of consumer loans (generally unrelated to mortgage loans) and most often are structured as pass-through securities. Interest and principal payments ultimately depend on payment of the underlying loans, although the securities may be supported by letters of credit or other credit enhancements. The value of asset-backed securities may also depend on the creditworthiness of the servicing agent for the loan pool, the originator of the loans, or the financial institution providing the credit enhancement.

Asset-backed securities are subject to certain risks. These risks generally arise out of the security interest in the assets collateralizing the security. For example, credit card receivables are generally unsecured and the debtors are entitled to a number of protections from the state and through federal consumer laws, many of which give the debtor the right to offset certain amounts of credit card debts and thereby reducing the amounts due.

BELOW INVESTMENT GRADE SECURITIES

The Funds may invest in below investment grade debt securities. Investments in securities rated below investment grade that are eligible for purchase by a Fund are described as “speculative” by Moody’s, S&P and Fitch, Inc.

Investments in lower rated corporate debt securities (“high yield securities” or “junk bonds”) generally provide greater income and increased opportunity for capital appreciation than investments in higher quality securities, but they also typically entail greater price volatility and principal and income risk.

These high yield securities are regarded as predominantly speculative with respect to the issuer’s continuing ability to meet principal and interest payments. Analysis of the creditworthiness of issuers of debt securities that are high yield may be more complex than for issuers of higher quality debt securities.

High yield securities may be more susceptible to real or perceived adverse economic and competitive industry conditions than investment grade securities. The prices of high yield securities have been found to be less sensitive to interest-rate changes than higher-rated investments, but more sensitive to adverse economic downturns or individual corporate developments. A projection of an economic downturn or of a period of rising interest rates, for example, could cause a decline in high yield security prices because the advent of a recession could lessen the ability of a highly leveraged company to make principal and interest payments on its debt securities. If an issuer of high yield securities defaults, in addition to risking payment of all or a portion of interest and principal, a Fund by investing in such securities may incur additional expenses to seek recovery. In the case of high yield securities structured as zero-coupon or pay-in-kind securities, their market prices are affected to a greater extent by interest rate changes, and therefore tend to be more volatile than securities which pay interest periodically and in cash.

The secondary market on which high yield securities are traded may be less liquid than the market for higher grade securities. Less liquidity in the secondary trading market could adversely affect the price at which a Fund could sell a high yield security, and could adversely affect the daily net asset value of the shares. Adverse publicity and investor perceptions, whether or not based on fundamental analysis, may decrease the values and liquidity of high yield securities, especially in a thinly-traded market. When secondary markets for high yield securities are less liquid than the market for higher grade securities, it may be more difficult to value the securities because such valuation may require more research, and elements of judgment may play a greater role in the valuation because there is less reliable, objective data available.

BORROWING; LEVERAGE

Borrowing to invest more is called “leverage.” A Fund may borrow from banks provided that the amount of borrowing is no more than one third of the net assets of the Fund plus the amount of the borrowings. A Fund is required to be able to restore borrowing to its permitted level within three days, if it should increase to more than one-third of its net assets as stated above. Methods that may be used to restore borrowings in this context include selling securities, even if the sale hurts a Fund’s investment performance. Leverage exaggerates the effect of rises or falls in prices of securities bought with borrowed money. Borrowing also costs money, including fees and interest. The Funds expect to borrow only through negotiated loan agreements with commercial banks or other institutional lenders.

COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE OBLIGATIONS

The Funds may invest in collateralized mortgage obligations (“CMOs”). CMOs are fixed-income securities which are collateralized by pools of mortgage loans or mortgage-related securities created by commercial banks, savings and loan institutions, private mortgage insurance companies and mortgage bankers. In effect, CMOs “pass through” the monthly payments made by individual borrowers on their mortgage loans. Prepayments of the mortgages included in the mortgage pool may influence the yield of the CMO. In addition, prepayments usually increase when interest rates are decreasing, thereby decreasing the life of the pool. As a result, reinvestment of prepayments may be at a lower rate than that on the original CMO. There are different classes of CMOs, and certain classes have priority over others with respect to prepayment of the mortgages. Timely payment of interest and principal (but not the market value) of these pools is supported by various forms of insurance or guarantees. Each Fund may buy CMOs without insurance or guarantees if, in the opinion of the Adviser, the pooler is creditworthy or if rated investment grade. In the event that any CMOs are determined to be investment companies, the Funds will be subject to certain limitations under the 1940 Act.

COMMERCIAL PAPER

The Funds may invest in commercial paper that is indexed to certain specific foreign currency exchange rates which may entail the risk of loss of principal. The terms of such commercial paper typically provide that its principal amount is adjusted upwards or downwards (but not below zero) at maturity to reflect changes in the exchange rate between two currencies while the obligation is outstanding. The Funds will purchase such commercial paper with the currency in which it is denominated and, at maturity, will typically receive interest and principal payments thereon in that currency, but the amount or principal payable by the issuer at maturity will change in proportion to the change (if any) in the exchange rate between two specified currencies between the date the instrument is issued and the date the instrument matures.

The Funds may invest in commercial paper with the principal amount indexed to the difference, up or down, in value between two foreign currencies. The Funds segregate asset accounts with an equivalent amount of cash, U.S. government securities or other highly liquid securities equal in value to this commercial paper.

CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES

The Funds may invest in securities that are convertible into common stock or other securities of the same or a different issuer or into cash within a particular period of time at a specified price or formula. Convertible securities are generally fixed income securities (but may include preferred stock) and generally rank senior to common stocks in a corporation's capital structure and, therefore, entail less risk than the corporation's common stock. The value of a convertible security is a function of its "investment value" (its value as if it did not have a conversion privilege), and its "conversion value" (the security's worth if it were to be exchanged for the underlying security, at market value, pursuant to its conversion privilege).

To the extent that a convertible security's investment value is greater than its conversion value, its price will generally be primarily a reflection of such investment value and its price will be likely to increase when interest rates fall and decrease when interest rates rise, as with a fixed-income security (the credit standing of the issuer and other factors may also have an effect on the convertible security's value). If the conversion value exceeds the investment value, the price of the convertible security will generally rise above its investment value and, in addition, will generally sell at some premium over its conversion value. (This premium represents the price investors are willing to pay for the privilege of purchasing a fixed-income security with a possibility of capital appreciation due to the conversion privilege.) At such times, the price of the convertible security will tend to fluctuate directly with the price of the underlying equity security. Convertible securities may be purchased by the Funds at varying price levels above their investment values and/or their conversion values in keeping with the Funds' objectives.

CREDIT

Credit risk is the risk that the issuer or guarantor of a debt security or the counterparty to an over-the-counter ("OTC") contract (including many derivatives) will be unable or unwilling to make timely principal, interest or settlement payments or otherwise honor its obligations. The Funds invest in debt securities that are subject to varying degrees of risk that the issuers of the securities will have their credit ratings downgraded or will default, potentially reducing the value of the securities. A Fund may enter into financial transactions that involve a limited number of counterparties, which may increase the Fund's exposure to credit risk. The Fund does not specifically limit its credit risk with respect to any single counterparty. Further, there is a risk that no suitable counterparties will be willing to enter into, or continue to enter into, transactions with the Fund and, as a result, the Fund may not be able to achieve its investment objective.

CURRENCY FORWARDS

A currency forward transaction is a contract to buy or sell a specified quantity of currency at a specified date in the future at a specified price which may be any fixed number of days from the date of the contract agreed upon by the parties. Currency forward contracts may be used to increase or reduce exposure to currency price movements.

The use of currency forward transactions involves certain risks. For example, if the counterparty under the contract defaults on its obligation to make payments due from it as a result of its bankruptcy or otherwise, a Fund may lose such payments altogether or collect only a portion thereof, which collection could involve costs or delays.

CURRENCY MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

Currency management strategies are generally used in an attempt to reduce the risk and impact of adverse currency movements to protect the value of, or seek to mitigate the currency exposure associated with, an investment (including, for example, mitigating the exposure to the Euro that may be embedded in the Polish zloty). Currency management strategies, including currency forward contracts (described above) and cross-hedging, may substantially change a Fund's exposure to currency exchange rates and could result in losses to the Fund if currencies do not perform as the Adviser expects. In addition, currency management strategies, to the extent that such strategies reduce a Fund's exposure to currency risks, may also reduce the Fund's ability to benefit from favorable changes in currency exchange rates. There is no assurance that the Adviser's use of currency management strategies will benefit a Fund or that they will be, or can be, used at appropriate times. Furthermore, there may not be a perfect correlation between the amount of exposure to a particular currency and the amount of securities in the portfolio denominated in that currency or exposed to that currency. Currency markets are generally less regulated than securities markets. Derivatives transactions, especially currency forward contracts, currency related futures contracts and swap agreements, may involve significant amounts of currency management strategies risk. The VanEck VIP Emerging Markets

Bond Fund, which may utilize these types of instruments to a significant extent, will be especially subject to currency management strategies risk.

CYBER SECURITY

The Funds and their service providers are susceptible to cyber security risks that include, among other things, theft, unauthorized monitoring, release, misuse, loss, destruction or corruption of confidential and highly restricted data; denial of service attacks; unauthorized access to relevant systems; compromises to networks or devices that the Funds and their service providers use to service the Funds' operations; and operational disruption or failures in the physical infrastructure or operating systems that support the Funds and their service providers. Cyber attacks against or security breakdowns of the Funds or their service providers may adversely impact the Funds and their shareholders, potentially resulting in, among other things, financial losses; the inability of Fund shareholders to transact business and the Funds to process transactions; the inability to calculate the Funds' NAV; violations of applicable privacy and other laws; regulatory fines, penalties, reputational damage, reimbursement or other compensation costs; and/or additional compliance costs. The Funds may incur additional costs for cyber security risk management and remediation purposes. In addition, cyber security risks may also impact issuers of securities in which the Funds invest, which may cause the Funds' investments in such issuers to lose value. There can be no assurance that the Funds or their service providers will not suffer losses relating to cyber attacks or other information security breaches in the future.

DEBT SECURITIES

The Funds may invest in debt securities. The market value of debt securities generally varies in response to changes in interest rates and the financial condition of each issuer and the value of a global resource if linked to the value of a global resource. Debt securities with similar maturities may have different yields, depending upon several factors, including the relative financial condition of the issuers. Investment grade means a rating of Baa3 or better by Moody's or BBB- or better by S&P, or of comparable quality in the judgment of the Adviser or if no rating has been given by either service. Many securities of foreign issuers are not rated by these services. Therefore, the selection of such issuers depends to a large extent on the credit analysis performed by the Adviser. During periods of declining interest rates, the value of debt securities generally increases. Conversely, during periods of rising interest rates, the value of such securities generally declines. These changes in market value will be reflected in a Fund's net asset value. Debt securities with similar maturities may have different yields, depending upon several factors, including the relative financial condition of the issuers. For example, higher yields are generally available from securities in the lower rating categories of S&P or Moody's. However, the values of lower-rated securities generally fluctuate more than those of high-grade securities. Many securities of foreign issuers are not rated by these services. Therefore the selection of such issuers depends to a large extent on the credit analysis performed by the Adviser.

New issues of certain debt securities are often offered on a when-issued basis. That is, the payment obligation and the interest rate are fixed at the time the buyer enters into the commitment, but delivery and payment for the securities normally take place after the date of the commitment to purchase. The value of when-issued securities may vary prior to and after delivery depending on market conditions and changes in interest rate levels. However, the Funds do not accrue any income on these securities prior to delivery. The Funds may also invest in low rated or unrated debt securities. Low rated debt securities present a significantly greater risk of default than do higher rated securities, in times of poor business or economic conditions, the Funds may lose interest and/or principal on such securities.

The Funds may also invest in various money market securities for cash management purposes or when assuming a temporary defensive position. Money market securities may include commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, bank obligations, corporate debt securities, certificates of deposit, U.S. government securities and obligations of savings institutions.

DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS

The Funds may invest in Depositary Receipts, which represent an ownership interest in securities of foreign companies (an "underlying issuer") that are deposited with a depositary. Depositary Receipts are not necessarily denominated in the same currency as the underlying securities. Depositary Receipts include American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs"), Global Depositary Receipts ("GDRs") and other types of Depositary Receipts (which, together with ADRs and GDRs, are hereinafter collectively referred to as "Depositary Receipts"). ADRs are dollar-denominated Depositary Receipts typically issued by a U.S. financial institution which evidence an ownership interest in a security or pool of securities issued by a foreign issuer. ADRs are listed and traded in the United States. GDRs and other types of Depositary Receipts are typically issued by foreign banks or trust companies, although they also may be issued by U.S. financial institutions, and evidence ownership interests in a security or pool of securities issued by either a foreign or a U.S. corporation. Generally, Depositary Receipts in registered form are designed for use in the U.S. securities market and Depositary Receipts in bearer form are designed for use in securities markets outside the United States.

Depository Receipts may be “sponsored” or “unsponsored.” Sponsored Depository Receipts are established jointly by a depository and the underlying issuer, whereas unsponsored Depository Receipts may be established by a depository without participation by the underlying issuer. Holders of unsponsored Depository Receipts generally bear all the costs associated with establishing unsponsored Depository Receipts. In addition, the issuers of the securities underlying unsponsored Depository Receipts are not obligated to disclose material information in the United States and, therefore, there may be less information available regarding such issuers and there may not be a correlation between such information and the market value of the Depository Receipts.

DERIVATIVES

The Funds may also use derivatives, such as futures contracts and options, forward contracts and swaps as part of various investment techniques and strategies, such as creating non-speculative “synthetic” positions (covered by segregation of liquid assets) or implementing “cross-hedging” strategies. A “synthetic” position is the duplication of a cash market transaction. “Cross-hedging” involves the use of one currency to hedge against the decline in the value of another currency. The use of such instruments as described herein involves several risks. First, there can be no assurance that the prices of such instruments and the hedge security or the cash market position will move as anticipated. If prices do not move as anticipated, a Fund may incur a loss on its investment, may not achieve the hedging protection it anticipated and/or may incur a loss greater than if it had entered into a cash market position. Second, investments in such instruments may reduce the gains which would otherwise be realized from the sale of the underlying securities or assets which are being hedged. Third, positions in such instruments can be closed out only on an exchange that provides a market for those instruments. There can be no assurance that such a market will exist for a particular derivative. If the Fund cannot close out an exchange traded derivative which it holds, it may have to perform its contract obligation or exercise its option to realize any profit and may incur transaction cost on the sale of the underlying assets. In addition, the use of derivative instruments involves the risk that a loss may be sustained as a result of the failure of the counterparty to the derivatives contract to make required payments or otherwise comply with the contract’s terms.

When the Funds intend to acquire securities (or gold bullion or coins as the case may be) for their portfolio, they may use call derivatives as a means of fixing the price of the security (or gold) they intend to purchase at the exercise price or contract price depending on the derivative. An increase in the acquisition cost may be offset, in whole or part, by a gain on the derivative. Options and futures contracts requiring delivery of a security may also be useful to the Funds in purchasing a large block of securities that would be more difficult to acquire by direct market purchases. If the Funds hold a call option rather than the underlying security itself, the Funds are partially protected from any unexpected decline in the market price of the underlying security and in such event could allow the call option to expire, incurring a loss only to the extent of the premium paid for the option. Using a futures contract would not offer such partial protection against market declines and the Funds may experience a loss as if they had owned the underlying security.

In addition, the Funds may invest in Participation Notes or P-Notes which are issued by banks or broker-dealers and are designed to offer a return linked to the performance of a particular underlying equity security or market. P-Notes can have the characteristics or take the form of various instruments, including, but not limited to, certificates or warrants. The holder of a P-Note that is linked to a particular underlying security is entitled to receive any dividends paid in connection with the underlying security. However, the holder of a P-Note generally does not receive voting rights as it would if it directly owned the underlying security. P-Notes constitute direct, general and unsecured contractual obligations of the banks or broker-dealers that issue them, which therefore subject a Fund to counterparty risk, as discussed below. Investments in P-Notes involve certain risks in addition to those associated with a direct investment in the underlying foreign companies or foreign securities markets whose return they seek to replicate. For instance, there can be no assurance that the trading price of a P-Note will equal the underlying value of the foreign company or foreign securities market that it seeks to replicate. As the purchaser of a P-Note, a Fund is relying on the creditworthiness of the counterparty issuing the P-Note and has no rights under a P-Note against the issuer of the underlying security. Therefore, if such counterparty were to become insolvent, a Fund would lose its investment. The risk that a Fund may lose its investments due to the insolvency of a single counterparty may be amplified to the extent the Fund purchases P-Notes issued by one issuer or a small number of issuers. P-Notes also include transaction costs in addition to those applicable to a direct investment in securities.

Due to liquidity and transfer restrictions, the secondary markets on which P-Notes are traded may be less liquid than the markets for other securities, which may lead to the absence of readily available market quotations for securities in a Fund’s portfolio. The ability of a Fund to value its securities becomes more difficult and the judgment in the application of fair value procedures may play a greater role in the valuation of a Fund’s securities due to reduced availability of reliable objective pricing data. Consequently, while such determinations will be made in good faith, it may nevertheless be more difficult for a Fund to accurately assign a daily value to such securities.

Under Rule 18f-4 (the “derivatives rule”), funds need to trade derivatives and other transactions that create future fund payment or delivery obligations subject to a value-at-risk (“VaR”) leverage limit, and certain derivatives risk management program and reporting requirements. Generally, these requirements apply unless a fund qualifies as a “limited derivatives user,”

as defined in the derivatives rule. Under the derivatives rule, when a fund trades reverse repurchase agreements or similar financing transactions, including certain tender option bonds, it needs to aggregate the amount of indebtedness associated with the reverse repurchase agreements or similar financing transactions with the aggregate amount of any other senior securities representing indebtedness when calculating the fund's asset coverage ratio or treat all such transactions as derivatives transactions. Reverse repurchase agreements or similar financing transactions aggregated with other indebtedness do not need to be included in the calculation of whether a fund is a limited derivatives user, but for funds subject to the VaR testing, reverse repurchase agreements and similar financing transactions must be included for purposes of such testing whether treated as derivatives transactions or not. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") also provided guidance in connection with the derivatives rule regarding use of securities lending collateral that may limit a fund's securities lending activities. In addition, under the derivatives rule, the Fund is permitted to invest in a security on a when-issued or forward-settling basis, or with a non-standard settlement cycle, and the transaction will be deemed not to involve a senior security under the 1940 Act, provided that (i) the Fund intends to physically settle the transaction and (ii) the transaction will settle within 35 days of its trade date (the "Delayed-Settlement Securities Provision"). The Fund may otherwise engage in such transactions that do not meet the conditions of the Delayed-Settlement Securities Provision so long as the Fund treats any such transaction as a "derivatives transaction" for purposes of compliance with the derivatives rule. Furthermore, under the derivatives rule, the Fund will be permitted to enter into an unfunded commitment agreement, and such unfunded commitment agreement will not be subject to the asset coverage requirements under the 1940 Act, if the Fund reasonably believes, at the time it enters into such agreement, that it will have sufficient cash and cash equivalents to meet its obligations with respect to all such agreements as they come due.

DIRECT INVESTMENTS

The Funds, except VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund, may not invest more than 10% of their total assets in direct investments. Direct investments include (i) the private purchase from an enterprise of an equity interest in the enterprise, and (ii) the purchase of such an equity interest in an enterprise from an investor in the enterprise. In each case, a Fund may, at the time of making an investment, enter into a shareholder or similar agreement with the enterprise and one or more other holders of equity interests in the enterprise.

Certain of the Funds' direct investments may include investments in smaller, less seasoned companies. These companies may have limited product lines, markets or financial resources, or they may be dependent on a limited management group. In some cases, the Funds' direct investments may fund new start-up operations for an enterprise.

Direct investments may involve a high degree of business and financial risk that can result in substantial losses. Because of the absence of any public trading market for these investments, the Funds may take longer to liquidate these positions than would be the case for publicly traded securities. Although these securities may be resold in privately negotiated transactions, the prices on these sales could be less than those originally paid by the Funds. Furthermore, issuers whose securities are not publicly traded may not be subject to public disclosure and other investor protection requirements applicable to publicly traded securities. If such securities are required to be registered under the securities laws of one or more jurisdictions before being resold, the Funds may be required to bear the expense of the registration. Direct investments are generally considered illiquid and will be aggregated with other illiquid investments for purposes of the limitation on illiquid investments. Direct investments can be difficult to price. The pricing of direct investments may not be reflective of the price at which these assets could be liquidated.

EQUITY SECURITIES

The Funds may invest in equity securities. Equity securities, such as common stock, represent an ownership interest, or the right to acquire an ownership interest, in an issuer.

Common stock generally takes the form of shares in a corporation. The value of a company's stock may fall as a result of factors directly relating to that company, such as decisions made by its management or lower demand for the company's products or services. A stock's value also may fall because of factors affecting not just the company, but also companies in the same industry or in a number of different industries, such as increases in production costs. The value of a company's stock also may be affected by changes in financial markets that are relatively unrelated to the company or its industry, such as changes in interest rates or currency exchange rates. In addition, a company's stock generally pays dividends only after the company invests in its own business and makes required payments to holders of its bonds, other debt and preferred stock. For this reason, the value of a company's stock usually reacts more strongly than its bonds, other debt and preferred stock to actual or perceived changes in the company's financial condition or prospects. Stocks of smaller companies may be more vulnerable to adverse developments than those of larger companies. Stocks of companies that the portfolio manager believes are fast-growing may trade at a higher multiple of current earnings than other stocks. The value of such stocks may be more sensitive to changes in current or expected earnings than the values of other stocks.

Different types of equity securities provide different voting and dividend rights and priority in the event of the bankruptcy and/or insolvency of the issuer. In addition to common stock, equity securities may include preferred stock, convertible securities and warrants, which are discussed elsewhere in the Prospectus and this Statement of Additional Information. Equity securities other than common stock are subject to many of the same risks as common stock, although possibly to different degrees.

Environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) considerations, may be utilized as a component of a Fund’s investment process to implement its investment strategy in pursuit of its investment objective. ESG factors may be incorporated to evaluate an issuer, as part of risk analysis, opportunity analysis, or in other manners. ESG factors may vary across types of investments and issuers, and not every ESG factor may be identified or evaluated. The incorporation of ESG factors may affect a Fund’s exposure to certain issuers or industries and may not work as intended. A Fund may underperform other funds that do not assess an issuer’s ESG factors as part of the investment process or that use a different methodology to identify and/or incorporate ESG factors. Because ESG considerations may be used as one part of an overall investment process, a Fund may still invest in securities of issuers that are not considered ESG-focused or that may be viewed as having a high ESG risk profile. As investors can differ in their views regarding ESG factors, a Fund may invest in issuers that do not reflect the views with respect to ESG of any particular investor. Information used by a Fund to evaluate such factors, including information from reliance on third-party research and/or proprietary research, may not be readily available, complete or accurate, and may vary across providers and issuers as ESG is not a uniformly defined characteristic, which could negatively impact a Fund’s ability to accurately assess an issuer, which could negatively impact a Fund’s performance. There is no guarantee that the evaluation of ESG considerations will be additive to a Fund’s performance.

FOREIGN SECURITIES

Foreign securities include securities issued by a foreign government, quasi-government or corporate entity, traded in foreign currencies or issued by companies with most of their business interests in foreign countries. Investors should recognize that investing in foreign securities involves certain special considerations that are not typically associated with investing in United States securities. Since investments in foreign companies frequently involve currencies of foreign countries, and since the Funds may hold securities and funds in foreign currencies, the Funds may be affected favorably or unfavorably by changes in currency rates and in exchange control regulations, if any, and may incur costs in connection with conversions between various currencies. Most foreign stock markets, while growing in volume of trading activity, have less volume than the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), and securities of some foreign companies may be less liquid and more volatile than securities of comparable domestic companies. Similarly, volume and liquidity in most foreign bond markets may be less than in the United States, and at times volatility of price can be greater than in the United States. Fixed commissions on foreign securities exchanges are generally higher than negotiated commissions on United States exchanges. There is generally less government supervision and regulation of securities exchanges, brokers and listed companies in foreign countries than in the United States. In addition, with respect to certain foreign countries, there is the possibility of exchange control restrictions, expropriation or confiscatory taxation, political, economic or social instability, which could affect investments in those countries. Foreign securities such as those purchased by the Funds may be subject to foreign government taxes, higher custodian fees, higher brokerage commissions and dividend collection fees which could reduce the yield on such securities.

Trading in futures contracts traded on foreign commodity exchanges may be subject to the same or similar risks as trading in foreign securities.

FOREIGN SECURITIES – EMERGING MARKET SECURITIES

The Funds may have a substantial portion of their assets invested in emerging markets. The Adviser has broad discretion to identify countries that it considers to qualify as emerging markets. The Adviser selects emerging market countries and currencies that the Funds will invest in based on the Adviser’s evaluation of economic fundamentals, legal structure, political developments and other specific factors the Adviser believes to be relevant. An instrument may qualify as an emerging market debt security if it is either (i) issued by an emerging market government, quasi-government or corporate entity (regardless of the currency in which it is denominated) or (ii) denominated in the currency of an emerging market country (regardless of the location of the issuer).

Investing in the equity and fixed income markets of emerging market countries involves exposure to potentially unstable governments, the risk of nationalization of businesses, restrictions on foreign ownership, prohibitions on repatriation of assets and a system of laws that may offer less protection of property rights. Emerging market economies may be based on only a few industries, may be highly vulnerable to changes in local and global trade conditions, and may suffer from extreme and volatile debt burdens or inflation rates.

Additionally, the government in an emerging market country may restrict or control to varying degrees the ability of foreign investors to invest in securities of issuers located or operating in such emerging market countries. These restrictions

and/or controls may at times limit or prevent foreign investment in securities of issuers located or operating in emerging market countries. In addition, a Fund may not be able to buy or sell securities or receive full value for such securities. Moreover, certain emerging market countries may require governmental approval or special licenses prior to investments by foreign investors and may limit the amount of investments by foreign investors in a particular industry and/or issuer; may limit such foreign investment to a certain class of securities of an issuer that may have less advantageous rights than the classes available for purchase by domiciliaries of such emerging market countries; and/or may impose additional taxes on foreign investors. A delay in obtaining a required government approval or a license would delay investments in those emerging market countries, and, as a result, a Fund may not be able to invest in certain securities while approval is pending. The government of certain emerging market countries may also withdraw or decline to renew a license that enables a Fund to invest in such country. These factors make investing in issuers located or operating in emerging market countries significantly riskier than investing in issuers located or operating in more developed countries, and any one of them could cause a decline in the value of a Fund's shares.

Additionally, investments in issuers located in certain emerging market countries may be subject to a greater degree of risk associated with governmental approval in connection with the repatriation of investment income, capital or the proceeds of sales of securities by foreign investors. Moreover, there is the risk that if the balance of payments in an emerging market country declines, the government of such country may impose temporary restrictions on foreign capital remittances. Consequently, a Fund could be adversely affected by delays in, or a refusal to grant, required governmental approval for repatriation of capital, as well as by the application to the Fund of any restrictions on investments. Furthermore, investments in emerging market countries may require a Fund to adopt special procedures, seek local government approvals or take other actions, each of which may involve additional costs to a Fund.

The securities markets in emerging markets are substantially smaller, less liquid and more volatile than the major securities markets in the United States. A high proportion of the shares of many issuers may be held by a limited number of persons and financial institutions, which may limit the number of shares available for investment by the portfolio. Similarly, volume and liquidity in the bond markets in Asia, Eastern and Central Europe and other emerging markets are less than in the United States and, at times, price volatility can be greater than in the United States. A limited number of issuers in Asian and emerging market securities markets may represent a disproportionately large percentage of market capitalization and trading value. The limited liquidity of securities markets in these regions may also affect a Fund's ability to acquire or dispose of securities at the price and time it wishes to do so. Accordingly, during periods of rising securities prices in the more illiquid regions' securities markets, a Fund's ability to participate fully in such price increases may be limited by its investment policy of investing not more than 15% of its net assets in illiquid investments. Conversely, the inability of a Fund to dispose fully and promptly of positions in declining markets may cause a Fund's net asset values to decline as the values of the unsold positions are marked to lower prices. In addition, these securities markets are susceptible to being influenced by large investors trading significant blocks of securities. Also, stockbrokers and other intermediaries in emerging markets may not perform in the same way as their counterparts in the United States and other more developed securities markets. The prices at which a Fund may acquire investments may be affected by trading by persons with material non-public information and by securities transactions by brokers in anticipation of transactions by the Fund in particular securities.

The Funds may invest in Latin American, Asian, Eurasian and other countries with emerging economies or securities markets. Political and economic structures in many such countries may be undergoing significant evolution and rapid development, and such countries may lack the social, political and economic stability characteristics of the United States. Certain such countries have in the past failed to recognize private property rights and have at times nationalized or expropriated the assets of private companies. As a result, the risks described above, including the risks of nationalization or expropriation of assets, may be heightened. In addition, unanticipated political or social developments may affect the value of a Fund's investments in those countries and the availability to a Fund of additional investments in those countries. Emerging market countries may have different accounting, auditing and financial reporting standards and may employ other regulatory practices and requirements as compared to more developed markets.

The Russian, Eastern and Central European, Chinese and Taiwanese stock markets are undergoing a period of growth and change which may result in trading volatility and difficulties in the settlement and recording of transactions, and in interpreting and applying the relevant law and regulations.

Certain Risks of Investing in Asia-Pacific Countries. In addition to the risks of foreign investing and the risks of investing in developing markets, the developing market Asia-Pacific countries in which a Fund may invest are subject to certain additional or specific risks. A Fund may make substantial investments in Asia-Pacific countries. In many of these markets, there is a high concentration of market capitalization and trading volume in a small number of issuers representing a limited number of industries, as well as a high concentration of investors and financial intermediaries. Many of these markets also may be affected by developments with respect to more established markets in the region such as in Japan and Hong Kong. Brokers in developing market Asia-Pacific countries typically are fewer in number and less well capitalized than brokers in the United

States. These factors, combined with the U.S. regulatory requirements for open-end investment companies, result in potentially fewer investment opportunities for the Fund and may have an adverse impact on the investment performance of a Fund.

Many of the developing market Asia-Pacific countries may be subject to a greater degree of economic, political and social instability than is the case in the United States and Western European countries. Such instability may result from, among other things: (i) authoritarian governments or military involvement in political and economic decision-making, including changes in government through extra-constitutional means; (ii) popular unrest associated with demands for improved political, economic and social conditions; (iii) internal insurgencies; (iv) hostile relations with neighboring countries; and (v) ethnic, religious and racial disaffection. Public health crises or major health-related developments may have a substantial impact on the economy of certain Asian-Pacific countries. Outbreaks of contagious viruses and diseases, including the novel viruses commonly known as SARS, MERS, and Covid-19 (Coronavirus), may reduce business activity or disrupt market activity, and have the potential to exacerbate market risks such as volatility in exchange rates or the trading of Asian-Pacific securities listed domestically or abroad. In addition, the governments of many of such countries, such as Indonesia, have a substantial role in regulating and supervising the economy. Another risk common to most such countries is that the economy is heavily export oriented and, accordingly, is dependent upon international trade. The existence of overburdened infrastructure and obsolete financial systems also presents risks in certain countries, as do environmental problems. Certain economies also depend to a significant degree upon exports of primary commodities and, therefore, are vulnerable to changes in commodity prices that, in turn, may be affected by a variety of factors.

Governments of many developing market Asia-Pacific countries have exercised and continue to exercise substantial influence over many aspects of the private sector. In certain cases, the government owns or controls many companies, including the largest in the country. Accordingly, government actions in the future could have a significant effect on economic conditions in developing market Asia-Pacific countries, which could affect private sector companies and a Fund itself, as well as the value of securities in the Fund's portfolio. In addition, economic statistics of developing market Asia-Pacific countries may be less reliable than economic statistics of more developed nations.

Investments through Stock Connect. VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund may invest in A-shares listed and traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange through the Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect Program and the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Stock Connect Program (together, "Stock Connect"), or on such other stock exchanges in China which participate in Stock Connect from time to time or in the future. Trading through Stock Connect is subject to a number of restrictions that may affect the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund's investments and returns. For example, trading through Stock Connect is subject to daily quotas that limit the maximum daily net purchases on any particular day, which may restrict or preclude the Fund's ability to invest in Stock Connect A-shares. In addition, investments made through Stock Connect are subject to trading, clearance and settlement procedures that are relatively untested in the PRC, which could pose risks to the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund. Furthermore, securities purchased via Stock Connect are generally held via a book entry omnibus account in the name of Hong Kong Securities Clearing Company Limited ("HKSCC"), Hong Kong's clearing entity, at the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited ("CSDCC"). The VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund's ownership interest in Stock Connect securities will not be reflected directly in book entry with CSDCC and will instead only be reflected on the books of its Hong Kong sub-custodian. The VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund may therefore depend on HKSCC's ability or willingness as record-holder of Stock Connect securities to enforce the Fund's shareholder rights. PRC law did not historically recognize the concept of beneficial ownership; while PRC regulations and the Hong Kong Stock Exchange have issued clarifications and guidance supporting the concept of beneficial ownership via Stock Connect, the interpretation of beneficial ownership in the PRC by regulators and courts may continue to evolve. Moreover, Stock Connect A-shares generally may not be sold, purchased or otherwise transferred other than through Stock Connect in accordance with applicable rules.

A primary feature of Stock Connect is the application of the home market's laws and rules applicable to investors in A-shares. Therefore, the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund's investments in Stock Connect A-shares are generally subject to PRC securities regulations and listing rules, among other restrictions. The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, Shenzhen Stock Exchange ("SZSE") and Shanghai Stock Exchange ("SSE") reserve the right to suspend trading if necessary for ensuring an orderly and fair market and managing risks prudently, which could adversely affect the VanEck VIP Emerging Market Fund's ability to access the mainland China market. A stock may be recalled from the scope of eligible SSE securities or SZSE securities for trading via the Stock Connect for various reasons, and in such event, the stock can only be sold but is restricted from being bought. Stock Connect is only available on days when markets in both the PRC and Hong Kong are open, which may limit the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund's ability to trade when it would be otherwise attractive to do so.

Since the inception of Stock Connect, foreign investors (including the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund) investing in A-shares through Stock Connect would be temporarily exempt from the PRC corporate income tax and value-added tax on the gains on disposal of such A-shares. Dividends would be subject to PRC corporate income tax on a withholding basis at 10%, unless reduced under a double tax treaty with China upon application to and obtaining approval from the competent tax authority. Aside from these temporary measures, uncertainties in permanent PRC tax rules governing taxation of income and

gains from investments in Stock Connect A-shares could result in unexpected tax liabilities for the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund.

The VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund may, through the Stock Connect, access securities listed on the ChiNext market and STAR Board of the SZSE. Listed companies on the ChiNext market and STAR Board are usually of an emerging nature with smaller operating scale. Listed companies on the ChiNext Market and STAR Board are subject to wider price fluctuation limits and due to higher entry thresholds for investors, may have limited liquidity, compared to other boards. They are subject to higher fluctuation in stock prices and liquidity and have higher risks and turnover ratios than companies listed on the main board of the SZSE. Securities listed on the ChiNext Market may be overvalued and such exceptionally high valuation may not be sustainable. Stock prices may be more susceptible to manipulation due to fewer circulating shares. It may be more common and faster for companies listed on the ChiNext to delist. This may have an adverse impact on the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund if the companies that it invests in are delisted. Also, the rules and regulations regarding companies listed on ChiNext Market and STAR Board are less stringent in terms of profitability and share capital than those on the main board. Investments in the ChiNext Market and STAR Board may result in significant losses for the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund and its investors. STAR Board is a newly established board and may have a limited number of listed companies during the initial stage. Investments in STAR board may be concentrated in a small number of stocks and subject the Fund to higher concentration risk.

The Stock Connect only operates on days when both the PRC and Hong Kong markets are open for trading and when banks in both markets are open on the corresponding settlement days. So it is possible that there are occasions when it is a normal trading day for the PRC market but the Fund cannot carry out any China A-Shares trading via the Stock Connect. The Fund may be subject to a risk of price fluctuations in China A-Shares during the time when any of the Stock Connect is not trading as a result.

PRC regulations require that before an investor sells any share, there should be sufficient shares in the account; otherwise the SSE or SZSE will reject the sell order concerned. SEHK will carry out pre-trade checking on China A-Shares sell orders of its participants (i.e. the stock brokers) to ensure there is no over-selling. If the Fund intends to sell certain China A-Shares it holds, it must transfer those China A-Shares to the respective accounts of its broker(s) before the market opens on the day of selling ("trading day"). If it fails to meet this deadline, it will not be able to sell those shares on the trading day. Because of this requirement, the Fund may not be able to dispose of its holdings of China A-Shares in a timely manner.

The Stock Connect program is a relatively new program and may be subject to further interpretation and guidance. There can be no assurance as to the program's continued existence or whether future developments regarding the program may restrict or adversely affect the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund's investments or returns. In addition, the application and interpretation of the laws and regulations of Hong Kong and the PRC, and the rules, policies or guidelines published or applied by relevant regulators and exchanges in respect of the Stock Connect program are uncertain, and they may have a detrimental effect on the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund's investments and returns. Moreover, the rules and regulations may have potential retrospective effect. There can be no assurance that the Stock Connects will not be abolished. Investments in mainland China markets through the Stock Connects may adversely affect the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund as a result of such changes.

Investments through Bond Connect. The VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund may invest in Renminbi ("RMB")-denominated bonds issued in the PRC by Chinese credit, government, and quasi-governmental issuers ("RMB Bonds"). RMB Bonds are available through the "Mutual Bond Market Access between Mainland China and Hong Kong" ("Bond Connect") program. The VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund's investments in bonds will be subject to a number of additional risks and restrictions that may affect the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund's investments and returns.

Bond Connect Risks (*VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund only*)

The "Mutual Bond Market Access between Mainland China and Hong Kong" ("Bond Connect") program is a new initiative established by China Foreign Exchange Trade System & National Interbank Funding Centre ("CFETS"), CSDCC, Shanghai Clearing House ("SHCH"), and Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited ("HKEx") and Central Moneymarkets Unit ("CMU") of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority ("HKMA") to facilitate investors from Mainland China and Hong Kong to trade in each other's bond markets through connection between the Mainland China and Hong Kong financial institutions.

Laws, rules, regulations, policies, notices, circulars or guidelines relating to the Bond Connect (the "Applicable Bond Connect Regulations") as published or applied by any of the Bond Connect Authorities (as defined below) are untested and are subject to change from time to time. There can be no assurance that the Bond Connect will not be restricted, suspended or abolished. If such event occurs, the Fund's ability to invest in the CIBM through the Bond Connect will be adversely affected, and if the Fund is unable to adequately access the CIBM through other means, the Fund's ability to achieve its investment objective will be adversely affected. "Bond Connect Authorities" refers to the exchanges, trading systems, settlement systems, governmental, regulatory or tax bodies which provide services and/or regulate Bond Connect and activities relating to Bond

Connect, including, without limitation, the PBOC, the HKMA, the HKEx, the CEFTS, the CMU, the CSDCC and the SHCH and any other regulator, agency or authority with jurisdiction, authority or responsibility in respect of Bond Connect.

Under the prevailing Applicable Bond Connect Regulations, eligible foreign investors who wish to participate in the Bond Connect may do so through an offshore custody agent, registration agent or other third parties (as the case may be), who would be responsible for making the relevant filings and account opening with the relevant authorities. The Fund is therefore subject to the risk of default or errors on the part of such agents.

Trading through the Bond Connect is performed through trading platforms and operational systems. There is no assurance that such systems will function properly (in particular, under extreme market conditions) or will continue to be adapted to changes and developments in the market. In the event that the relevant systems fails to function properly, trading through the Bond Connect may be disrupted. The Fund's ability to trade through the Bond Connect (and hence to pursue its investment strategy) may therefore be adversely affected.

The CMU (i.e. the HKMA) is the "nominee holder" of the bonds acquired by the Fund through the Bond Connect. Whilst the Bond Connect Authorities have expressly stated that investors will enjoy the rights and interests of the bonds acquired through the Bond Connect in accordance with applicable laws, the exercise and the enforcement of beneficial ownership rights over such bonds in the courts in China is yet to be tested. In addition, in the event that the nominee holder (i.e. the HKMA) becomes insolvent, such bonds may form part of the pool of assets of the nominee holder available for distribution to its creditors and the Fund, as a beneficial owner, may have no rights whatsoever in respect thereof.

Chinese Variable Interest Entities Risks

Chinese operating companies sometimes rely on variable interest entity ("VIE") structures to raise capital from non-Chinese investors. In a VIE structure, a China-based operating company establishes an entity (typically offshore) that enters into service and other contracts with the Chinese company designed to provide economic exposure to the company. The offshore entity then issues exchange-traded shares that are sold to the public, including non-Chinese investors (such as a Fund). Shares of the offshore entity are not equity ownership interests in the Chinese operating company and therefore the ability of the offshore entity to control the activities of the Chinese company are limited and the Chinese company may engage in activities that negatively impact investment value. The VIE structure is designed to provide the offshore entity (and in turn, investors in the entity) with economic exposure to the Chinese company that replicates equity ownership, without actual equity ownership. VIE structures are used due to Chinese government prohibitions on foreign ownership of companies in certain industries and it is not clear that the contracts are enforceable or that the structures will otherwise work as intended.

Intervention by the Chinese government with respect to VIE structures could adversely affect the Chinese operating company's performance, the enforceability of the offshore entity's contractual arrangements with the Chinese company and the value of the offshore entity's shares. Further, if the Chinese government determines that the agreements establishing the VIE structure do not comply with Chinese law and regulations, including those related to prohibitions on foreign ownership, the Chinese government could subject the Chinese company to penalties, revocation of business and operating licenses or forfeiture of ownership interests. The offshore entity's control over the Chinese company may also be jeopardized if certain legal formalities are not observed in connection with the agreements, if the agreements are breached or if the agreements are otherwise determined not to be enforceable. If any of the foregoing were to occur, the market value of a Fund's associated portfolio holdings would likely fall, causing substantial investment losses for the Fund.

In addition, Chinese companies listed on U.S. exchanges, including ADRs and companies that rely on VIE structures, may be delisted if they do not meet U.S. accounting standards and auditor oversight requirements. Delisting could significantly decrease the liquidity and value of the securities of these companies, decrease the ability of a Fund to invest in such securities and increase the cost of the Fund if it is required to seek alternative markets in which to invest in such securities.

Risks Relating to Investing in India (*VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund only*)

Investments in securities of Indian issuers involve risks and special considerations not typically associated with investments in the U.S. securities markets. Such heightened risks include, among others, greater government control over the economy, political and legal uncertainty, competition from low-cost issuers of other emerging economies in Asia, currency fluctuations or blockage of foreign currency exchanges and the risk of nationalization or expropriation of assets. Large portions of many Indian companies remain in the hands of individuals and corporate governance standards of Indian companies may be weaker and less transparent, which may increase the risk of loss and unequal treatment of investors. In addition, religious and border disputes persist in India. India has experienced civil unrest and hostilities with neighboring countries, including Pakistan, and the Indian government has confronted separatist movements in several Indian states. India has also experienced acts of terrorism that have targeted foreigners, which have had a negative impact on tourism, an important sector of the Indian economy. India has tested nuclear arms, and the threat of deployment of such weapons could hinder development of the Indian economy and escalating tensions could impact the broader region.

The Indian securities markets are smaller and less liquid than securities markets in more developed economies and are subject to greater price volatility. Issuers in India are subject to less stringent requirements regarding accounting, auditing and financial reporting than are issuers in more developed markets, and therefore, all material information may not be available or reliable. India also has less developed clearance and settlement procedures, and there have been times when settlements have been unable to keep pace with the volume of securities and have been significantly delayed. Indian stock exchanges have experienced problems such as temporary exchange closures, broker defaults, settlement delays and strikes by brokers that have affected the market price and liquidity of the securities of Indian companies. In addition, the governing bodies of the Indian stock exchanges have from time to time restricted securities from trading, limited price movements and restricted margin requirements. Further, from time to time, disputes have occurred between listed companies and the Indian stock exchanges and other regulatory bodies that, in some cases, have had a negative effect on market sentiment. In addition, inflation in India may be at very high levels. High inflation may lead to the adoption of corrective measures designed to moderate growth, regulate prices of staples and other commodities and otherwise contain inflation. Such measures could inhibit economic activity in India. Additionally, each of the factors described below could have a negative impact on the Fund's performance and increase the volatility of the Fund.

Economic Risk. The Indian government has exercised and continues to exercise significant influence over many aspects of the economy, and the number of public sector enterprises in India is substantial. Accordingly, Indian government actions in the future could have a significant effect on the Indian economy. The Indian government has experienced chronic structural public sector deficits. High amounts of debt and public spending could have an adverse impact on India's economy. Services are the major source of economic growth, accounting for half of India's output with less than one quarter of its labor force. Additionally, the Indian economy may be dependent upon agriculture. About two thirds of the workforce is in agriculture. The Fund's investments may be susceptible to adverse weather changes including the threat of monsoons and other natural disasters. Despite strong growth, the World Bank and others express concern about the combined state and federal budget deficit.

Regulatory Risk. A foreign portfolio investor ("FPI") in India is subject to certain restrictions on buying, selling or otherwise dealing in securities.

The Fund is registered as an FPI with the Securities and Exchange Board of India in order to obtain the ability to make and dispose of investments. There can be no assurance that the Fund will continue to qualify for the FPI license. Loss of the FPI registration could adversely impact the ability of the Fund to make investments in India. The Securities and Exchange Board of India imposes certain limitations on participation in an FPI. The Fund may compulsorily redeem units held by such investor(s) or take other actions in order to comply with applicable Indian law.

Investment and Repatriation Restrictions. The Central Government and the Reserve Bank of India impose certain limits on the foreign ownership of Indian securities. These restrictions and/or controls may at times limit or prevent foreign investment in securities of issuers located or operating in India and may inhibit the Fund's ability to pursue its investment objective.

In the case of an ultimate beneficial owner who has direct or indirect common shareholding/beneficial ownership/beneficial interest of more than 50% in an FPI and an offshore derivative instrument ("ODI") subscriber entity or two or more FPIs/ODI subscribers, the participation through ODIs would be aggregated with the direct holding of FPIs or the other concerned ODI subscribers while determining whether the above investment cap in an Indian company has been triggered.

Tax Risks. The taxation of income and capital gains of the Fund is subject to the fiscal laws and practices of different jurisdictions. Any of those jurisdictions may change their fiscal laws and practices (or interpretation thereof) and enforcement policies, possibly with retroactive effect.

a. *Indirect Transfer Risk:* Indian capital gains tax can be imposed on income arising from the transfer of shares in a company registered outside India which derives, directly or indirectly, its value substantially from the assets located in India. Being a Category I FPI, the Fund is currently exempt from the application of these rules. In case of loss of the Fund's registration as a Category I FPI or changes in Indian rules, the Fund could be subject to the indirect transfer tax provisions in the future.

b. *Exposure to Permanent Establishment ("PE"):* While the Fund believes that its activities should not create a PE in India, the Indian tax authorities may claim that these activities have resulted in a PE in India. Under such circumstances, the profits of the Fund to the extent attributable to the PE would be subject to taxation in India.

c. *Exposure to Place of Effective Management ("POEM") risk:* While the Fund believes that its activities or the activities of the Adviser described in the Prospectus or this SAI should not lead to a situation where the POEM of the Fund or the Adviser is considered to be in India, there may be a risk that the Indian tax authorities will claim that these activities have resulted in a POEM of the Fund and/or the Adviser in India. If for any reason the activities are held to be a POEM of the Fund and/or the Adviser in India, then the worldwide profits of the Fund would be subject to taxation in India.

FOREIGN SECURITIES – FOREIGN CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS

Although the Funds value their assets daily in terms of U.S. dollars, they do not generally physically convert their holdings of foreign currencies into U.S. dollars on a daily basis. The Funds may do so from time to time, and investors should be aware of the costs of currency conversion. Although foreign exchange dealers do not charge a fee for conversion, they do realize a profit based on the difference (the “spread”) between the prices at which they are buying and selling various currencies. Thus, a dealer may offer to sell a foreign currency to the Funds at one rate, while offering a lesser rate of exchange should the Funds desire to resell that currency to the dealer. The Funds may use forward contracts, along with futures contracts, foreign exchange swaps and put and call options (all types of derivatives) as part of their overall hedging strategy. The Funds generally conduct their foreign currency exchange transactions, either on a spot (i.e., cash) basis at the spot rate prevailing in the foreign currency exchange market, or through purchasing put and call options on, or entering into futures contracts or forward contracts to purchase or sell foreign currencies. See “Options, Futures, Warrants and Subscription Rights.”

Changes in currency exchange rates may affect the Funds’ net asset value and performance. The Adviser may not be able to anticipate currency fluctuations in exchange rates accurately. The Funds may invest in a variety of derivatives and enter into hedging transactions to attempt to moderate the effect of currency fluctuations. The Funds may purchase and sell put and call options on, or enter into futures contracts or forward contracts to purchase or sell foreign currencies. This may reduce a Fund’s losses on a security when a foreign currency’s value changes. Hedging against a change in the value of a foreign currency does not eliminate fluctuations in the prices of portfolio securities or prevent losses if the prices of such securities decline. Furthermore, such hedging transactions reduce or preclude the opportunity for gain if the value of the hedged currency should change relative to the other currency. Finally, when the Funds use options and futures in anticipation of the purchase of a portfolio security to hedge against adverse movements in the security’s underlying currency, but the purchase of such security is subsequently deemed undesirable, a Fund may incur a gain or loss on the option or futures contract.

The Funds may enter into forward contracts to duplicate a cash market transaction. See also “Options, Futures, Warrants and Subscription Rights.”

A Fund may (but is not required to) engage in these transactions in order to protect against uncertainty in the level of future foreign exchange rates in the purchase and sale of securities. A Fund may also use foreign currency options and foreign currency forward contracts to increase exposure to a foreign currency or to shift exposure to foreign currency fluctuations from one country to another. Suitable currency hedging transactions may not be available in all circumstances and the Adviser may decide not to use hedging transactions that are available.

In those situations where foreign currency options or futures contracts, or options on futures contracts may not be readily purchased (or where they may be deemed illiquid or unattractive) in the primary currency in which the hedge is desired, the hedge may be obtained by purchasing or selling an option, futures contract or forward contract on a secondary currency. There can be no assurances that the exchange rate or the primary and secondary currencies will move as anticipated, or that the relationship between the hedged security and the hedging instrument will continue. If they do not move as anticipated or the relationship does not continue, a loss may result to a Fund on its investments in the hedging positions.

A forward foreign currency exchange contract involves an obligation to purchase or sell a specific currency at a future date, which may be any fixed number of days from the date of the contract agreed upon by the parties, at a price set at the time of the contract. Although forwards are intended to minimize the risk of loss due to a decline in the value of the hedged currencies, at the same time, they tend to limit any potential gain which might result should the value of such currencies increase.

The forecasting of currency market movement is extremely difficult, and whether any hedging strategy will be successful is highly uncertain. Moreover, it is impossible to forecast with precision the market value of portfolio securities at the expiration of a foreign currency forward contract. Accordingly, a Fund may be required to buy or sell additional currency on the spot market (and bear the expense of such transaction) if the Adviser’s predictions regarding the movement of foreign currency or securities markets prove inaccurate. In addition, the use of cross-hedging transactions may involve special risks, and may leave the Fund in a less advantageous position than if such a hedge had not been established.

At the maturity of a forward contract, the Funds may either sell the portfolio security and make delivery of the foreign currency, or they may retain the security and terminate their contractual obligation to deliver the foreign currency prior to maturity by purchasing an “offsetting” contract with the same currency trader, obligating it to purchase, on the same maturity date, the same amount of the foreign currency. There can be no assurance, however, that the Funds will be able to effect such a closing purchase transaction.

It is impossible to forecast the market value of a particular portfolio security at the expiration of the contract. Accordingly, if a decision is made to sell the security and make delivery of the foreign currency it may be necessary for a Fund to purchase additional foreign currency on the spot market (and bear the expense of such purchase) if the market value of the security is less than the amount of foreign currency that a Fund is obligated to deliver.

If a Fund retains the portfolio security and engages in an offsetting transaction, the Fund may incur a gain or a loss to the extent that there has been movement in forward contract prices. Additionally, although such contracts tend to minimize the risk of loss due to a decline in the value of the hedged currency, at the same time, they tend to limit any potential gain which might result should the value of such currency increase.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

The Funds may take advantage of opportunities in the area of options, futures contracts, options on futures contracts, warrants, swaps and any other investments which are not presently contemplated for use or which are not currently available, but which may be developed, to the extent such investments are considered suitable for the Funds by the Adviser.

GLOBAL RESOURCES SECURITIES

Global resources securities include securities of global resource companies and instruments that derive their value from global resources. Global Resources include precious metals (including gold), base and industrial metals, energy (including, but not limited to, gas, petroleum, petrochemicals and other hydrocarbons, and renewable energy resources such as solar, wind, geothermal, or biofuel), natural resources and other commodities. A global resource company is a company that derives, directly or indirectly, at least 50% of its revenues from exploration, development, production, distribution or facilitation of processes relating to global resources.

Since the market action of global resources securities may move against or independently of the market trend of industrial shares, the addition of such securities to an overall portfolio may increase the return and reduce the price fluctuations of such a portfolio. There can be no assurance that an increased rate of return or a reduction in price fluctuations of a portfolio will be achieved. Global resources securities are affected by many factors, including movement in the stock market. Inflation may cause a decline in the market, including global resource securities. The VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund has a fundamental policy of concentrating in “global resource” industries, and more than 50% of the VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund’s assets may be invested in any one of the above sectors. Precious metal and natural resource securities are at times volatile and there may be sharp fluctuations in prices, even during periods of rising prices.

HEDGING

Hedging is a strategy in which a derivative or other instrument or practice is used to offset the risks associated with other Fund holdings. Losses on the other investment may be substantially reduced by gains on a derivative that reacts in an opposite manner to market movements. Hedging can reduce or eliminate gains or cause losses if the market moves in a manner different from that anticipated by a Fund or if the cost of the derivative outweighs the benefit of the hedge. Hedging also involves correlation risk, i.e. the risk that changes in the value of the derivative will not match those of the holdings being hedged as expected by a Fund, in which case any losses on the holdings being hedged may not be reduced or may be increased. The inability to close options and futures positions also could have an adverse impact on a Fund’s ability to hedge effectively its portfolio. There is also a risk of loss by a Fund of margin deposits or collateral in the event of bankruptcy of a broker with whom the Fund has an open position in an option, a futures contract or a related option. There can be no assurance that a Fund’s hedging strategies will be effective. The use of hedging may invoke the application of the mark-to-market and straddle provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”). If such provisions are applicable, there could be an increase (or decrease) in the amount of taxable dividends paid by a Fund and may impact whether dividends paid by the Fund are classified as capital gains or ordinary income. The use of derivatives increases the risk that a Fund will be unable to close out certain hedged positions to avoid adverse tax consequences.

ILLIQUID INVESTMENTS

Each Fund may not acquire any illiquid investment if, immediately after the acquisition, the Fund would have invested more than 15% of its net assets in illiquid investments that are assets. For purposes of the above 15% limitation, illiquid investment means any investment that a Fund reasonably expects cannot be sold or disposed of in current market conditions in seven calendar days or less without the sale or disposition significantly changing the market value of the investment, as determined pursuant to the 1940 Act and applicable rules and regulations thereunder.

INDEXED SECURITIES AND STRUCTURED NOTES

The Funds may invest in indexed securities, i.e., structured notes securities and index options, whose value is linked to one or more currencies, interest rates, commodities, or financial or commodity indices. An indexed security enables the investor to purchase a note whose coupon and/or principal redemption is linked to the performance of an underlying asset. Indexed securities may be positively or negatively indexed (i.e., their value may increase or decrease if the underlying instrument appreciates). Indexed securities may have return characteristics similar to direct investments in the underlying instrument or to one or more options on the underlying instrument. Indexed securities may be more volatile than the underlying instrument itself, and present many of the same risks as investing in futures and options. Indexed securities are also subject to credit risks associated with the issuer of the security with respect to both principal and interest. Securities linked to one or more non-agriculture commodities or commodity indices may be considered global resources securities.

Indexed securities may be publicly traded or may be two-party contracts (such two-party agreements are referred to hereafter collectively as structured notes). When a Fund purchases a structured note, it makes a payment of principal to the counterparty. Some structured notes have a guaranteed repayment of principal while others place a portion (or all) of the principal at risk. Notes determined to be illiquid will be aggregated with other illiquid securities and will be subject to the Funds' limitations on illiquid investments.

Credit Linked Notes. The Funds may invest in credit linked securities or credit linked notes ("CLNs"). CLNs are typically issued by a limited purpose trust or other vehicle (the "CLN trust") that, in turn, invests in a derivative or basket of derivatives instruments, such as credit default swaps, interest rate swaps and/or other securities, in order to provide exposure to certain high yield, sovereign debt, emerging markets, or other fixed income markets. Generally, investments in CLNs represent the right to receive periodic income payments (in the form of distributions) and payment of principal at the end of the term of the CLN. However, these payments are conditioned on the CLN trust's receipt of payments from, and the CLN trust's potential obligations, to the counterparties to the derivative instruments and other securities in which the CLN trust invests. For example, the CLN trust may sell one or more credit default swaps, under which the CLN trust would receive a stream of payments over the term of the swap agreements provided that no event of default has occurred with respect to the referenced debt obligation upon which the swap is based. If a default were to occur, the stream of payments may stop and the CLN trust would be obligated to pay the counterparty the par (or other agreed upon value) of the referenced debt obligation. This, in turn, would reduce the amount of income and principal that the Fund would receive as an investor in the CLN trust. A Fund may also enter in CLNs to gain access to sovereign debt and securities in emerging markets particularly in markets where the Fund is not able to purchase securities directly due to domicile restrictions or tax restrictions or tariffs. In such an instance, the issuer of the CLN may purchase the reference security directly and/or gain exposure through a credit default swap or other derivative. The Fund's investments in CLNs is subject to the risks associated with the underlying reference obligations and derivative instruments.

INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

The Funds may invest in initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock or other primary or secondary syndicated offerings of equity or debt securities issued by a corporate issuer. A purchase of IPO securities often involves higher transaction costs than those associated with the purchase of securities already traded on exchanges or markets. IPO securities are subject to market risk and liquidity risk. The market value of recently issued IPO securities may fluctuate considerably due to factors such as the absence of a prior public market, unseasoned trading and speculation, a potentially small number of securities available for trading, limited information about the issuer, and other factors. A Fund may hold IPO securities for a period of time, or may sell them soon after the purchase. Investments in IPOs could have a magnified impact – either positive or negative – on a Fund's performance while the Fund's assets are relatively small. The impact of an IPO on the Fund's performance may tend to diminish as the Fund's assets grow.

INVESTMENTS IN OTHER INVESTMENT COMPANIES

Each Fund may invest up to 20% of its net assets in securities issued by other investment companies (excluding money market funds), including open end and closed end funds and exchange-traded funds ("ETFs"), subject to the limitations under the 1940 Act. A Fund's investments in money market funds are not subject to this limitation. The Funds may invest in investment companies which are sponsored or advised by the Adviser and/or its affiliates (each, a "VanEck Investment Company").

A Fund's investment in another investment company may subject such Fund indirectly to the underlying risks of the investment company. Such Fund also will bear its share of the underlying investment company's fees and expenses, which are in addition to the Fund's own fees and expenses. Shares of closed-end funds and ETFs may trade at prices that reflect a premium above or a discount below the investment company's net asset value, which may be substantial in the case of closed-end funds. If investment company securities are purchased at a premium to net asset value, the premium may not exist when those securities are sold and the Fund could incur a loss.

Rule 12d1-4 under the 1940 Act, which became effective January 19, 2022, created a regulatory framework for Funds' investments in other funds. Rule 12d1-4 allows a fund to acquire the securities of another investment company in excess of the limitations imposed by Section 12 without obtaining an exemptive order from the SEC, subject to certain limitations and conditions. Among those conditions is the requirement that, prior to a fund relying on Rule 12d1-4 to acquire securities of another fund in excess of the limits of Section 12(d)(1), the acquiring fund must enter into a Fund of Funds Agreement with the acquired fund, unless the acquiring fund's investment adviser acts as the acquired fund's investment adviser and does not act as sub-adviser to either fund. In connection with the adoption of Rule 12d1-4, the SEC also rescinded certain prior exemptive relief. These regulatory changes may adversely impact a Fund's investment strategies and operations to the extent that it invests, or might otherwise have invested, in shares issued by other investment companies.

FLOATING RATE LIBOR RISK

Certain financial instruments in which a Fund invests may pay interest based on, or otherwise have payments tied to, the London Inter-bank Offered Rate ("LIBOR"), Euro Interbank Offered Rate, Secured Overnight Financing Rate ("SOFR"), Sterling Overnight Interbank Average Rate ("SONIA") and other similar types of reference rates (each, a "Reference Rate"). Due to the uncertainty regarding the future utilization of LIBOR and the nature of any replacement rate, the potential effect of a transition away from LIBOR on a fund or the financial instruments in which a Fund may invest cannot yet be determined.

All Sterling, Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, Euro and certain U.S. dollar LIBOR settings ceased to be published at the end of 2021 and the remaining U.S. dollar LIBOR settings will no longer be published after June 30, 2023. Certain U.S. dollar LIBOR settings will continue to be published on a non-representative synthetic basis from July 1, 2023 and will cease on September 30, 2024. A Fund may continue to invest in instruments that reference or otherwise use such Reference Rates until they cease to be published due to favorable liquidity or pricing. These events and any additional regulatory or market changes may have an adverse impact on a Fund or its investments.

In anticipation of the transition away from LIBOR, regulators and market participants have worked to identify or develop successor Reference Rates (e.g., the SOFR, which is likely to replace U.S. dollar LIBOR and spreads (if any) to be utilized in existing contracts or instruments as part of the transition away from LIBOR. Spreads (if any) to be utilized in existing contracts or instruments may be amended through government regulations, market-wide protocols, fallback contractual provisions, bespoke negotiations or amendments or otherwise. Nonetheless, the termination of certain Reference Rates presents risks to the Funds. It is not possible to exhaustively identify or predict the effect of any such changes, any establishment of alternative Reference Rates or any other reforms to Reference Rates that may be enacted in the United States or elsewhere. The elimination of a Reference Rate or any other changes or reforms to the determination or supervision of Reference Rates may affect the value, liquidity, volatility or return on certain Fund investments and may result in costs to a Fund, including costs incurred in connection with closing out positions and entering into new trades, adversely impacting a Fund's overall financial condition or results of operations. The impact of any successor or substitute Reference Rate, if any, will vary on an investment-by-investment basis, and any differences may be material and/or create material economic mismatches. The successor or substitute Reference Rate and any adjustments selected may negatively impact a Fund's investments, performance or financial condition, including in ways unforeseen by the Advisers. In addition, any successor or substitute Reference Rate and any pricing adjustments imposed by a regulator or by counterparties or otherwise may adversely affect a Fund's performance and/or NAV, and may expose a Fund to additional tax, accounting and regulatory risks.

MARKET

A Fund could lose money over short periods due to short-term market movements and over longer periods during more prolonged market downturns. The prices of the securities in a Fund are subject to the risks associated with investing in the securities market, including general economic conditions, sudden and unpredictable drops in value, exchange trading suspensions and closures and public health risks. Market risk arises mainly from uncertainty about future values of financial instruments and may be influenced by price, currency and interest rate movements. These risks may be magnified if certain social, political, economic and other conditions and events (such as natural disasters, epidemics and pandemics, terrorism, conflicts and social unrest) adversely interrupt the global economy; in these and other circumstances, such events or developments might affect companies world-wide. As global systems, economies and financial markets are increasingly interconnected, events that occur in one country, region or financial market will, more frequently, adversely impact issuers in other countries, regions or markets. During a general market downturn, multiple asset classes may be negatively affected. Changes in market conditions and interest rates generally do not have the same impact on all types of securities and instruments.

MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

Other equity securities in which the VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund may invest include master limited partnerships (“MLPs”). MLPs are limited partnerships in which the ownership units are publicly traded. MLP units are registered with the SEC and are freely traded on a securities exchange or in the OTC market. MLPs often own several properties or businesses (or own interests) that are related to oil and gas industries, but they also may finance research and development and other projects. Generally, an MLP is operated under the supervision of one or more managing general partners. Limited partners are not involved in the day-to-day management of the partnership. The risks of investing in an MLP are generally those involved in investing in a partnership as opposed to a corporation. Investments in securities of MLPs involve risks that differ from an investment in common stock. Holders of the units of MLPs have more limited control and limited rights to vote on matters affecting the partnership. There are also certain tax risks associated with an investment in units of MLPs. In addition, conflicts of interest may exist between common unit holders, subordinated unit holders and the general partner of an MLP, including a conflict arising as a result of incentive distribution payments..

OPTIONS, FUTURES, WARRANTS AND SUBSCRIPTION RIGHTS

Options Transactions. Each Fund may purchase and sell (write) exchange-traded and OTC call and put options on domestic and foreign securities, foreign currencies, stock and bond indices and financial futures contracts. VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund may also buy and sell options linked to the price of global resources.

Purchasing Call and Put Options. Each Fund may invest up to 5% of its total assets in premiums on call and put options. The purchase of a call option would enable a Fund, in return for the premium paid, to lock in a purchase price for a security or currency during the term of the option. The purchase of a put option would enable a Fund, in return for a premium paid, to lock in a price at which it may sell a security or currency during the term of the option. OTC options are typically purchased from or sold (written) to dealers or financial institutions which have entered into direct agreements with a Fund. With OTC options, such variables as expiration date, exercise price and premium are typically agreed upon between the Fund and the transacting dealer.

The principal factors affecting the market value of a put or a call option include supply and demand, interest rates, the current market price of the underlying security or index in relation to the exercise price of the option, the volatility of the underlying security or index, and the time remaining until the expiration date. Accordingly, the successful use of options depends on the ability of the Adviser to forecast correctly interest rates, currency exchange rates and/or market movements.

When a Fund sells put or call options it has previously purchased, the Fund may realize a net gain or loss, depending on whether the amount realized on the sale is more or less than the premium and other transaction costs paid on the put or call option which is sold. There is no assurance that a liquid secondary market will exist for options, particularly in the case of OTC options. In the event of the bankruptcy of a broker through which a Fund engages in transactions in options, such Fund could experience delays and/or losses in liquidating open positions purchased or sold through the broker and/or incur a loss of all or part of its margin deposits with the broker. In the case of OTC options, if the transacting dealer fails to make or take delivery of the securities underlying an option it has written, in accordance with the terms of that option, due to insolvency or otherwise, a Fund would lose the premium paid for the option as well as any anticipated benefit of the transaction. If trading were suspended in an option purchased by a Fund, the Fund would not be able to close out the option. If restrictions on exercise were imposed, the Fund might be unable to exercise an option it has purchased.

A call option on a foreign currency gives the purchaser of the option the right to purchase the currency at the exercise price until the option expires. A put option on a foreign currency gives the purchaser of the option the right to sell a foreign currency at the exercise price until the option expires. The markets in foreign currency options are relatively new and the Fund's ability to establish and close out positions on such options is subject to the maintenance of a liquid secondary market. Currency options traded on U.S. or other exchanges may be subject to position limits, which may limit the ability of a Fund to reduce foreign currency risk using such options.

Writing Covered Call and Put Options. Each Fund may write covered call options on portfolio securities to the extent that the value of all securities with respect to which covered calls are written does not exceed 10% of the Fund's net asset value. When a Fund writes a covered call option, the Fund incurs an obligation to sell the security underlying the option to the purchaser of the call, at the option's exercise price at any time during the option period, at the purchaser's election. When a Fund writes a put option, the Fund incurs an obligation to buy the security underlying the option from the purchaser of the put, at the option's exercise price at any time during the option period, at the purchaser's election.

The Fund may be required, at any time during the option period, to deliver the underlying security (or currency) against payment of the exercise price on any calls it has written, or to make payment of the exercise price against delivery of the underlying security (or currency) on any puts it has written. This obligation is terminated upon the expiration of the option period or at such earlier time as the writer effects a closing purchase transaction. A closing purchase transaction is accomplished by purchasing an option of the same series as the option previously written. However, once the Fund has been assigned an exercise notice, the Fund will typically be unable to effect a closing purchase transaction.

During the option period, the Fund gives up, in return for the premium on the option, the opportunity for capital appreciation above the exercise price should the market price of the underlying security (or the value of its denominated currency) increase, but retains the risk of loss should the price of the underlying security (or the value of its denominated currency) decline.

Futures Contracts. The Funds may buy and sell financial futures contracts which may include security and interest-rate futures, stock and bond index futures contracts and foreign currency futures contracts. VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund may also buy and sell futures contracts and options thereon linked to the price of global resources. A futures contract is an agreement between two parties to buy and sell a security for a set price on a future date. An interest rate, commodity, foreign currency or index futures contract provides for the future sale by one party and purchase by another party of a specified quantity of a financial instrument, commodity, foreign currency or the cash value of an index at a specified price and time.

Futures contracts and options on futures contracts may be used to reduce a Fund's exposure to fluctuations in the prices of portfolio securities and may prevent losses if the prices of such securities decline. Similarly, such investments may protect a Fund against fluctuation in the value of securities in which a Fund is about to invest.

The Funds may purchase and write (sell) call and put options on futures contracts and enter into closing transactions with respect to such options to terminate an existing position. An option on a futures contract gives the purchaser the right (in return for the premium paid), and the writer the obligation, to assume a position in a futures contract (a long position if the option is a call and a short position if the option is a put) at a specified exercise price at any time during the term of the option. Upon exercise of the option, the delivery of the futures position by the writer of the option to the holder of the option is accompanied by delivery of the accumulated balance in the writer's futures margin account, which represents the amount by which the market price of the futures contract at the time of exercise exceeds (in the case of a call) or is less than (in the case of a put) the exercise price of the option contract.

Future contracts are traded on exchanges, so that, in most cases, either party can close out its position on the exchange for cash, without delivering the security or commodity. However, there is no assurance that a Fund will be able to enter into a closing transaction.

Risks of Transactions in Futures Contracts and Related Options. There are several risks associated with the use of futures contracts and futures options as hedging techniques. A purchase or sale of a futures contract may result in losses in excess of the amount invested in the futures contract. There can be no guarantee that there will be a correlation between price movements in the hedging vehicle and in the Fund securities being hedged. In addition, there are significant differences between the securities and futures markets that could result in an imperfect correlation between the markets, causing a given hedge not to achieve its objectives. As a result, a hedge may be unsuccessful because of market behavior or unexpected interest rate trends.

Investments in options, futures contracts and options on futures contracts may reduce the gains which would otherwise be realized from the sale of the underlying securities or assets which are being hedged. Additionally, positions in futures contracts and options can be closed out only on an exchange that provides a market for those instruments. There can be no assurances that such a market will exist for a particular futures contract or option. If a Fund cannot close out an exchange traded futures contract or option which it holds, it would have to perform its contractual obligation or exercise its option to realize any profit, and would incur transaction costs on the sale of the underlying assets.

There is a risk of loss by a Fund of the initial and variation margin deposits in the event of bankruptcy of the futures commission merchant ("FCM") with which the Fund has an open position in a futures contract.

Futures exchanges may limit the amount of fluctuation permitted in certain futures contract prices during a single trading day. The daily limit establishes the maximum amount that the price of a futures contract may vary either up or down from the previous day's settlement price at the end of the current trading session. Once the daily limit has been reached in a futures contract subject to the limit, no more trades may be made on that day at a price beyond that limit. The daily limit governs only price movements during a particular trading day and therefore does not limit potential losses because the limit may work to prevent the liquidation of unfavorable positions. For example, futures prices have occasionally moved to the daily limit for several consecutive trading days with little or no trading, thereby preventing prompt liquidation of positions and subjecting some holders of futures contracts to substantial losses.

There can be no assurance that an active market will exist at a time when a Fund seeks to close out a futures or a futures option position, and that Fund would remain obligated to meet margin requirements until the position is closed. In such situations, if a Fund had insufficient cash, it might have to sell securities to meet margin requirements at a time when it would be disadvantageous to do so. Losses incurred in futures transactions and the costs of these transactions will affect the performance of a Fund. Positions in futures contracts may be closed out only on the exchange on which they were entered into (or through a linked exchange). No secondary market for such contract exists.

Warrants and Subscription Rights. The Funds may invest in warrants, which are instruments that permit, but do not obligate, the holder to subscribe for other securities. Subscription rights are similar to warrants, but normally have a short duration and are distributed directly by the issuer to its shareholders. Warrants and rights are not dividend-paying investments and do not have voting rights like common stock. They also do not represent any rights in the assets of the issuer. As a result, warrants and rights may be considered more speculative than direct equity investments. In addition, the value of warrants and rights do not necessarily change with the value of the underlying securities and may cease to have value if they are not exercised prior to their expiration dates.

PARTLY PAID SECURITIES

Securities paid for on an installment basis. A partly paid security trades net of outstanding installment payments—the buyer “takes over payments.” The buyer’s rights are typically restricted until the security is fully paid. If the value of a partly-paid security declines before a Fund finishes paying for it, the Fund will still owe the payments, but may find it hard to sell and as a result may incur a loss.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN PUBLIC EQUITY

The Funds may acquire equity securities of an issuer that are issued through a private investment in public equity (PIPE) transaction, including on a when-issued basis. See “When, As and If Issued Securities.” A Fund will earmark an amount of cash or high quality securities equal (on a daily mark to market basis) to the amount of its commitment to purchase the when-issued securities. PIPE transactions typically involve the purchase of securities directly from a publicly traded company or its affiliates in a private placement transaction, typically at a discount to the market price of the company’s securities. See also “Direct Investments.” There is a risk that if the market price of the securities drops below a set threshold, the company may have to issue additional stock at a significantly reduced price, which may dilute the value of a Fund’s investment. Shares in PIPES generally are not registered with the SEC until after a certain time period from the date the private sale is completed. This restricted period can last many months. Until the public registration process is completed, PIPES are restricted as to resale and a Fund cannot freely trade the securities. Generally, such restrictions cause the PIPES to be illiquid during this time. PIPES may contain provisions that the issuer will pay specified financial penalties to the holder if the issuer does not publicly register the restricted equity securities within a specified period of time, but there is no assurance that the restricted equity securities will be publicly registered, or that the registration will remain in effect. See “Rule 144A and Section 4(a)(2) Securities.”

PREFERRED STOCK

The Funds may invest in preferred stock. Preferred stock represents an equity interest in a company that generally entitles the holder to receive, in preference to the holders of other stocks such as common stocks, dividends and a fixed share of the proceeds resulting from a liquidation of the company. Some preferred stocks also entitle their holders to receive additional liquidation proceeds on the same basis as holders of a company’s common stock, and thus also represent an ownership interest in that company.

Preferred stocks may pay fixed or adjustable rates of return. Preferred stock is subject to issuer-specific and market risks applicable generally to equity securities. In addition, a company’s preferred stock generally pays dividends only after the company makes required payments to holders of its bonds and other debt. For this reason, the value of preferred stock will usually react more strongly than bonds and other debt to actual or perceived changes in the company’s financial condition or prospects. Preferred stock of smaller companies may be more vulnerable to adverse developments than preferred stock of larger companies.

REAL ESTATE SECURITIES

The Funds may not purchase or sell real estate, except that the Funds may invest in securities of issuers that invest in real estate or interests therein. These include equity securities of real estate investment trusts (“REITs”) and other real estate industry companies or companies with substantial real estate investments. VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund may invest more than 50% of its assets in such securities. The Funds are therefore subject to certain risks associated with direct ownership of real estate and with the real estate industry in general. These risks include, among others: possible declines in the value of real estate; possible lack of availability of mortgage funds; extended vacancies of properties; risks related to general and local economic conditions; overbuilding; increases in competition, property taxes and operating expenses; changes in zoning laws; costs resulting from the clean-up of, and liability to third parties for damages resulting from, environmental problems; casualty or condemnation losses; uninsured damages from floods, earthquakes or other natural disasters; limitations on and variations in rents; and changes in interest rates.

REITs are pooled investment vehicles whose assets consist primarily of interests in real estate and real estate loans. REITs are generally classified as equity REITs, mortgage REITs or hybrid REITs. Equity REITs own interest in property and

realize income from the rents and gain or loss from the sale of real estate interests. Mortgage REITs invest in real estate mortgage loans and realize income from interest payments on the loans. Hybrid REITs invest in both equity and debt. Equity REITs may be operating or financing companies. An operating company provides operational and management expertise to and exercises control over, many if not most operational aspects of the property. REITs are not taxed on income distributed to shareholders, provided they comply with several requirements of the Code.

Investing in REITs involves certain unique risks in addition to those risks associated with investing in the real estate industry in general. Equity REITs may be affected by changes in the value of the underlying property owned by the REITs, while mortgage REITs may be affected by the quality of any credit extended. REITs are dependent upon management skills, are not diversified, and are subject to the risks of financing projects. REITs are subject to heavy cash flow dependency, default by borrowers, self-liquidation and the possibilities of failing to qualify for the exemption from tax for distributed income under the Code. REITs (especially mortgage REITs) are also subject to interest rate risk (i.e., as interest rates rise, the value of the REIT may decline).

REGULATORY

Changes in the laws or regulations of the United States or the Cayman Islands, including any changes to applicable tax laws and regulations, could impair the ability of the VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund to achieve its investment objective and could increase the operating expenses of the Fund or the wholly-owned subsidiary of the Fund (the “Subsidiary”). For example, in 2012, the CFTC adopted amendments to its rules that affect the ability of certain investment advisers to registered investment companies and other entities to rely on previously available exclusions or exemptions from registration under the CEA and regulations thereunder. In addition, the CFTC or the SEC could at any time alter the regulatory requirements governing the use of commodity futures, options on commodity futures, structured notes or swap transactions by investment companies, which could result in the inability of the VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund to achieve its investment objective through its current strategies.

REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS AND REVERSE REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS

Each of the Funds may enter into repurchase agreements.

Repurchase agreements, which may be viewed as a type of secured lending by a Fund, typically involve the acquisition by a Fund of debt securities from a selling financial institution such as a bank, savings and loan association or broker-dealer. The agreements typically provide that a Fund will sell back to the institution, and that the institution will repurchase, the underlying security serving as collateral at a specified price and at a fixed time in the future, usually not more than seven days from the date of purchase. The collateral is marked-to-market daily to determine that the value of the collateral, as specified in the agreement, does not decrease below the purchase price plus accrued interest. If such decrease occurs, additional collateral will be requested and, when received, added to the account to maintain full collateralization. A Fund accrues interest from the institution until the time when the repurchase is to occur.

The Funds may also enter into reverse repurchase agreements. Reverse repurchase agreements involve sales by the Funds of portfolio assets concurrently with an agreement by the Fund to repurchase the same assets at a later date at a fixed price. Such transactions are advantageous only if the interest cost to the Funds of the reverse repurchase transaction is less than the cost of obtaining the cash otherwise. Opportunities to achieve this advantage may not always be available, and the Funds seek to use the reverse repurchase technique only when it will be advantageous to the Funds. In addition, reverse repurchase agreements may be viewed as a form of borrowing, and borrowed assets used for investment creates leverage risk. Leverage may exaggerate the Funds’ volatility and risk of loss.

RULE 144A AND SECTION 4(a)(2) SECURITIES

The Funds may invest in securities which are subject to restrictions on resale because they have not been registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “1933 Act”), or which are otherwise not readily marketable.

Rule 144A under the 1933 Act allows a broader institutional trading market for securities otherwise subject to restriction on resale to the general public. Rule 144A establishes a “safe harbor” from the registration requirements of the 1933 Act of resale of certain securities to qualified institutional buyers. The Adviser monitors the liquidity determinations of restricted securities in the Funds’ holdings pursuant to Rule 22e-4. The determination of whether a Rule 144A security is liquid or illiquid generally takes into account relevant market, trading, and investment-specific considerations consistent with applicable SEC guidance. Additional factors that may be considered include: (1) the frequency of trades and quotes for the security; (2) the number of dealers wishing to purchase or sell the security and the number of other potential purchasers; (3) dealer undertakings to make a market in the security; and (4) the nature of the security and the nature of the marketplace trades (e.g., the time needed to dispose of the security, the method of soliciting offers and the mechanisms of the transfer).

In addition, commercial paper may be issued in reliance on the “private placement” exemption from registration afforded by Section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Act. Such commercial paper is restricted as to disposition under the federal securities laws and, therefore, any resale of such securities must be effected in a transaction exempt from registration under the 1933 Act.

Securities eligible for resale pursuant to Rule 144A under the 1933 Act and commercial paper issued in reliance on the Section 4(a)(2) exemption under the 1940 Act may be determined to be liquid in accordance with Rule 22e-4 for purposes of complying with investment restrictions applicable to investments by the Funds in illiquid investments. To the extent such securities are determined to be illiquid, they will be aggregated with other illiquid investments for purposes of the limitation on illiquid investments.

RISKS RELATED TO RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE

In late February 2022, Russian military forces invaded Ukraine, significantly amplifying already existing geopolitical tensions among Russia, Ukraine, Europe, NATO, and the West. Russia’s invasion, the responses of countries and political bodies to Russia’s actions, and the potential for wider conflict may increase financial market volatility and could have severe adverse effects on regional and global economic markets, including the markets for certain securities and commodities such as oil and natural gas. Following Russia’s actions, various countries, including the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, as well as the European Union, issued broad-ranging economic sanctions against Russia. The sanctions consist of the prohibition of trading in certain Russian securities and engaging in certain private transactions, the prohibition of doing business with certain Russian corporate entities, large financial institutions, officials and oligarchs, and the freezing of Russian assets. The sanctions include a commitment by certain countries and the European Union to remove selected Russian banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, commonly called “SWIFT,” the electronic network that connects banks globally, and imposed restrictive measures to prevent the Russian Central Bank from undermining the impact of the sanctions. A number of large corporations and U.S. states have also announced plans to divest interests or otherwise curtail business dealings with certain Russian businesses.

The imposition of these current sanctions (and potential further sanctions in response to continued Russian military activity) and other actions undertaken by countries and businesses may adversely impact various sectors of the Russian economy, including but not limited to, the financials, energy, metals and mining, engineering, and defense and defense-related materials sectors. Such actions also may result in a weakening of the ruble, a downgrade of Russia’s credit rating, and the decline of the value and liquidity of Russian securities, and could impair the ability of a Fund to buy, sell, receive, or deliver those securities. Moreover, the measures could adversely affect global financial and energy markets and thereby negatively affect the value of a Fund’s investments beyond any direct exposure to Russian issuers or those of adjoining geographic regions. In response to sanctions, the Russian Central Bank raised its interest rates and banned sales of local securities by foreigners, which may include a Fund. Russia may take additional counter measures or retaliatory actions, which may further impair the value and liquidity of Russian securities and Fund investments. Such actions could, for example, include restricting gas exports to other countries, seizure of U.S. and European residents’ assets, conducting cyberattacks on other governments, corporations or individuals, or undertaking or provoking other military conflict elsewhere in Europe, any of which could exacerbate negative consequences on global financial markets and the economy. The actions discussed above could have a negative effect on the performance of Funds that have exposure to Russia. While diplomatic efforts have been ongoing, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is currently unpredictable and has the potential to result in broadened military actions. The duration of ongoing hostilities and corresponding sanctions and related events cannot be predicted and may result in a negative impact on performance and the value of Fund investments, particularly as it relates to Russia exposure.

Due to difficulties transacting in impacted securities, a Fund may experience challenges liquidating the applicable positions to continue to seek a Fund’s investment objective. Additionally, due to current and potential future sanctions or potential market closure impacting the ability to trade Russian securities, a Fund may experience higher transaction costs. Furthermore, any exposure that a Fund may have to Russian counterparties or counterparties that are otherwise impacted by sanctions also could negatively impact the Fund’s portfolio.

SECURITIES LENDING

The Funds may lend securities to approved borrowers, including affiliates of the Funds' securities lending agent, State Street Bank and Trust Company ("State Street"). Securities lending allows a Fund to retain ownership of the securities loaned and, at the same time, earn additional income. The borrower provides cash or non-cash collateral equal to at least 102% (105% for foreign securities) of the value of the securities loaned. Collateral is maintained by State Street on behalf of the Funds. Cash received as collateral through loan transactions is generally invested in shares of a money market fund. Investing this cash subjects that investment, as well as the securities loaned, to market appreciation or depreciation. Non-cash collateral consists of securities issued or guaranteed by the United States government or one of its agencies and cannot be re-hypothecated by the Funds. The Funds maintain the ability to vote or consent on proxy proposals involving material events affecting securities loaned. If the borrower defaults on its obligation to return the securities loaned because of insolvency or other reasons, a Fund could experience delays and costs in recovering the securities loaned or in gaining access to the collateral. These delays and costs could be greater for foreign securities. If a Fund is not able to recover the securities loaned, the collateral may be sold and a replacement investment may be purchased in the market. The value of the collateral could decrease below the value of the replacement investment by the time the replacement investment is purchased.

SHORT SALES

The Funds may short sell equity securities. A short sale of an equity security is the sale of a security that the seller does not own. In order to deliver the security to the purchaser, the short seller borrows the security, typically from a broker-dealer or an institutional investor, for a fee. The short seller later closes out the position by returning the security to the lender, typically by purchasing the same security on the open market. A short sale theoretically carries the risk of an unlimited loss, because the price of the underlying security could increase without limit, thus increasing the cost of buying that security to cover the short position. In addition, there can be no assurance that the security needed to cover a short position will be available for purchase. Also, the purchase of a security to close out the short position can itself cause the price of the security to rise further, thereby exacerbating the loss. Short selling is often used to profit from an expected downward price movement in a security.

SPECIAL PURPOSE ACQUISITION COMPANIES

The Funds may invest in stock, warrants, and other securities of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) or similar special purpose entities. A SPAC is typically a publicly traded company that raises investment capital via an IPO for the purpose of acquiring the equity securities of one or more existing companies (or interests therein) via merger, combination, acquisition or other similar transactions. A Fund may acquire an interest in a SPAC in an IPO or a secondary market transaction. See also "Equity Securities" and "Options, Futures, Warrants and Subscription Rights."

Unless and until an acquisition is completed, a SPAC generally invests its assets (less a portion retained to cover expenses) in U.S. government securities, money market securities and cash. To the extent the SPAC is invested in cash or similar securities, this may negatively affect a Fund's performance. Because SPACs and similar entities are in essence blank check companies without operating history or ongoing business other than seeking acquisitions, the value of their securities is particularly dependent on the ability of the entity's management to identify and complete a profitable acquisition. There is no guarantee that the SPACs in which a Fund invests will complete an acquisition or that any acquisitions that are completed will be profitable. Some SPACs may pursue acquisitions only within certain industries or regions, which may increase the volatility of their prices. In addition, these securities, which are typically traded in the over-the-counter market, may be considered illiquid and/or be subject to restrictions on resale.

Other risks of investing in SPACs include that a significant portion of the monies raised by the SPAC may be expended during the search for a target transaction; an attractive transaction may not be identified at all (or any requisite approvals may not be obtained) and the SPAC may dissolve and be required to return any remaining monies to shareholders, causing a Fund to incur the opportunity cost of missed investment opportunities the Fund otherwise could have benefited from; a transaction once identified or effected may prove unsuccessful and an investment in the SPAC may lose value; the warrants or other rights with respect to the SPAC held by a Fund may expire worthless or may be repurchased or retired by the SPAC at an unfavorable price; and an investment in a SPAC may be diluted by additional later offerings of interests in the SPAC or by other investors exercising existing rights to purchase shares of the SPAC. In addition, a SPAC target company may have limited operating experience, a smaller size, limited product lines, markets, distribution channels and financial and managerial resources. Investing in the securities of smaller companies involves greater risk, and portfolio price volatility.

SUBSIDIARY

The VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund's investment in the Subsidiary is expected to provide it with exposure to the commodity markets within the limitations of Subchapter M of the Code and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") revenue rulings, as discussed below under "Taxation." The Subsidiary is a company organized under the laws of the Cayman Islands and is overseen by its own board of directors. The VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund is the sole shareholder of the Subsidiary, and it is not currently expected that shares of the Subsidiary will be sold or offered to other investors. It is expected that the Subsidiary will primarily invest in gold bullion, gold futures and other instruments that provide direct or indirect exposure to gold, including ETFs, and also may invest in silver, platinum and palladium bullion and futures. To the extent that the VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund invests in the Subsidiary, it may be subject to the risks associated with those instruments and other securities.

While the Subsidiary may be considered similar to investment companies, it is not registered under the 1940 Act and, unless otherwise noted in the VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund's Prospectus and this SAI, is not subject to all of the investor protections of the 1940 Act and other U.S. regulations. Changes in the laws of the United States and/or the Cayman Islands could result in the inability of the VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund and/or the Subsidiary to operate as described in its Prospectus and this SAI and could eliminate or severely limit the Fund's ability to invest in the Subsidiary which may adversely affect the Fund and its shareholders.

SWAPS

The Funds may enter into swap agreements. A swap is a derivative in the form of an agreement to exchange the return generated by one instrument for the return generated by another instrument. The payment streams are calculated by reference to a specified index and agreed upon notional amount. The term "specified index" includes currencies, fixed interest rates, prices, total return on interest rate indices, fixed income indices, stock indices and commodity indices (as well as amounts derived from arithmetic operations on these indices). For example, a Fund may agree to swap the return generated by a fixed income index for the return generated by a second fixed income index. The currency swaps in which a Fund may enter will generally involve an agreement to pay interest streams in one currency based on a specified index in exchange for receiving interest streams denominated in another currency. Such swaps may involve initial and final exchanges that correspond to the agreed upon notional amount.

A Fund may also enter into credit default swaps, index swaps and interest rate swaps. Credit default swaps may have as reference obligations one or more securities or a basket of securities that are or are not currently held by the Fund. The protection "buyer" in a credit default contract is generally obligated to pay the protection "seller" an upfront or a periodic stream of payments over the term of the contract provided that no credit event, such as a default, on a reference obligation has occurred. If a credit event occurs, the seller generally must pay the buyer the "par value" (full notional value) of the swap in exchange for an equal face amount of deliverable obligations of the reference entity described in the swap, or the seller may be required to deliver the related net cash amount, if the swap is cash settled. Interest rate swaps involve the exchange by a Fund with another party of their respective commitments to pay or receive interest, e.g., an exchange of fixed rate payments for floating rate payments. Index swaps, also called total return swaps, involves a Fund entering into a contract with a counterparty in which the counterparty makes payments to the Fund based on the positive returns of an index, such as a corporate bond index, in return for the Fund paying to the counterparty a fixed or variable interest rate, as well as paying to the counterparty any negative returns on the index. In a sense, a Fund is purchasing exposure to an index in the amount of the notional principal in return for making interest rate payments on the notional principal. As with interest-rate swaps, the notional principal does not actually change hands at any point in the transaction. Cross-currency swaps are interest rate swaps in which the notional amount upon which the fixed interest rate is accrued is denominated in another currency and the notional amount upon which the floating rate is accrued is denominated in another currency. The notional amounts are typically determined based on the spot exchange rate at the inception of the trade. The swaps in which a Fund may engage also include rate caps, floors and collars under which one party pays a single or periodic fixed amount(s) (or premium), and the other party pays periodic amounts based on the movement of a specified index. VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund may also enter into other asset swaps. Asset swaps are similar to swaps in that the performance of one global resource (e.g., gold) may be "swapped" for another (e.g., energy).

Swaps do not typically involve the delivery of securities, other underlying assets, or principal. Accordingly, the risk of loss with respect to swaps is limited to the net amount of payments that a Fund is contractually obligated to make. If the other party to a swap defaults, a Fund's risk of loss consists of the net amount of payments that a Fund is contractually entitled to receive. Currency swaps usually involve the delivery of the entire principal value of one designated currency in exchange for the other designated currency. Therefore, the entire principal value of a currency swap is subject to the risk that the other party to the swap will default on its contractual delivery obligations. If there is a default by the counterparty, a Fund may have contractual remedies pursuant to the agreements related to the transaction. The use of swaps is a highly specialized activity which involves investment techniques and risks different from those associated with ordinary fund securities transactions. If the Adviser is incorrect in its forecasts of market values, interest rates, and currency exchange rates, the investment performance of

a Fund would be less favorable than it would have been if this investment technique were not used. Also, if a counterparty's creditworthiness declines, the value of the swap would likely decline.

Certain standardized swaps are subject to mandatory central clearing and exchange-trading. Central clearing is intended to reduce counterparty credit risk and increase liquidity, but central clearing does not eliminate these risks and may involve additional costs and risks not involved with uncleared swaps. Credit risk of cleared swap participants is concentrated in a few clearinghouses, and the consequences of insolvency of a clearinghouse are not clear. There is also a risk of loss by a Fund of the initial and variation margin deposits in the event of bankruptcy of the FCM with which the Fund has an open position, or the central counterparty in a swap contract.

U.S. GOVERNMENT AND RELATED OBLIGATIONS

U.S. government obligations include U.S. Treasury obligations and securities issued or guaranteed by various agencies of the U.S. government or by various instrumentalities which have been established or sponsored by the U.S. government. U.S. Treasury obligations and securities issued or guaranteed by various agencies of the U.S. government differ in their interest rates, maturities and time of issuance, as well as with respect to whether they are guaranteed by the U.S. government. U.S. government and related obligations may be structured as fixed-, variable- or floating-rate obligations.

While U.S. Treasury obligations are backed by the "full faith and credit" of the U.S. government, securities issued or guaranteed by federal agencies and U.S. government-sponsored instrumentalities may or may not be backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government. These securities may be supported by the ability to borrow from the U.S. Treasury or only by the credit of the issuing agency or instrumentality and, as a result, may be subject to greater credit risk than securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury. Obligations of U.S. government agencies, authorities, instrumentalities and sponsored enterprises historically have involved limited risk of loss of principal if held to maturity. However, no assurance can be given that the U.S. government would provide financial support to any of these entities if it is not obligated to do so by law. Additionally, from time to time uncertainty regarding the status of negotiations in the U.S. government to increase the statutory debt limit, commonly called the "debt ceiling," could increase the risk that the U.S. government may default on payments on certain U.S. government securities, cause the credit rating of the U.S. government to be downgraded, increase volatility in the stock and bond markets, result in higher interest rates, reduce prices of U.S. Treasury securities, and/or increase the costs of various kinds of debt. If a U.S. government-sponsored entity is negatively impacted by legislative or regulatory action, is unable to meet its obligations, or its creditworthiness declines, the performance of a Fund that holds securities of that entity will be adversely impacted.

WHEN, AS AND IF ISSUED SECURITIES

Each Fund may purchase securities on a "when, as and if issued" basis, under which the issuance of the security depends upon the occurrence of a subsequent event, such as approval of a merger, corporate reorganization or debt restructuring. At that time, the Fund will record the transaction and, in determining its net asset value, will reflect the value of the security daily. An increase in the percentage of the Fund assets committed to the purchase of securities on a "when, as and if issued" basis may increase the volatility of its net asset value. A Fund may also sell securities on a "when, as and if issued" basis provided that the issuance of the security will result automatically from the exchange or conversion of a security owned by the Fund at the time of sale.

FUNDAMENTAL INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS

The following investment restrictions are in addition to those described in the Prospectuses. These investment restrictions are "fundamental" and may be changed with respect to the Fund only with the approval of the holders of a majority of the Fund's "outstanding voting securities" as defined in the 1940 Act. As to any of the following investment restrictions, if a percentage restriction is adhered to at the time of investment, a later increase or decrease in percentage resulting from a change in value of portfolio securities or amount of net assets will not be considered a violation of the investment restriction. In the case of borrowing, however, a Fund will promptly take action to reduce the amount of the Fund's borrowings outstanding if, because of changes in the net asset value of the Fund due to market action, the amount of such borrowings exceeds one-third of the value of the Fund's net assets. The fundamental investment restrictions are as follows:

Each Fund may not:

1. Borrow money, except as permitted under the 1940 Act, as amended and as interpreted or modified by regulation from time to time.

2. Engage in the business of underwriting securities issued by others, except to the extent that the Fund may be considered an underwriter within the meaning of the Securities Act of 1933 in the disposition of restricted securities or in connection with its investments in other investment companies.
3. Make loans, except that the Fund may (i) lend portfolio securities, (ii) enter into repurchase agreements, (iii) purchase all or a portion of an issue of debt securities, bank loan participation interests, bank certificates of deposit, bankers' acceptances, debentures or other securities, whether or not the purchase is made upon the original issuance of the securities, and (iv) participate in an interfund lending program with other registered investment companies.
4. Issue senior securities, except as permitted under the 1940 Act, as amended and as interpreted or modified by regulation from time to time.
5. Purchase or sell real estate, except that the Fund may (i) invest in securities of issuers that invest in real estate or interests therein, (ii) invest in mortgage-related securities and other securities that are secured by real estate or interests therein, and (iii) hold and sell real estate acquired by the Fund as a result of the ownership of securities.

Each Fund, except VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund, may not:

6. Purchase or sell commodities, unless acquired as a result of owning securities or other instruments, but it may purchase, sell or enter into financial options and futures, forward and spot currency contracts, swap transactions and other financial contracts or derivative instruments and may invest in securities or other instruments backed by commodities.
7. Purchase any security if, as a result of that purchase, 25% or more of its total assets would be invested in securities of issuers having their principal business activities in the same industry, except that VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund will invest 25% or more of its total assets in "global resource" industries as defined in the Prospectus. This limit does not apply to securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, its agencies or instrumentalities.

VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund may not:

6. Purchase or sell commodities, unless acquired as a result of owning securities or other instruments, but it may purchase, sell or enter into financial options and futures, forward and spot currency contracts, swap transactions and other financial contracts or derivative instruments and may invest in securities or other instruments backed by commodities, except that the Fund may invest in gold and silver coins which are legal tender in the country of issue and gold and silver bullion, and palladium and platinum group metals bullion.
7. Purchase any security if, as a result of that purchase, 25% or more of its total assets would be invested in securities of issuers having their principal business activities in the same industry, except that the Fund may invest 25% or more of its total assets in the gold-mining industry. This limit does not apply to (i) securities issued or guaranteed by the U.S. government, its agencies or instrumentalities, or (ii) securities of other investment companies.

For purposes of Restriction 1, the 1940 Act generally permits a Fund to borrow money in amounts of up to one-third of a Fund's total assets from banks, and to borrow up to 5% of a Fund's total assets from banks or other lenders for temporary purposes. To limit the risks attendant to borrowing, the 1940 Act generally requires a Fund to maintain at all times an "asset coverage" of at least 300% of the amount of its borrowings. Asset coverage generally means the ratio that the value of a Fund's total assets, minus liabilities other than borrowings, bears to the aggregate amount of all borrowings.

For purposes of Restriction 4, "senior securities" are generally Fund obligations that have a priority over a Fund's shares with respect to the payment of dividends or the distribution of Fund assets. The 1940 Act generally prohibits a Fund from issuing senior securities, except that the Fund may borrow money in amounts of up to one-third of a Fund's total assets from banks. The Fund also may borrow an amount equal to up to 5% of the Fund's total assets from banks or other lenders for temporary purposes, and these borrowings are not considered senior securities.

For the purposes of Restriction 7, companies in different geographical locations will not be deemed to be in the same industry if the investment risks associated with the securities of such companies are substantially different. For example, although generally considered to be "interest rate-sensitive," investing in banking institutions in different countries is generally dependent upon substantially different risk factors, such as the condition and prospects of the economy in a particular country and in particular industries, and political conditions. Similarly, each foreign government issuing securities (together with its agencies and instrumentalities) will be treated as a separate industry. Also, for the purposes of Restriction 7, investment companies are not considered to be part of an industry. To the extent the Funds invest their assets in underlying investment companies, 25% or more of their total assets may be indirectly exposed to a particular industry or group of related industries through their investments in one or more underlying investment companies.

In addition, each of VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund and VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund may not invest in a manner inconsistent with each of their classifications as a "diversified company" as provided by (i) the 1940 Act, as amended

from time to time, (ii) the rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC under the 1940 Act, as amended from time to time, or (iii) an exemption or other relief applicable to the Fund from the provisions of the 1940 Act, as amended from time to time.

PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS DISCLOSURE

The Funds have adopted policies and procedures governing the disclosure of information regarding the Funds' portfolio holdings. They are reasonably designed to prevent selective disclosure of the Funds' portfolio holdings to third parties, other than disclosures that are consistent with the best interests of the Funds' shareholders. The Board is responsible for overseeing the implementation of these policies and procedures, and will review them annually to ensure their adequacy.

These policies and procedures apply to employees of the Adviser, administrator, principal underwriter, and all other service providers to the Funds that, in the ordinary course of their activities, come into possession of information about the Funds' portfolio holdings. These policies and procedures are made available to each service provider.

The following outlines the policies and procedures adopted by the Funds regarding the disclosure of portfolio-related information:

Generally, it is the policy of the Funds that no current or potential investor (or their representative), including any Fund shareholder (collectively, "Investors"), shall be provided information about a Fund's portfolio on a preferential basis in advance of the provision of that same information to other investors.

Disclosure to Investors. Portfolio holdings information for the Funds is available to all investors on the VanEck website at vaneck.com. Information regarding the Funds' top holdings and country and sector weightings, updated as of each month-end, is located on this website. Generally, this information is posted to the website within 10 business days of the end of the applicable month. The Funds may also publish a detailed list of the securities held by such Fund as of each month-end, which is generally posted to the website within 10 business days after the end of the applicable month. This information generally remains available on the website until new information is posted. Each Fund reserves the right to exclude any portion of these portfolio holdings from publication when deemed in the best interest of the Fund, and to discontinue the posting of portfolio holdings information at any time, without prior notice.

Best Interest of the Funds: Information regarding the Funds' specific security holdings, sector weightings, geographic distribution, issuer allocations and related information ("Portfolio-Related Information"), shall be disclosed to the public only (i) as required by applicable laws, rules or regulations, (ii) pursuant to the Funds' Portfolio-Related Information disclosure policies and procedures, or (iii) otherwise when the disclosure of such information is determined by the Trust's officers to be in the best interest of Fund shareholders.

Conflicts of Interest: Should a conflict of interest arise between a Fund and any of the Fund's service providers regarding the possible disclosure of Portfolio-Related Information, the Trust's officers shall resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the Fund's interest. In the event that an officer of the Fund is unable to resolve such a conflict of interest, the matter shall be referred to the Trust's Audit Committee for resolution.

Equality of Dissemination: Shareholders of the same Fund shall be treated alike in terms of access to the Fund's portfolio holdings. With the exception of certain selective disclosures, noted in the paragraph below, Portfolio-Related Information with respect to a Fund shall not be disclosed to any Investor prior to the time the same information is disclosed publicly (e.g., posted on the Fund's website). Accordingly, all Investors will have equal access to such information.

Selective Disclosure of Portfolio-Related Information in Certain Circumstances: In some instances, it may be appropriate for a Fund to selectively disclose a Fund's Portfolio-Related Information (e.g., for due diligence purposes, disclosure to a newly hired adviser or sub-adviser, or disclosure to a rating agency) prior to public dissemination of such information.

Conditional Use of Selectively-Disclosed Portfolio-Related Information: To the extent practicable, each of the Trust's officers shall condition the receipt of Portfolio-Related Information upon the receiving party's written agreement to both keep such information confidential and not to trade Fund shares based on this information.

Compensation: No person, including officers of the Funds or employees of other service providers or their affiliates, shall receive any compensation in connection with the disclosure of Portfolio-Related Information. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Funds reserve the right to charge a nominal processing fee, payable to the Funds, to non-shareholders requesting Portfolio-Related Information. This fee is designed to offset the Fund's costs in disseminating such information.

Source of Portfolio-Related Information: All Portfolio-Related Information shall be based on information provided by the Fund's administrator(s)/accounting agent.

The Funds may provide non-public portfolio holdings information to third parties in the normal course of their performance of services to the Funds, including to the Funds' auditors; custodian; financial printers; counsel to the Funds or

counsel to the Funds' independent trustees; regulatory authorities; and securities exchanges and other listing organizations. In addition, the Funds may provide non-public portfolio holdings information to data providers, fund ranking/rating services, and fair valuation services. The entities to which the Funds voluntarily disclose portfolio holdings information are required, either by explicit agreement or by virtue of their respective duties to the Funds, to maintain the confidentiality of the information disclosed.

There can be no assurance that the Funds' policies and procedures regarding selective disclosure of the Funds' portfolio holdings will protect the Funds from potential misuse of that information by individuals or entities to which it is disclosed.

The Board shall be responsible for overseeing the implementation of these policies and procedures. These policies and procedures shall be reviewed by the Board on an annual basis for their continuing appropriateness.

Additionally, the Funds shall maintain and preserve permanently in an easily accessible place a written copy of these policies and procedures. The Fund shall also maintain and preserve, for a period not less than six years (the first two years in an easily accessible place), all Portfolio-Related Information disclosed to the public.

INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES

The following information supplements and should be read in conjunction with the section in the Prospectuses entitled "How the Fund is Managed – Management of the Fund."

Van Eck Associates Corporation, the Adviser, acts as investment manager to the Trust and, subject to the supervision of the Board, is responsible for the day-to-day investment management of the Funds. The Adviser is a private company with headquarters in New York and acts as adviser or sub-adviser to other mutual funds, ETFs, other pooled investment vehicles and separate accounts.

The Adviser serves as investment manager to each Fund pursuant to an investment advisory agreement between the Trust and the Adviser (each, an "Advisory Agreement"). The advisory fee paid pursuant to each Advisory Agreement is computed daily and paid monthly to the Adviser by each Fund at the following annual rates: for VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund and VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund, each Fund pays the Adviser a fee at the annual rate of 1.00% of the first \$500 million of average daily net assets of each Fund, 0.90% on the next \$250 million of average daily net assets and 0.70% of average daily net assets in excess of \$750 million, which includes the fee paid to the Adviser for accounting and administrative services; for VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund, the Fund pays the Adviser a fee at an annual rate of 1.00% of average daily net assets of the Fund, which includes the fee paid to the Adviser for accounting and administrative services; and for VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund, the Fund pays the Adviser a fee at an annual rate of 0.75% of the first \$500 million of average daily net assets of the Fund, 0.65% of the next \$250 million of average daily net assets and 0.50% of average daily net assets in excess of \$750 million. For purposes of calculating these fees, the net assets of the VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund include the value of the Fund's interest in the Subsidiary. The Subsidiary does not pay the Adviser a fee for managing the Subsidiary's portfolio. Each class of a Fund's shares pays its proportionate share of the Fund's fee. Under each Advisory Agreement, the Adviser, subject to the supervision of the Board and in conformity with the stated investment policies of each Fund, manages the investment of the Funds' assets. The Adviser is responsible for placing purchase and sale orders and providing continuous supervision of the investment portfolio of the Funds.

In addition to providing investment advisory services, the Adviser also performs accounting and administrative services for the VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund pursuant to a written agreement. For these accounting and administrative services, a fee is calculated daily and paid monthly at an annual rate equal to 0.25% of the first \$750 million of average daily net assets, and 0.20% of average daily net assets in excess of \$750 million.

The Adviser has agreed to waive fees and/or pay Fund expenses to the extent necessary to prevent the operating expenses of each Fund (excluding acquired fund fees and expenses, interest expense, trading expenses, dividends and interest payments on securities sold short, taxes and extraordinary expenses) from exceeding the following:

FUND	EXPENSE CAP	FEE ARRANGEMENT DURATION DATE
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund Initial Class	1.10%	May 1, 2025

VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund		
Initial Class	1.30%	May 1, 2025
Class S	1.55%	May 1, 2025
VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund		
Initial Class	1.20%	May 1, 2025
Class S	1.45%	May 1, 2025
VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund		
Class S	1.45%	May 1, 2025

During such time, the expense limitation is expected to continue until the Board of Trustees acts to discontinue all or a portion of such expense limitation.

Pursuant to each Advisory Agreement, the Trust has agreed to indemnify the Adviser for certain liabilities, including certain liabilities arising under the federal securities laws, unless such loss or liability results from willful misfeasance, bad faith or gross negligence in the performance of its duties or the reckless disregard of its obligations and duties.

The management fees earned and the expenses waived or assumed by the Adviser for the past three fiscal years are as follows:

		MANAGEMENT FEES	EXPENSES WAIVED/ASSUMED BY THE ADVISER
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund	2023	\$169,136	\$143,723
	2022	\$166,453	\$118,864
	2021	\$196,441	\$148,723
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund	2023	\$1,026,876	\$13,889
	2022	\$1,122,038	\$12,083
	2021	\$1,773,086	\$11,530
VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund	2023	\$3,409,799	None
	2022	\$3,942,242	None
	2021	\$3,497,897	None
VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund	2023	\$393,316	\$51,383
	2022	\$363,059	\$39,560
	2021	\$389,288	\$68,891

Each Advisory Agreement provides that it shall continue in effect from year to year as long as it is approved at least annually by (1) the Board or (2) a vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities (as defined in the 1940 Act) of each Fund, provided that in either event such continuance also is approved by a majority of the Trustees who are not interested persons (as defined in the 1940 Act) of the Trust by a vote cast in person at a meeting called for the purpose of voting on such approval. Each Advisory Agreement is terminable without penalty, on 60 days' notice, by the Board or by a vote of the holders of a majority (as defined in the 1940 Act) of a Fund's outstanding voting securities. Each Advisory Agreement is also terminable upon 60 days' notice by the Adviser and will terminate automatically in the event of its assignment (as defined in the 1940 Act).

THE DISTRIBUTOR

Shares of the Funds are offered on a continuous basis and are distributed through Van Eck Securities Corporation, the Distributor, 666 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10017, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Adviser. The Board has approved a Distribution Agreement appointing the Distributor as distributor of shares of the Funds.

The Distribution Agreement provides that the Distributor will pay all fees and expenses in connection with printing and distributing prospectuses and reports for use in offering and selling shares of the Funds and preparing, printing and distributing advertising or promotional materials. The Funds will pay all fees and expenses in connection with registering and qualifying their shares under federal and state securities laws. The Distribution Agreement is reviewed and approved annually by the Board.

During the last three fiscal years, the Distributor retained no underwriting commissions on sales of shares of the Funds, after reallowance to dealers.

PLAN OF DISTRIBUTION (12B-1 PLAN)

Each Fund has adopted a plan of distribution pursuant to Rule 12b-1 (collectively, the “Plan”) on behalf of its Class S shares. Fees paid by the Class S shares under the Plan will be used for servicing and/or distribution expenses of the Distributor and to compensate insurance companies, brokers and dealers, and other financial institutions which sell Class S shares of a Fund, or provide servicing. The Plan is a compensation type plan. Shares of Initial Class are not subject to the expenses of the Plan.

Pursuant to the Plan, the Distributor provides the Funds, at least quarterly, with a written report of the amounts expended under the Plan and the purpose for which such expenditures were made. The Board reviews such reports on a quarterly basis. The Plan is reapproved annually for each Fund’s Class S shares by the Board, including a majority of the Trustees who are not “interested persons” of the Fund and who have no direct or indirect financial interest in the operation of the Plan.

The Plan shall continue in effect as to each Fund’s Class S shares, provided such continuance is approved annually by a vote of the Board in accordance with the 1940 Act. The Plan may not be amended to increase materially the amount to be spent for the services described therein without approval of the Class S shareholders of the Fund, and all material amendments to the Plan must also be approved by the Board in the manner described above. The Plan may be terminated at any time, without payment of any penalty, by vote of a majority of the Trustees who are not “interested persons” of a Fund and who have no direct or indirect financial interest in the operation of the Plan, or by a vote of a majority of the outstanding voting securities (as defined in the 1940 Act) of the Fund’s Class S shares on written notice to any other party to the Plan. The Plan will automatically terminate in the event of its assignment (as defined in the 1940 Act). So long as the Plan is in effect, the election and nomination of Trustees who are not “interested persons” of the Trust shall be committed to the discretion of the Trustees who are not “interested persons.” The Board has determined that, in its judgment, there is a reasonable likelihood that the Plan will benefit the Funds and their shareholders. The Funds will preserve copies of the Plan and any agreement or report made pursuant to Rule 12b-1 under the 1940 Act, for a period of not less than six years from the date of the Plan or such agreement or report, the first two years in an easily accessible place. For additional information regarding the Plan, see the Funds’ Class S Prospectuses.

As of the date of this SAI, Class S shares of VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund had not launched and therefore no 12b-1 fees were paid. For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023, it is estimated that the Distributor spent the amounts received under the Plan in the following ways:

	<u>VANECK VIP EMERGING MARKETS FUND CLASS S</u>	<u>VANECK VIP GLOBAL RESOURCES FUND CLASS S</u>	<u>VANECK VIP GLOBAL GOLD FUND CLASS S</u>
Total 12b-1 Fees	\$2,442	\$450,390	\$131,105
Compensation to Dealers	(2,442)	(450,390)	(131,105)
Net 12b-1 Fees	None	None	None

PORTFOLIO MANAGER COMPENSATION

The Adviser’s portfolio managers are paid a fixed base salary and a bonus. The bonus is based upon the quality of investment analysis and management of the funds for which they serve as portfolio manager. Portfolio managers who oversee accounts with significantly different fee structures are generally compensated by discretionary bonus rather than a set formula to help reduce potential conflicts of interest. At times, the Adviser and affiliates may manage accounts with incentive fees.

The Adviser’s portfolio managers may serve as portfolio managers to other clients. Such “Other Clients” may have investment objectives or may implement investment strategies similar to those of the Funds. When the portfolio managers implement investment strategies for Other Clients that are similar or directly contrary to the positions taken by a Fund, the

prices of the Fund's securities may be negatively affected. The compensation that the Funds' portfolio managers receive for managing other client accounts may be higher than the compensation the portfolio managers receive for managing the Funds. The portfolio managers do not believe that their activities materially disadvantage the Funds. The Adviser has implemented procedures to monitor trading across funds and its Other Clients.

PORTFOLIO MANAGER SHARE OWNERSHIP

As of December 31, 2023, none of the portfolio managers or deputy portfolio managers owned shares of the Funds.

OTHER ACCOUNTS MANAGED BY THE PORTFOLIO MANAGERS

The following table provides the number of other accounts managed (excluding the Fund) and the total assets managed of such accounts by each Fund's portfolio manager(s) and deputy portfolio manager (if any) within each category of accounts, as of December 31, 2023.

Fund	Name of Portfolio Managers/ Deputy Portfolio Managers	Category of Account	Other Accounts Managed (As of December 31, 2023)		Accounts with respect to which the advisory fee is based on the performance of the account	
			Number of Accounts	Total Assets in Accounts	Number of Accounts	Total Assets in Accounts
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund	Angus Shillington (Deputy Portfolio Manager)	Registered investment companies	2	\$855.64 Million	0	\$0
		Other pooled investment vehicles	2	\$110.05 Million	0	\$0
		Other accounts	1	\$484.69 Thousand	0	\$0
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund	Ola El-Shawarby (Portfolio Manager)	Registered investment companies	2	\$855.64 Million	0	\$0
		Other pooled investment vehicles	2	\$110.05 Million	0	\$0
		Other accounts	1	\$484.69 Thousand	0	\$0
VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund	Charles T. Cameron (Deputy Portfolio Manager)	Registered investment companies	2	\$1,508.26 Million	0	\$0
		Other pooled investment vehicles	1	\$17.80 Million	0	\$0
		Other accounts	0	\$—	0	\$0
VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund	Shawn Reynolds (Portfolio Manager)	Registered investment companies	3	\$1,794.82 Million	0	\$0
		Other pooled investment vehicles	1	\$17.80 Million	0	\$0
		Other accounts	0	\$—	0	\$0
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund	Eric Fine (Portfolio Manager)	Registered investment companies	1	\$84.82 Million	0	\$0
		Other pooled investment vehicles	3	\$260.83 Million	0	\$0
		Other accounts	0	\$—	0	\$0
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund	David Austerweil (Deputy Portfolio Manager)	Registered investment companies	1	\$84.82 Million	0	\$0
		Other pooled investment vehicles	3	\$260.83 Million	0	\$0
		Other accounts	0	\$—	0	\$0
VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund	Imaru Casanova (Portfolio Manager)	Registered investment companies	1	\$731.61 Million	0	\$0
		Other pooled investment vehicles	0	\$—	0	\$0
		Other accounts	0	\$—	0	\$0

SECURITIES LENDING ARRANGEMENTS

Pursuant to a securities lending agreement (the “Securities Lending Agreement”) between the Funds and State Street (in such capacity, the “Securities Lending Agent”), the Funds may lend their securities through the Securities Lending Agent to certain qualified borrowers. The Securities Lending Agent administers the Funds’ securities lending program. During the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023, these services include arranging the securities loans with approved borrowers and collecting fees and rebates due to the Funds from each borrower. The Securities Lending Agent maintains records of loans made and income derived therefrom and makes available such records that the Funds deem necessary to monitor the securities lending program.

For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023, each of the Funds listed below earned income and incurred the following costs and expenses, during its respective fiscal year, as a result of its securities lending activities:

Fund	Gross Income ⁽¹⁾	Revenue Split ⁽²⁾	Cash Collateral Management Fees ⁽³⁾	Administrative Fees ⁽⁴⁾	Indemnification Fees ⁽⁵⁾	Rebates to Borrowers	Other Fees	Total Costs of the Securities Lending Activities	Net Income from the Securities Lending Activities
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund	\$ 12,424	\$ 118	\$ —	\$ —	\$ —	\$ 11,243	\$ —	\$ 11,361	\$ 1,063
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund	57,564	1,283	—	—	—	44,648	—	45,931	11,633
VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund	182,450	12,311	—	—	—	59,098	—	71,409	111,041
VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund	802,565	55,183	—	—	—	249,730	—	304,913	497,652

¹ Gross income includes income from the reinvestment of cash collateral and rebates paid by the borrower.

² Revenue split represents the share of revenue generated by the securities lending program and paid to the Securities Lending Agent.

³ Cash collateral management fees include fees deducted from a pooled cash collateral reinvestment vehicle that are not included in the revenue split.

⁴ These administrative fees are not included in the revenue split.

⁵ These indemnification fees are not included in the revenue split.

PORTFOLIO TRANSACTIONS AND BROKERAGE

When selecting brokers and dealers to handle the purchase and sale of portfolio securities, the Adviser looks for prompt execution of the order at a favorable price. Generally, the Adviser works with recognized dealers in these securities, except when a better price and execution of the order can be obtained elsewhere. The Funds will not deal with affiliates in principal transactions unless permitted by exemptive order or applicable rule or regulation. The Adviser owes a duty to its clients to provide best execution on trades effected.

The Adviser assumes general supervision over placing orders on behalf of the Trust for the purchase or sale of portfolio securities. If purchases or sales of portfolio securities of the Trust and one or more other investment companies or clients supervised by the Adviser are considered at or about the same time, transactions in such securities are allocated among the several investment companies and clients in a manner deemed equitable to all by the Adviser. In some cases, this procedure could have a detrimental effect on the price or volume of the security so far as the Trust is concerned.

The portfolio managers may deem it appropriate for one fund or account they manage to sell a security while another fund or account they manage is purchasing the same security. Under such circumstances, the portfolio managers may arrange to have the purchase and sale transactions effected directly between the funds and/or accounts (“cross transactions”). Cross transactions will be effected in accordance with procedures adopted pursuant to Rule 17a-7 under the 1940 Act.

Portfolio turnover may vary from year to year, as well as within a year. High turnover rates are likely to result in comparatively greater brokerage expenses. The overall reasonableness of brokerage commissions is evaluated by the Adviser based upon its knowledge of available information as to the general level of commissions paid by other institutional investors for comparable services.

The Adviser may cause the Funds to pay a broker-dealer who furnishes brokerage and/or research services, a commission that is in excess of the commission another broker-dealer would have received for executing the transaction, if it is determined that such commission is reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and/or research services as defined in Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, which have been provided. Such research services may include, among other things, analyses and reports concerning issuers, industries, securities, economic factors and trends and portfolio strategy. Any such research and other information provided by brokers to the Adviser is considered to be in addition to and not in lieu of services required to be performed by the Adviser under its Advisory Agreements with the Trust. The research services provided by broker-dealers can be useful to the Adviser in serving its other clients or clients of the Adviser's affiliates. The Board periodically reviews the Adviser's performance of its responsibilities in connection with the placement of portfolio transactions on behalf of the Funds. The Board also reviews the commissions paid by the Funds over representative periods of time to determine if they are reasonable in relation to the benefits to the Funds.

The aggregate amount of brokerage transactions directed to a broker during the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023 for, among other things, research services, and the commissions and concessions related to such transactions were as follows:

Fund	Transaction Amount	Commissions and Concessions
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund	None	None
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund	\$20,287,119	\$37,029
VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund	\$241,782,078	\$192,057
VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund	\$21,028,797	\$23,707

The table below shows the aggregate amount of brokerage commissions paid on purchases and sales of portfolio securities by each Fund during the Fund's three most recent fiscal years ended December 31. None of such amounts were paid to brokers or dealers which furnished daily quotations to the Fund for the purpose of calculating daily per share net asset value or to brokers and dealers which sold shares of the Fund.

2023	
<u>COMMISSIONS</u>	
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund	None
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund	\$ 54,017
VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund	\$ 226,727
VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund	\$ 31,812
2022	
<u>COMMISSIONS</u>	
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund	None
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund	\$ 52,231
VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund	\$ 199,850
VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund	\$ 26,142
2021	
<u>COMMISSIONS</u>	
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund	None
VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund	\$ 166,067
VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund	\$ 95,087
VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund	\$ 31,060

The Adviser does not consider sales of shares of the Funds as a factor in the selection of broker-dealers to execute portfolio transactions for the Funds. The Adviser has implemented policies and procedures pursuant to Rule 12b-1(h) that are reasonably designed to prevent the consideration of the sales of fund shares when selecting broker-dealers to execute trades.

Due to the potentially high rate of turnover, the Funds may pay a greater amount in brokerage commissions than a similar size fund with a lower turnover rate. The portfolio turnover rates of all Funds may vary greatly from year to year.

TRUSTEES AND OFFICERS

LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE AND THE BOARD

The Board has general oversight responsibility with respect to the operation of the Trust and the Funds. The Board has engaged the Adviser to serve as the investment adviser for the Funds. The Board is responsible for overseeing the provision of services to the Trust and the Funds by the Adviser and the other service providers in accordance with the provisions of the 1940 Act and other applicable laws. The Board is currently composed of six (6) Trustees, five of whom are Independent Trustees. In addition to five (5) regularly scheduled meetings per year, the Independent Trustees meet regularly in executive sessions among themselves and with their counsel to consider a variety of matters affecting the Trust. These sessions generally occur prior to, or during, scheduled Board meetings and at such other times as the Trustees may deem necessary. Each Independent Trustee attended at least 75% of the total number of meetings of the Board in the year ending December 31, 2023. As discussed in further detail below, the Board has established three (3) standing committees to assist the Board in performing its oversight responsibilities.

The Board believes that the Board's leadership structure is appropriate in light of the characteristics and circumstances of the Trust and each of the Funds, including factors such as the number of Funds that comprise the Trust, the variety of asset classes in which those Funds invest, the net assets of the Funds, the committee structure of the Trust, and the management, distribution and other service arrangements of the Funds. In connection with its determination, the Board considered that the Board is comprised primarily of Independent Trustees, and that the Chairperson of the Board and the Chairperson of each of the Audit Committee and the Governance Committee is an Independent Trustee. The Board believes having an interested trustee on the Board and as Chairperson of the Investment Oversight Committee provides it with additional access to the perspectives and resources of the Advisers and their affiliates. In addition, to further align the Trustees' interests with those of Fund shareholders, the Board has, among other things, adopted a policy requiring each Trustee to maintain a minimum direct or indirect investment in the Funds.

The Chairperson presides at all meetings of the Board and participates in the preparation of the agenda for such meetings. She also serves as a liaison with management, service providers, officers, attorneys, and the other Trustees generally between meetings. The Chairperson may also perform other such functions as may be delegated by the Board from time to time. The Trustees believe that the Chairperson's independence facilitates meaningful dialogue between the Adviser and the Independent Trustees. Except for any duties specified herein or pursuant to the Trust's Master Trust Agreement, the designation of Chairperson does not impose on such Independent Trustee any duties, obligations or liability that is greater than the duties, obligations or liability imposed on such person as a member of the Board, generally.

The Independent Trustees regularly meet outside the presence of management and are advised by independent legal counsel. The Board believes that its Committees help ensure that the Trust has effective and independent governance and oversight. The Board also believes that its leadership structure facilitates the orderly and efficient flow of information to the Trustees from management of the Trust, and from the Adviser.

RISK OVERSIGHT

The Funds and the Trust are subject to a number of risks, including investment, compliance, operational, and valuation risks. Day-to-day risk management functions are within the responsibilities of the Adviser, the Distributor and the other service providers (depending on the nature of the risk) that carry out the Funds' investment management, distribution and business affairs. Each of the Adviser, the Distributor and the other service providers have their own, independent interests and responsibilities in risk management, and their policies and methods of carrying out risk management functions will depend, in part, on their individual priorities, resources and controls.

Risk oversight forms part of the Board's general oversight of the Funds and the Trust and is addressed through various activities of the Board and its Committees. As part of its regular oversight of the Funds and Trust, the Board, directly or through a Committee, meets with representatives of various service providers and reviews reports from, among others, the Adviser, the Distributor, the Chief Compliance Officer of the Funds, and the independent registered public accounting firm for the Funds regarding risks faced by the Funds and relevant risk management functions. The Board or Investment Oversight Committee, with the assistance of management, reviews investment policies and related risks in connection with its review of the Funds' performance and its evaluation of the nature and quality of the services provided by the Adviser. The Board has appointed a Chief Compliance Officer for the Funds who oversees the implementation and testing of the Funds' compliance program and reports to the Board regarding compliance matters for the Funds and their principal service providers. The Chief Compliance Officer's designation, removal and compensation must be approved by the Board, including a majority of the Independent Trustees. Material changes to the compliance program are reviewed by and approved by the Board. In addition, as part of the Board's periodic review of the Funds' advisory, distribution and other service provider agreements, the Board may consider risk management aspects of their operations and the functions for which they are responsible, including the manner in which such service providers implement and administer their codes of ethics and related policies and procedures. For certain of its

service providers, such as the Adviser and Distributor, the Board also receives reports periodically regarding business continuity and disaster recovery plans, as well as actions being taken to address cybersecurity and other information technology risks. With respect to valuation, the Board approves and periodically reviews valuation policies and procedures applicable to valuing the Funds' shares. The Adviser is responsible for the implementation and day-to-day administration of these valuation policies and procedures and provides reports periodically to the Board regarding these and related matters. In addition, the Board or the Audit Committee of the Board receives reports at least annually from the independent registered public accounting firm for the Funds regarding tests performed by such firm on the valuation of all securities. Reports received from the Adviser and the independent registered public accounting firm assist the Board in performing its oversight function of valuation activities and related risks.

The Board recognizes that not all risks that may affect the Funds and the Trust can be identified, that it may not be practical or cost-effective to eliminate or mitigate certain risks, that it may be necessary to bear certain risks to achieve the Funds' or Trust's goals, and that the processes, procedures and controls employed to address certain risks may be limited in their effectiveness. Moreover, reports received by the Board that may relate to risk management matters are typically summaries of the relevant information. As a result of the foregoing and other factors, the function of the Board with respect to risk management is one of oversight and not active involvement in, or coordination of, day-to-day risk management activities for the Funds or Trust. The Board may, at any time and in its discretion, change the manner in which it conducts its risk oversight role.

TRUSTEE INFORMATION

The Trustees of the Trust, their address, position with the Trust, age and principal occupations during the past five years are set forth below.

TRUSTEE'S NAME, ADDRESS⁽¹⁾ AND YEAR OF BIRTH	POSITION(S) HELD WITH TRUST, TERM OF OFFICE⁽²⁾ AND LENGTH OF TIME SERVED	PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION(S) DURING PAST FIVE YEARS	NUMBER OF PORTFOLIOS IN FUND COMPLEX⁽³⁾ OVERSEEN BY TRUSTEE	OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS HELD OUTSIDE THE FUND COMPLEX⁽³⁾ DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS
INDEPENDENT TRUSTEES:				
Jayesh Bhansali 1964 (A)(G)(I)	Trustee (since 2022)	Chief Investment Officer, IRIQIV LLC (a multi- family office). Formerly, Managing Director and Lead Portfolio Manager, Nuveen, a TIAA company.	10	Trustee, YMCA Retirement Fund; Trustee of Judge Baker Children's Center; Director of Under One Roof.

TRUSTEE'S NAME, ADDRESS⁽¹⁾ AND YEAR OF BIRTH	POSITION(S) HELD WITH TRUST, TERM OF OFFICE⁽²⁾ AND LENGTH OF TIME SERVED	PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION(S) DURING PAST FIVE YEARS	NUMBER OF PORTFOLIOS IN FUND COMPLEX⁽³⁾ OVERSEEN BY TRUSTEE	OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS HELD OUTSIDE THE FUND COMPLEX⁽³⁾ DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS
INDEPENDENT TRUSTEES:				
Jon Lukomnik 1956 (A)(G)(I)	Trustee (since 2006); Chairperson of the Audit Committee (since 2021)	Managing Partner, Sinclair Capital LLC (consulting firm). Adjunct Professor, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University. Formerly, Pembroke Visiting Professor of International Finance, Judge Business School, Cambridge.	10	Member of the Deloitte Audit Quality Advisory Committee; Director, The Shareholder Commons; Director of VanEck ICAV (an Irish UCITS); VanEck Vectors UCITS ETF plc (an Irish UCITS). Formerly, Director of VanEck (a Luxembourg UCITS); Member of the Standards and Emerging Issues Advisory Group to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
Jane DiRenzo Pigott 1957 (A)(G)(I)	Trustee (since 2007); Chairperson of the Board (since 2020)	Managing Director, R3 Group LLC (consulting firm).	10	Board member for Gratitude Railroad LLC and Impact Engine Management, PBC; Trustee of Northwestern University, Lyric Opera of Chicago and the Chicago Symphony Orchestra. Formerly, Director and Chair of Audit Committee of 3E Company (services relating to hazardous material safety); Director of MetLife Investment Funds, Inc.

TRUSTEE'S NAME, ADDRESS⁽¹⁾ AND YEAR OF BIRTH	POSITION(S) HELD WITH TRUST, TERM OF OFFICE⁽²⁾ AND LENGTH OF TIME SERVED	PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION(S) DURING PAST FIVE YEARS	NUMBER OF PORTFOLIOS IN FUND COMPLEX⁽³⁾ OVERSEEN BY TRUSTEE	OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS HELD OUTSIDE THE FUND COMPLEX⁽³⁾ DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS
INDEPENDENT TRUSTEES:				
R. Alastair Short 1953 (A)(G)(I)	Trustee (since 2004)	President, Apex Capital Corporation (personal investment vehicle).	79	Chairman and Independent Director, EULAV Asset Management; Lead Independent Director, Total Fund Solution; Independent Director, Contingency Capital, LLC; Trustee, Kenyon Review; Trustee, Children's Village. Formerly, Independent Director, Tremont offshore funds.
Richard D. Stamberger 1959 (A)(G)(I)	Trustee (since 1995); Chairperson of the Governance Committee (since 2022)	Senior Vice President, B2B, Future Plc (global media company), July 2020 to August 2022; President, CEO and co-founder, SmartBrief, Inc., 1999 to 2020.	79	Director, Food and Friends, Inc.; Board Member, The Arc Foundation of the US; Chairman, Lifetime Care Services, LLC.

TRUSTEE'S NAME, ADDRESS⁽¹⁾ AND YEAR OF BIRTH	POSITION(S) HELD WITH TRUST, TERM OF OFFICE⁽²⁾ AND LENGTH OF TIME SERVED	PRINCIPAL OCCUPATION(S) DURING PAST FIVE YEARS	NUMBER OF PORTFOLIOS IN FUND COMPLEX⁽³⁾ OVERSEEN BY TRUSTEE	OTHER DIRECTORSHIPS HELD OUTSIDE THE FUND COMPLEX⁽³⁾ DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS
INTERESTED TRUSTEE:				
Jan F. van Eck ⁽⁴⁾ 1963 (I)	Trustee (Since 2019); Chairperson of the Investment Oversight Committee (since 2020); Chief Executive Officer and President (Since 2010)	Director, President and Chief Executive Officer of VEAC, Van Eck Absolute Return Advisers Corporation ("VEARA") and VESC; Officer and/or Director of other companies affiliated with VEAC and/or the Trust.	79	Director, National Committee on US-China Relations.

(1) The address for each Trustee and officer is 666 Third Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, New York 10017.

(2) Trustee serves until resignation, death, retirement or removal.

(3) The Fund Complex consists of VanEck Funds, VanEck VIP Trust and VanEck ETF Trust.

(4) "Interested person" of the Trust within the meaning of the 1940 Act. Mr. van Eck is an officer of VEAC, VEARA and VESC. In addition, Mr. van Eck and members of his family own 100% of the voting stock of VEAC, which in turns owns 100% of the voting stock of each of VEARA and VESC.

(A) Member of the Audit Committee.

(G) Member of the Governance Committee.

(I) Member of the Investment Oversight Committee.

Set forth below is additional information relating to the professional experience, attributes and skills of each Trustee relevant to such individual's qualifications to serve as a Trustee:

Jayesh Bhansali has extensive business and financial experience and currently serves as the Chief Investment Officer of IRIQIV LLC, a multi-family office. He was previously a Managing Director and Lead Portfolio Manager at Nuveen, a TIAA company, and has over 25 years of experience in the investment management industry. Mr. Bhansali also serves as a member of the board for multiple not-for-profit organizations.

Jon Lukomnik has extensive business and financial experience, particularly in the investment management industry. He currently serves as: Managing Partner of Sinclair Capital LLC, a consulting firm to the investment management industry; and is a member of Deloitte LLP's Audit Quality Advisory Council. He previously served as chairman of the Advisory Committee of Legion Partners Asset Management, a registered investment advisor that provides investment management and consulting services to various institutional clients; and was a member of the Standards and Emerging Issues Advisory Group to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.

Jane DiRenzo Pigott has extensive business and financial experience and serves as Managing Director of R3 Group LLC, a firm specializing in talent retention, development and matriculation consulting services. Ms. Pigott has prior experience as an independent trustee of other mutual funds and previously served as chair of the global Environmental Law practice group at Winston & Strawn LLP.

R. Alastair Short has extensive business and financial experience, particularly in the investment management industry. He has served as a president, board member or executive officer of various businesses, including asset management and private equity investment firms.

Richard D. Stamberger has extensive business and financial experience as founder, president and CEO of SmartBrief, Inc., and previous service as the Senior Vice President of B2B, Future Plc, a global media company. Mr. Stamberger has experience as a member of the board of directors of numerous not-for-profit organizations and has more than 20 years of experience as a member of the Board of the Trust.

Jan F. van Eck has extensive business and financial experience, particularly in the investment management industry. He currently serves as president, executive officer and/or board member of various businesses, including VEAC, VESC, and VEARA.

The forgoing information regarding the experience, qualifications, attributes and skills of each Trustee is provided pursuant to requirements of the SEC, and does not constitute holding out of the Board or any Trustee as having any special expertise or experience, and shall not impose any greater responsibility or liability on any such person or on the Board by reason thereof.

COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

The Board has established a standing Audit Committee, a standing Governance Committee, and a standing Investment Oversight Committee to assist the Board in the oversight and direction of the business and affairs of the Trust.

Audit Committee. The duties of this Committee include meeting with representatives of the Trust's independent registered public accounting firm to review fees, services, procedures, conclusions and recommendations of independent registered public accounting firm and to discuss the Trust's system of internal controls. Thereafter, the Committee reports to the Board the Committee's findings and recommendations concerning internal accounting matters as well as its recommendation for retention or dismissal of the auditing firm. Except for any duties specified herein or pursuant to the Trust's charter document, the designation of Chairperson of the Audit Committee does not impose on such Independent Trustee any duties, obligations or liability that is greater than the duties, obligations or liability imposed on such person as a member of the Board, generally. The Audit Committee met four times during the last fiscal year, and currently consists of the following Trustees: Mr. Lukomnik (Chairperson), Mr. Short, Mr. Stamberger, Ms. Pigott and Mr. Bhansali.

Governance Committee. The duties of this Committee include the consideration of recommendations to the Trustees for the Board nominations for Trustees, review of the composition of the Board, compensation and similar matters. In addition, the Governance Committee periodically reviews the performance of the Board and its Committees, including the effectiveness and composition of the overall Board, Board's Committees, and the Chairperson of the Board and other related matters. When considering potential nominees for election to the Board and to fill vacancies occurring on the Board, where shareholder approval is not required, and as part of the annual self-evaluation, the Governance Committee reviews the mix of skills and other relevant experiences of the Trustees. The Governance Committee met four times during the last fiscal year, and currently consists of the following Trustees: Mr. Stamberger (Chairperson), Mr. Lukomnik, Mr. Short, Ms. Pigott and Mr. Bhansali.

The Independent Trustees shall, when identifying candidates for the position of Independent Trustee, consider candidates recommended by a shareholder of a Fund if such recommendation provides sufficient background information concerning the candidate and evidence that the candidate is willing to serve as an Independent Trustee if selected, and is received in a sufficiently timely manner. Shareholders should address recommendations in writing to the attention of the Governance Committee, c/o the Secretary of the Trust, at 666 Third Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, NY 10017. The Secretary

shall retain copies of any shareholder recommendations which meet the foregoing requirements for a period of not more than 12 months following receipt. The Secretary shall have no obligation to acknowledge receipt of any shareholder recommendations.

Investment Oversight Committee. The duties of this Committee include the review of investment performance of the Funds, meeting with relevant Adviser personnel and outside experts, and overseeing the provision of investment-related services for the Funds. In addition, the Committee will review on a periodic basis and consider a variety of matters, such as proposed material changes to, each Fund's investment strategy (if applicable), investment processes, investment personnel, non-personnel resources, and relevant investment markets. The Investment Oversight Committee was established by vote of the Board, effective January 1, 2020. This Committee met four times during the last fiscal year, and currently consists of all the Trustees, and Mr. van Eck serves as Chairperson.

OFFICER INFORMATION

The executive officers of the Trust, their age and address, the positions they hold with the Trust, their term of office and length of time served and their principal business occupations during the past five years are shown below.

OFFICER'S NAME, ADDRESS⁽¹⁾ AND YEAR OF BIRTH	POSITION(S) HELD WITH TRUST	TERM OF OFFICE AND LENGTH OF TIME SERVED⁽²⁾	PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS
Lawrence G. Altadonna, 1966	Vice President and Treasurer	Since 2024	Vice President of VEAC and VEARA; Officer of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA. Formerly, Fund Assistant Treasurer and Vice President of Credit Suisse Asset Management, LLC (June 2022- January 2024).
Matthew A. Babinsky, 1983	Assistant Vice President and Assistant Secretary	Since 2016	Vice President, Associate General Counsel and Assistant Secretary of VEAC, VEARA and Van Eck Securities Corporation (VESC); Officer of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA. Formerly, Assistant Vice President of VEAC, VEARA and VESC.
Russell G. Brennan, 1964	Assistant Vice President and Assistant Treasurer	Since 2008	Assistant Vice President of VEAC; Officer of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA.
Charles T. Cameron, 1960	Vice President	Since 1996	Portfolio Manager for VEAC; Officer and/or Portfolio Manager of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA. Formerly, Director of Trading of VEAC.
John J. Crimmins, 1957	Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Principal Accounting Officer	Since 2012	Vice President of VEAC and VEARA; Officer of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA. Formerly, Vice President of VESC. Formerly, Treasurer of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA.
Susan Curry, 1966	Assistant Vice President	Since 2022	Assistant Vice President of VEAC, VEARA and VESC; Formerly, Managing Director, Legg Mason, Inc.
F. Michael Gozzillo, 1965	Chief Compliance Officer	Since 2018	Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer of VEAC and VEARA; Chief Compliance Officer of VESC; Officer of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA. Formerly, Chief Compliance Officer of City National Rochdale, LLC and City National Rochdale Funds.

OFFICER'S NAME, ADDRESS⁽¹⁾ AND YEAR OF BIRTH	POSITION(S) HELD WITH TRUST	TERM OF OFFICE AND LENGTH OF TIME SERVED⁽²⁾	PRINCIPAL OCCUPATIONS DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS
Laura Hamilton, 1977	Vice President	Since 2019	Assistant Vice President of VEAC and VESC; Officer of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA. Formerly, Operations Manager of Royce & Associates.
Laura I. Martinez, 1980	Vice President and Assistant Secretary	Vice President (since 2016); Assistant Secretary (since 2008)	Vice President, Associate General Counsel and Assistant Secretary of VEAC, VEARA and VESC; Officer of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA.
Lisa A. Moss	Assistant Vice President and Assistant Secretary	Since 2022	Assistant Vice President of VEAC, VEARA and VESC; Officer of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA. Formerly Senior Counsel, Perkins Coie LLP.
James Parker, 1969	Assistant Treasurer	Since 2014	Assistant Vice President of VEAC and VEARA; Manager, Portfolio Administration of VEAC and VEARA; Officer of other investment companies advised by VEAC and VEARA.
Jonathan R. Simon, 1974	Senior Vice President, Secretary and Chief Legal Officer	Senior Vice President (since 2016); Secretary and Chief Legal Officer (since 2014)	Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary of VEAC, VEARA and VESC; Officer and/or Director of other companies affiliated with VEAC and/or the Trust.
Andrew Tilzer, 1972	Assistant Vice President	Since 2021	Vice President of VEAC and VEARA; Vice President of Portfolio Administration of VEAC. Formerly, Assistant Vice President, Portfolio Operations of VEAC.

(1) The address for each Executive Officer is 666 Third Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, NY 10017.

(2) Officers are elected yearly by the Board.

TRUSTEE SHARE OWNERSHIP

For each Trustee, the dollar range of equity securities beneficially owned by the Trustee in the Trust and in all registered investment companies advised by the Adviser or its affiliates (“Family of Investment Companies”) that are overseen by the Trustee is shown below.

Name of Trustee	Dollar Range of Equity Securities in the Trust (As of December 31, 2023)*	Aggregate Dollar Range of Equity Securities in all Registered Investment Companies Overseen By Trustee In Family of Investment Companies (As of December 31, 2023)
Jayesh Bhansali	None	\$50,001 - \$100,000*
Jon Lukomnik	None	Over \$100,000*
Jane DiRenzo Pigott	None	Over \$100,000*
R. Alastair Short	None	Over \$100,000
Richard D. Stamberger	None	Over \$100,000*
Jan F. van Eck	None	Over \$100,000

* Includes ownership through the Trust's deferred compensation plan as of December 31, 2023.

As of March 31, 2024, all of the Trustees and Officers, as a group, owned less than 1% of each Fund and each class of each Fund.

As to each Independent Trustee and his/her immediate family members, no person owned beneficially or of record securities in an investment manager or principal underwriter of the Funds, or a person (other than a registered investment company) directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common control with the investment manager or principal underwriter of the Funds.

2023 COMPENSATION TABLE

The Trustees are paid for services rendered to the Trust and VanEck Funds (the “VanEck Trusts”), each a registered investment company managed by the Adviser or its affiliates, which are allocated to each series of the VanEck Trusts based on their average daily net assets. Each Independent Trustee is paid an annual retainer of \$80,000, a per meeting fee of \$10,000 for regularly scheduled meetings of the Board and a per meeting fee of \$5,000 for special Board and/or Committee meetings. The VanEck Trusts pay the Chairperson of the Board an annual retainer of \$30,000, the Chairperson of the Audit Committee an annual retainer of \$15,000 and the Chairperson of the Governance Committee an annual retainer of \$15,000. The VanEck Trusts also reimburse each Trustee for travel and other out-of-pocket expenses incurred in attending such meetings. No pension or retirement benefits are accrued as part of Trustee compensation.

The table below shows the compensation paid to the Independent Trustees for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023. Annual Independent Trustee fees may be reviewed periodically and changed by the Board.

	Jayesh Bhansali⁽¹⁾	Jon Lukomnik⁽²⁾	Jane DiRenzo Pigott⁽³⁾	R. Alastair Short	Richard D. Stamberger⁽⁴⁾
Aggregate Compensation from the VanEck Trusts	\$130,000	\$145,000	\$160,000	\$130,000	\$145,000
Aggregate Deferred Compensation from the VanEck Trusts	\$65,000	\$72,500	\$-	\$-	\$29,000
Pension or Retirement Benefits Accrued as Part of the VanEck Trusts’ Expenses	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Estimated Annual Benefits Upon Retirement	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Total Compensation From the VanEck Trusts and the Fund Complex ⁽⁵⁾ Paid to Trustee	\$130,000	\$145,000	\$160,000	\$414,500	\$416,500

- (1) As of December 31, 2023, the value of Mr. Bhansali’s account under the deferred compensation plan was \$67,086.
- (2) As of December 31, 2023, the value of Mr. Lukomnik’s account under the deferred compensation plan was \$1,365,999.
- (3) As of December 31, 2023, the value of Ms. Pigott’s account under the deferred compensation plan was \$733,643.
- (4) As of December 31, 2023, the value of Mr. Stamberger’s account under the deferred compensation plan was \$982,716.
- (5) The “Fund Complex” consists of the VanEck Trusts and VanEck ETF Trust.

PRINCIPAL SHAREHOLDERS

Principal Holders Ownership

As of March 31, 2024, shareholders of record of 5% or more of the outstanding shares of each class of a Fund were as follows:

FUND AND CLASS	NAME AND ADDRESS OF OWNER	PERCENTAGE OF CLASS OF FUND OWNED
VIP Emerging Markets Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life NWPP c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	26.96 %
VIP Emerging Markets Fund Initial Class	Jefferson National Life Insurance Co. c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	19.94 %
VIP Emerging Markets Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life PMLIC VLI c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	13.29 %
VIP Emerging Markets Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life NWVA II c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	7.16 %
VIP Emerging Markets Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life NWVA9 c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	6.54 %
VIP Emerging Markets Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life NWVLI-4 c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	5.73 %
VIP Emerging Markets Fund Class S	Nationwide Life NWVA4 c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	80.72 %
VIP Emerging Markets Fund Class S	Nationwide Life NWVA-15 c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	17.44 %
VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life NWVA II c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	24.74 %

FUND AND CLASS	NAME AND ADDRESS OF OWNER	PERCENTAGE OF CLASS OF FUND OWNED
VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund Initial Class	Jefferson National Life Insurance Company c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	13.87 %
VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life PMLIC VLI c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	12.96 %
VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund Initial Class	Great-West OneSource 8515 E Orchard Rd. Greenwood Village, CO 80111-5002	11.42 %
VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund Initial Class	Great-West Select 8515 E Orchard Rd. Greenwood Village, CO 80111-5002	5.29 %
VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life Insurance Co. VA Attn: Penny Dooley- M415 One National Life Dr. Montpelier, VT 05604-1000	5.12 %
VIP Global Resources Fund Initial Class	Pacific Life Selexd D2 c/o Pacific Life Insurance Company 700 Newport Center Dr. Newport Beach, CA 92660-6307	19.35 %
VIP Global Resources Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life NWPP c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	12.24 %
VIP Global Resources Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life NWVLI-4 c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	10.32 %
VIP Global Resources Fund Initial Class	Midland National Life Value Attn: Variable Life Services PO Box 79907 Des Moines, IA 50325-0907	6.78 %
VIP Global Resources Fund Initial Class	Nationwide Life NWVA II c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	6.49%

FUND AND CLASS	NAME AND ADDRESS OF OWNER	PERCENTAGE OF CLASS OF FUND OWNED
VIP Global Resources Fund Initial Class	Jefferson National Life Insurance Company c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	5.42%
VIP Global Resources Fund Class S	Nationwide Life NWVA II c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	25.26 %
VIP Global Resources Fund Class S	Pacific Life SA-A c/o Pacific Life Insurance Co. 700 Newport Center Dr. Newport Beach, CA 92660-6397	13.42 %
VIP Global Resources Fund Class S	AXA Equitable Life SA-A c/o J.P. Morgan Worldwide Securities Services 1 Beacon St. Boston, MA 02108-3107	12.93 %
VIP Global Resources Fund Class S	AXA Equitable Life SA FP c/o J.P. Morgan Worldwide Securities Services 1 Beacon St. Boston, MA 02108-3107	9.46 %
VIP Global Resources Fund Class S	AXA Equitable Life SA 70 c/o J.P. Morgan Worldwide Securities Services 1 Beacon St. Boston, MA 02108-3107	5.88 %
VIP Global Gold Fund Class S	Riversource Life Insurance Company Attn: Investment Accounting 10468 Ameriprise Financial Ctr. Minneapolis, MN 55474-0001	68.39 %
VIP Global Gold Fund Class S	Jefferson National Life Insurance Co. c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	16.75 %
VIP Global Gold Fund Class S	Nationwide Life NWVA4 c/o IPO Portfolio Accounting PO Box 182029 Columbus, OH 43218-2029	9.43 %

Control Person Ownership

As of March 31, 2024, no person owned directly or indirectly or through one or more controlled companies more than 25% of the voting securities of a Fund, except for VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund. For VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund, a shareholder who may be deemed to be a “control person” (as that term is defined in the 1940 Act) because the shareholder owns of record more than 25% of the outstanding shares of the Fund by virtue of its fiduciary roles with respect to its clients or otherwise, is shown below. A control person may be able to facilitate shareholder approval of proposals it approves and to

impede shareholder approval of proposals it opposes. If a control person's record ownership of the Fund's outstanding shares exceeds 50%, then, for certain shareholder proposals, such control person may be able to approve, or prevent approval, of such proposals without regard to votes by other Fund shareholders.

<u>FUND</u>	<u>NAME AND ADDRESS OF OWNER</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF FUND OWNED</u>
VIP Global Gold Fund	Riversource Life Insurance Company Attn: Investment Accounting 10468 Ameriprise Financial Ctr. Minneapolis, MN 55474-0001	68.39%

PROXY VOTING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

The Funds' proxy voting record is available upon request and on the SEC's website at <http://www.sec.gov>. Proxies for each Fund's portfolio securities are voted in accordance with the Adviser's proxy voting policies and procedures, which are set forth in Appendix A to this SAI.

The Trust is required to disclose annually each Fund's complete proxy voting record on Form N-PX covering the period July 1 through June 30 and file it with the SEC no later than August 31. Form N-PX for the Funds is available through the Funds' website, at vaneck.com, or by writing to 666 Third Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, New York 10017. The Funds' Form N-PX is also available on the SEC's website at www.sec.gov.

POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

The Adviser (and its principals, affiliates or employees) may serve as investment adviser to other client accounts and conduct investment activities for their own accounts. Such “Other Clients” may have investment objectives or may implement investment strategies similar to those of the Funds. When the Adviser implements investment strategies for Other Clients that are similar or directly contrary to the positions taken by a Fund, the prices of the Fund’s securities may be negatively affected. For example, when purchase or sales orders for a Fund are aggregated with those of other Funds and/or Other Clients and allocated among them, the price that the Fund pays or receives may be more in the case of a purchase or less in a sale than if the Adviser served as adviser to only the Fund. When Other Clients are selling a security that a Fund owns, the price of that security may decline as a result of the sales. The compensation that the Adviser receives from Other Clients may be higher than the compensation paid by a Fund to the Adviser. The Adviser has implemented procedures to monitor trading across the Funds and its Other Clients. Furthermore, the Adviser may recommend a Fund purchase securities of issues to which it, or its affiliate, acts as adviser, manager, sponsor, distributor, marketing agent, or in another capacity and for which it receives advisory or other fees. While this practice may create conflicts of interest, the Adviser has adopted procedures to minimize such conflicts.

CODE OF ETHICS

The Funds, the Adviser and the Distributor have each adopted a Code of Ethics pursuant to Rule 17j-1 under the 1940 Act (“Rule 17j-1”). Such Codes of Ethics require, among other things, that “access persons” (as defined in Rule 17j-1) conduct personal securities transactions in a manner that avoids any actual or potential conflict of interest or any abuse of a position of trust and responsibility. The Codes of Ethics allow such access persons to invest in securities that may be purchased and held by a Fund, provided such investments are done consistently with the provisions of the Codes of Ethics.

PURCHASE OF SHARES

The Funds may invest in securities or futures contracts listed on foreign exchanges which trade on Saturdays or other customary United States national business holidays (i.e., days on which the Funds are not open for business). Consequently, since the Funds will compute their net asset values only Monday through Friday, exclusive of national business holidays, the net asset values of shares of the Funds may be significantly affected on days when an investor has no access to the Funds. The sale of shares will be suspended during any period when the determination of net asset value is suspended, and may be suspended by the Board whenever the Board judges it is in a Fund’s best interest to do so. Certificates for shares of the Funds will not be issued.

VALUATION OF SHARES

The net asset value per share of each of the Funds is computed by dividing the value of all of a Fund’s securities plus cash and other assets, less liabilities, by the number of shares outstanding. The net asset value per share is computed as of the close of the NYSE, usually 4:00 p.m. New York time, Monday through Friday, exclusive of national business holidays. The Funds will be closed on the following national business holidays: New Year’s Day, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, Presidents’ Day, Good Friday, Memorial Day, Juneteenth National Independence Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day and Christmas Day (or the days on which these holidays are observed).

Shares of the Funds are sold at the public offering price, which is determined once each day the Funds are open for business and is the net asset value per share. The net asset values need not be computed on a day in which no orders to purchase, sell or redeem shares of the Funds have been received.

Each Fund’s investments are generally valued based on market quotations which may be based on quotes obtained from a quotation reporting system, established market makers, broker dealers or by an independent pricing service. Short-term debt investments having a maturity of 60 days or less are valued at amortized cost, which approximates the fair value of the security. Assets or liabilities denominated in currencies other than the U.S. dollar are converted into U.S. dollars at the current market rates on the date of valuation as quoted by one or more sources. When market quotations are not readily available for a portfolio security or other asset, or, in the opinion of the Adviser, are deemed unreliable, a Fund will use the security’s or asset’s “fair value” as determined in good faith in accordance with the Funds’ Fair Value Pricing Policies and Procedures, which have been approved by the Board. As a general principle, the current fair value of a security or other asset is the amount which a Fund might reasonably expect to receive for the security or asset upon its current sale. The Funds’ Pricing Committee, whose members are selected by the senior management of the Adviser and reported to the Board, is responsible for recommending fair value procedures to the Board and for administering the process used to arrive at fair value prices. Factors

that may cause a Fund's Pricing Committee to fair value a security include, but are not limited to: (1) market quotations are not readily available because a portfolio security is not traded in a public market, trading in the security has been suspended, or the principal market in which the security trades is closed, (2) trading in a portfolio security is limited or suspended and not resumed prior to the time at which the Fund calculates its NAV, (3) the market for the relevant security is thin, or the price for the security is "stale" because its price has not changed for 5 consecutive business days, (4) the Adviser determines that a market quotation is not reliable, for example, because price movements are highly volatile and cannot be verified by a reliable alternative pricing source, or (5) a significant event affecting the value of a portfolio security is determined to have occurred between the time of the market quotation provided for a portfolio security and the time at which the Fund calculates its NAV.

In determining the fair value of securities, the Pricing Committee will consider, among other factors, the fundamental analytical data relating to the security, the nature and duration of any restrictions on the disposition of the security, and the forces influencing the market in which the security is traded.

Foreign equity securities in which the Funds invest may be traded in markets that close before the time that each Fund calculates its NAV. Foreign equity securities are normally priced based upon the market quotation of such securities as of the close of their respective principal markets, as adjusted to reflect the Adviser's determination of the impact of events, such as a significant movement in the U.S. markets occurring subsequent to the close of such markets but prior to the time at which the Fund calculates its NAV. In such cases, the Pricing Committee may apply a fair valuation formula to those foreign equity securities based on the Committee's determination of the effect of the U.S. significant event with respect to each local market.

Certain of the Funds' portfolio securities are valued by an independent pricing service approved by the Board. The independent pricing service may utilize an automated system incorporating a model based on multiple parameters, including a security's local closing price (in the case of foreign securities), relevant general and sector indices, currency fluctuations, and trading in depositary receipts and futures, if applicable, and/or research evaluations by its staff, in determining what it believes is the fair valuation of the portfolio securities valued by such independent pricing service.

There can be no assurance that the Funds could purchase or sell a portfolio security or other asset at the price used to calculate the Funds' NAV. Because of the inherent uncertainty in fair valuations, and the various factors considered in determining value pursuant to the Funds' fair value procedures, there can be material differences between a fair value price at which a portfolio security or other asset is being carried and the price at which it is purchased or sold. Furthermore, changes in the fair valuation of portfolio securities or other assets may be less frequent, and of greater magnitude, than changes in the price of portfolio securities or other assets valued by an independent pricing service, or based on market quotations.

TAXES

This section discusses certain U.S. federal income tax issues concerning this portfolio. This discussion does not purport to be complete or to deal with all aspects of federal income taxation that may be relevant to shareholders in light of their specific circumstances. This summary is based on the provisions of the Code, applicable U.S. Treasury regulations, administrative pronouncements of the IRS and judicial decisions in effect as of the date of this SAI. Those authorities may be changed, possibly retroactively, or may be subject to differing interpretations so as to result in U.S. federal income tax consequences different from those summarized herein. Prospective investors should consult their own tax advisers with regard to the federal tax consequences of the purchase, sale, or ownership of shares of this portfolio, in addition to the tax consequences arising under the laws of any state, foreign country or other taxing jurisdiction.

Each Fund has elected and intends to operate in a manner that will permit it to qualify to be treated each taxable year as a "regulated investment company" under Subchapter M of the Code. To so qualify, a Fund must, among other things, (a) derive at least 90% of its gross income from dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities loans, gains from the sale or other disposition of stock, securities or foreign currencies, or other income (including gains from options, futures or forward contracts) derived with respect to its business of investing in such stock, securities or currencies and (b) satisfy certain diversification requirements.

As a regulated investment company, a Fund will not be subject to federal income tax on its net investment income and capital gain net income (net long-term capital gains in excess of net short-term capital losses) that it distributes to shareholders if at least 90% of its investment company taxable income for the taxable year is distributed. However, if for any taxable year a Fund does not satisfy the requirements of Subchapter M of the Code, all of its taxable income will be subject to tax at the corporate income tax rate without any deduction for distributions to shareholders and such distributions will be taxable to shareholders as dividend income to the extent of the Fund's current or accumulated earnings or profits. In lieu of potential disqualification, a Fund is permitted to pay a tax for certain failures to satisfy the above requirements, which, in general, are limited to those due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect.

The Fund serves as the underlying investment for variable annuity contracts and variable life insurance policies ("Variable Contracts") issued through separate accounts of life insurance companies that may or may not be affiliated. In

addition to the diversification requirements under Subchapter M of the Code, Variable Contracts are subject to more stringent diversification rules pursuant to Section 817 of the Code. Variable Contracts will lose their favorable tax treatment should the underlying investments fail to meet the diversification requirements of Section 817(h). Generally, Section 817(h) and applicable regulatory guidelines state that in order to maintain diversification requirements, a separate account, or segregated asset account, may not invest more than 55% of the value of its total assets in a single investment, no more than 70% in any two investments, no more than 80% in any three investments and not more than 90% in any four investments. For the purpose of these restrictions, multiple investments in a single issuer constitute a single investment. Each United States government agency or instrumentality, however, is treated as a separate issuer. A Fund is structured so that a segregated account investing in the Fund can satisfy these diversification requirements by taking into account a pro rata portion of each asset of the Fund, rather than treating the Fund as a single investment. If a Fund fails to qualify as a registered investment company, the Section 817 diversification requirements may not be satisfied, and the variable contracts may be adversely affected. Additionally, in order to maintain the tax deferral of a separate account, the contract holder may not be treated as having control of the underlying investments in the account.

With respect to foreign securities, foreign taxes may be imposed on these investments by the applicable foreign tax authority regardless of any tax deferred or other status granted by the Code.

The Adviser shall manage this portfolio with the intention of complying with these diversification requirements such that the variable contracts do not lose their favorable tax status. It is possible, however, that in order to comply with these tax requirements, less desirable investment decisions shall be made which may affect the investment performance of the portfolio.

Subsidiary. The VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund intends to invest a portion of its assets in the Subsidiary, which will be classified as a corporation for U.S. federal income tax purposes. For U.S. federal income tax purposes, the Subsidiary will be treated as a controlled foreign corporation (“CFC”) and the Fund will be treated as a “U.S. shareholder” of the Subsidiary. As a result, the VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund will be required to include in gross income for U.S. federal income tax purposes all of the Subsidiary’s “subpart F income,” whether or not such income is distributed to the Fund (deemed inclusions). Recently released Treasury Regulations permit the Fund to treat deemed inclusions as satisfying the Income Requirement even if the Subsidiary does not make a distribution of such income. It is expected that all of the Subsidiary’s income will be “subpart F income.” The VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund’s recognition of the Subsidiary’s “subpart F income” will increase the Fund’s tax basis in the Subsidiary. Distributions by the Subsidiary to the VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund will be tax-free, to the extent of its previously undistributed “subpart F income,” and will correspondingly reduce the Fund’s tax basis in the Subsidiary. “Subpart F income” is generally treated as ordinary income, regardless of the character of the Subsidiary’s underlying income. If a net loss is realized by the Subsidiary, such loss is not generally available to offset the income earned by the Subsidiary’s parent Fund.

The VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund has received a private letter ruling from the IRS that concludes that income from the Fund’s investment in a subsidiary that is structured substantially similarly to the Subsidiary will constitute qualifying income for purposes of Subchapter M of the Code. However, applicable regulations treat “Subpart F” income (which includes passive income such as income from commodity-linked derivatives) as qualifying income even if a foreign corporation, such as a Subsidiary does not make a distribution of such income. As such, the Fund will no longer need to rely upon the private letter ruling received.

A foreign corporation, such as the Subsidiary, will generally not be subject to U.S. federal income taxation unless it is deemed to be engaged in a U.S. trade or business. It is expected that the Subsidiary will conduct its activities in a manner so as to meet the requirements of a safe harbor under Section 864(b)(2) of the Code under which the Subsidiary may engage in trading in stocks or securities or certain commodities under certain circumstances without being deemed to be engaged in a U.S. trade or business. However, if certain of the Subsidiary’s activities were determined not to be of the type described in the safe harbor (which the VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund does not expect), then the activities of such Subsidiary may constitute a U.S. trade or business, or be taxed as such.

In general, foreign corporations, such as the Subsidiary, that do not conduct a U.S. trade or business are nonetheless subject to tax at a flat rate of 30 percent (or lower tax treaty rate), generally payable through withholding, on the gross amount of certain U.S.-source income that is not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business. There is presently no tax treaty in force between the U.S. and the Cayman Islands, where the Subsidiary is a resident for U.S. federal income tax purposes, that would reduce this rate of withholding tax. It is not expected that the Subsidiary will derive income subject to such withholding tax.

Investments in Chinese Bonds

The VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund may invest in RMB-denominated bonds issued in the PRC.

There are some uncertainties in the PRC tax rules governing taxation of income and gains from investments in the PRC due to the lack of formal guidance from the PRC's tax authorities that could result in unexpected tax liabilities. On the basis that nonresidents enterprises (i) do not have places of business, establishments or permanent establishments in the PRC; and (ii) are not PRC tax resident enterprises, China generally may impose Withholding Income Tax ("WHT") at a rate of 10% (which may be reduced by the double taxation agreement/arrangement) on interest derived by nonresidents, from issuers resident in the PRC. However, on November 7, 2018, the PRC Ministry of Finance (MOF) and PRC State Administration of Taxation (SAT) jointly issued Caishui 2018 108 (Circular 108) to clarify the temporary three-year tax exemption on bond interest derived by foreign institutional investors (FIIs). Pursuant to Circular 108, FIIs are temporarily exempt from withholding income tax and value added tax with respect to bond interest income derived in the domestic bond market (via CIBM and Hong Kong Bond Connect) from November 7, 2018 to November 6, 2021. On November 26, 2021, the PRC Ministry of Finance and PRC State Taxation Administration jointly issued Caishui [2021] No. 34 ("Circular 34") to formally extend the tax exemption period provided in Circular 108 to December 31, 2025. Additionally, prior to November 7, 2018, interest received by nonresidents from PRC government bonds issued by the PRC Ministry of Finance ("MOF") or local government bonds was exempt from WHT. The term "local government bonds" refers to bonds which are approved by the PRC State Council to be issued by governments of provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the PRC government or municipalities separately listed on the state plan.

Under the PRC Corporate Income Tax regime, PRC also imposes WHT at a rate of 10% (subject to treaty relief) on PRC-sourced capital gains derived by nonresident enterprises, provided that the nonresident enterprises (i) do not have places of business, establishments or permanent establishments in the PRC; and (ii) are not PRC tax resident enterprises. The VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund currently considers capital gains derived from bonds issued by PRC entities to be non PRC-sourced income, and thus nonresident enterprises should not be subject to WHT on such gains.

Gains derived by nonresidents from the trading of bonds issued by PRC entities should be exempt from value-added tax.

PRC rules for taxation of nonresidents trading bonds via Bond Connect are evolving, and the PRC tax regulations to be issued by the PRC State Administration of Taxation and/or PRC MOF to clarify the subject matter may apply retrospectively, even if such rules are adverse to the nonresident investors. If the PRC tax authorities were to issue differing formal guidance or tax rules regarding the taxation of interest and capital gains derived by nonresident investors from PRC bonds, and / or begin collecting WHT on gains from such investments, the VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund could be subject to additional tax liabilities.

DESCRIPTION OF THE TRUST

The Trust is an open-end management investment company organized as a "business trust" under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on January 7, 1987. The Trust commenced operations on September 7, 1989. On April 12, 1995, Van Eck Investment Trust changed its name to Van Eck Worldwide Insurance Trust. On May 1, 2010, Van Eck Worldwide Insurance Trust changed its name to Van Eck VIP Trust. On May 1, 2016, Van Eck VIP Trust changed its name to VanEck VIP Trust.

The Board has authority to issue an unlimited number of shares of beneficial interest of each Fund, \$.001 par value. The Trust currently consists of four separate series: VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund, VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund, VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund, and VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund.

VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Bond Fund and VanEck VIP Global Gold Fund are classified as non-diversified funds under the 1940 Act. VanEck VIP Emerging Markets Fund and VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund are classified as diversified funds under the 1940 Act. A diversified fund is a fund which meets the following requirements: At least 75% of the value of its total assets is represented by cash and cash items (including receivables), Government securities, securities of other investment companies and other securities for the purpose of this calculation limited in respect of any one issuer to an amount not greater than 5% of the value of the Fund's total assets, and to not more than 10% of the outstanding voting securities of such issuer. A non-diversified fund is any fund other than a diversified fund. This means that the fund at the close of each quarter of its taxable year must, in general, limit its investment in the securities of a single issuer to (i) no more than 25% of its assets, (ii) with respect to 50% of the fund's assets, no more than 5% of its assets, and (iii) will not own more than 10% of outstanding voting securities. Each Fund is a separate pool of assets of the Trust which is separately managed and which may have a different investment objective from that of another Fund. The Board has the authority, without the necessity of a shareholder vote, to create any number of new series.

Each share of a Fund has equal dividend, redemption and liquidation rights and when issued is fully paid and non-assessable by the Trust. Under the Trust's Master Trust Agreement, as amended (the "Master Trust Agreement"), no annual or regular meeting of shareholders is required. Thus, there will ordinarily be no shareholder meetings unless required by the 1940 Act. The Trust held an initial meeting of shareholders on April 1, 1991, at which shareholders elected the Board, approved each Advisory Agreement and ratified the selection of the Trust's independent registered public accounting firm. On April 9, 1997, shareholders of Gold and Natural Resources Fund approved changes in the Fund's investment objective, policies and restrictions, which together with changes approved by the Board, resulted in the VanEck VIP Global Resources Fund as described in the Prospectus. The Board is a self-perpetuating body unless and until fewer than 50% of the Trustees, then serving as Trustees, are Trustees who were elected by shareholders. At that time another meeting of shareholders will be called to elect additional trustees. On any matter submitted to the shareholders, the holder of each Trust share is entitled to one vote per share (with proportionate voting for fractional shares). Under the Master Trust Agreement, any Trustee may be removed by vote of two-thirds of the outstanding Trust shares, and holders of ten percent or more of the outstanding shares of the Trust can require the Board to call a meeting of shareholders for purposes of voting on the removal of one or more trustees. Shareholders of all Funds are entitled to vote matters affecting all of the Funds (such as the election of Trustees and ratification of the selection of the Trust's independent registered public accounting firm). On matters affecting an individual Fund, a separate vote of that Fund is required. Shareholders of a Fund are not entitled to vote on any matter not affecting that Fund. In accordance with the 1940 Act, under certain circumstances, the Trust will assist shareholders in communicating with other shareholders in connection with calling a special meeting of shareholders. The insurance company separate accounts, as the sole shareholders of the Funds, have the right to vote Fund shares at any meeting of shareholders. However, the Contracts may provide that the separate accounts will vote Fund shares in accordance with instructions received from Contract holders.

Under Massachusetts law, the shareholders of the Trust could, under certain circumstances, be held personally liable for the obligations of the Trust. However, the Master Trust Agreement disclaims shareholder liability for acts or obligations of the Trust and requires that notice of such disclaimer be given in each agreement, obligation or instrument entered into or executed by the Trust or the Trustees. The Master Trust Agreement provides for indemnification out of the Trust's property of all losses and expenses of any shareholder held personally liable for the obligations of the Trust. Thus, the risk of a shareholder incurring financial loss on account of shareholder liability is limited to circumstances in which the Trust itself would be unable to meet its obligations. The Adviser believes that, in view of the above, the risk of personal liability to shareholders is remote.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Custodian. State Street Bank and Trust Company, One Lincoln Street, Boston, MA 02111, is the custodian of the Trust's portfolio securities, cash, coins and bullion. The Custodian is authorized, upon the approval of the Trust, to establish credits or debits in dollars or foreign currencies with, and to cause portfolio securities of a Fund to be held by its overseas branches or subsidiaries, and foreign banks and foreign securities depositories which qualify as eligible foreign custodians under the rules adopted by the SEC.

Transfer Agent. SS&C GIDS, Inc., 210 West 10th Street, 8th Floor, Kansas City, MO 64105, serves as transfer agent for the Trust.

Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 300 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10017, serves as independent registered public accounting firm for the Trust.

Counsel. Stradley Ronon Stevens and Young LLP, 2005 Market Street, Suite 2600, Philadelphia, PA 19103, serves as counsel to the Trust.

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

The [audited financial statements of the Funds for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2023](#) are incorporated by reference from the Funds' Annual Reports to shareholders, which are available at no charge by visiting the VanEck website at vaneck.com, or upon written or telephone request to the Trust at the address or telephone number set forth on the first page of this SAI.

APPENDIX A
ADVISER'S PROXY VOTING POLICIES
VANECK PROXY VOTING POLICIES

VanEck (the “Adviser” or “VanEck”) has adopted the following policies and procedures which are reasonably designed to ensure that proxies are voted in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of its clients in accordance with its fiduciary duties and Rule 206(4)-6 under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. When an adviser has been granted proxy voting authority by a client, the adviser owes its clients the duties of care and loyalty in performing this service on their behalf. The duty of care requires the adviser to monitor corporate actions and vote client proxies. The duty of loyalty requires the adviser to cast the proxy votes in a manner that is consistent with the best interests of the client.

Rule 206(4)-6 also requires the Adviser to disclose information about the proxy voting procedures to its clients and to inform clients how to obtain information about how their proxies were voted. Additionally, Rule 204-2 under the Advisers Act requires the Adviser to maintain certain proxy voting records.

An adviser that exercises voting authority without complying with Rule 206(4)-6 will be deemed to have engaged in a “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative” act, practice or course of business within the meaning of Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act.

The Adviser intends to vote all proxies in accordance with applicable rules and regulations, and in the best interests of clients without influence by real or apparent conflicts of interest. To assist in its responsibility for voting proxies and the overall voting process, the Adviser has engaged an independent third party proxy voting specialist, Glass Lewis & Co., LLC. The services provided by Glass Lewis include in-depth research, global issuer analysis, and voting recommendations as well as vote execution, reporting and recordkeeping.

Resolving Material Conflicts of Interest

When a material conflict of interest exists, proxies will be voted in the following manner:

1. Strict adherence to the Glass Lewis guidelines , or
2. The potential conflict will be disclosed to the client:
 - a. with a request that the client vote the proxy,
 - b. with a recommendation that the client engage another party to determine how the proxy should be voted or
 - c. if the foregoing are not acceptable to the client, disclosure of how VanEck intends to vote and a written consent to that vote by the client.

Any deviations from the foregoing voting mechanisms must be approved by the Chief Compliance Officer with a written explanation of the reason for the deviation.

A **material conflict of interest** means the existence of a business relationship between a portfolio company or an affiliate and the Adviser, any affiliate or subsidiary, or an “affiliated person” of a VanEck mutual fund. Examples of when a material conflict of interest exists include a situation where the adviser provides significant investment advisory, brokerage or other services to a company whose management is soliciting proxies; an officer of the Adviser serves on the board of a charitable organization that receives charitable contributions from the portfolio company and the charitable organization is a client of the Adviser; a portfolio company that is a significant selling agent of the Adviser’s products and services solicits proxies; a broker-dealer or insurance company that controls 5% or more of the Adviser’s assets solicits proxies; the Adviser serves as an investment adviser to the pension or other investment account of the portfolio company; the Adviser and the portfolio company have a lending relationship. In each of these situations voting against management may cause the Adviser a loss of revenue or other benefit.

Client Inquiries

All inquiries by clients as to how the Adviser has voted proxies must immediately be forwarded to Portfolio Administration.

Disclosure to Clients:

1. Notification of Availability of Information
 - a. Client Brochure - The Client Brochure or Part II of Form ADV will inform clients that they can obtain information from the Adviser on how their proxies were voted. The Client Brochure or Part II of Form ADV will be mailed to each client annually. The Legal Department will be responsible for coordinating the mailing with Sales/Marketing Departments.

2. Availability of Proxy Voting Information

At the client's request or if the information is not available on the Adviser's website, a hard copy of the account's proxy votes will be mailed to each client.

Recordkeeping Requirements

1. VanEck will retain the following documentation and information for each matter relating to a portfolio security with respect to which a client was entitled to vote:
 - a. proxy statements received;
 - b. identifying number for the portfolio security;
 - c. shareholder meeting date;
 - d. brief identification of the matter voted on;
 - e. whether the vote was cast on the matter;
 - f. how the vote was cast (e.g., for or against proposal, or abstain; for or withhold regarding election of directors);
 - g. records of written client requests for information on how the Adviser voted proxies on behalf of the client;
 - h. a copy of written responses from the Adviser to any written or oral client request for information on how the Adviser voted proxies on behalf of the client; and any documents prepared by the Adviser that were material to the decision on how to vote or that memorialized the basis for the decision, if such documents were prepared.
2. Copies of proxy statements filed on EDGAR, and proxy statements and records of proxy votes maintained with a third party (i.e., proxy voting service) need not be maintained. The third party must agree in writing to provide a copy of the documents promptly upon request.
3. If applicable, any document memorializing that the costs of voting a proxy exceed the benefit to the client or any other decision to refrain from voting, and that such abstention was in the client's best interest.
4. Proxy voting records will be maintained in an easily accessible place for five years, the first two at the office of the Adviser. Proxy statements on file with EDGAR or maintained by a third party and proxy votes maintained by a third party are not subject to these particular retention requirements.

Voting Foreign Proxies

At times the Adviser may determine that, in the best interests of its clients, a particular proxy should not be voted. This may occur, for example, when the cost of voting a foreign proxy (translation, transportation, etc.) would exceed the benefit of voting the proxy or voting the foreign proxy may cause an unacceptable limitation on the sale of the security. Any such instances will be documented by the Portfolio Manager and reviewed by the Chief Compliance Officer.

Securities Lending

Certain portfolios managed by the Adviser participate in securities lending programs to generate additional revenue. Proxy voting rights generally pass to the borrower when a security is on loan. The Adviser will use its best efforts to recall a security on loan and vote such securities if the Portfolio Manager determines that the proxy involves a material event.

Proxy Voting Policy

The Adviser has reviewed the Glass Lewis Proxy Guidelines ("Guidelines") and has determined that the Guidelines are consistent with the Adviser's proxy voting responsibilities and its fiduciary duty with respect to its clients. The Adviser will review any material amendments to the Guidelines.

While it is the Adviser's policy to generally follow the Guidelines, the Adviser retains the right, on any specific proxy, to vote differently from the Guidelines, if the Adviser believes it is in the best interests of its clients. Any such exceptions will be documented by the Adviser and reviewed by the Chief Compliance Officer.

The portfolio manager or analyst covering the security is responsible for making proxy voting decisions. Portfolio Administration, in conjunction with the portfolio manager and the custodian, is responsible for monitoring corporate actions and ensuring that corporate actions are timely voted.

United States



GLASS LEWIS

2024 Benchmark Policy Guidelines

www.glasslewis.com

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About Glass Lewis

Glass Lewis is the world's choice for governance solutions. We enable institutional investors and publicly listed companies to make informed decisions based on research and data. We cover 30,000+ meetings each year, across approximately 100 global markets. Our team has been providing in-depth analysis of companies since 2003, relying solely on publicly available information to inform its policies, research, and voting recommendations.

Our customers include the majority of the world's largest pension plans, mutual funds, and asset managers, collectively managing over \$40 trillion in assets. We have teams located across the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific giving us global reach with a local perspective on the important governance issues.

Investors around the world depend on Glass Lewis' [Viewpoint](#) platform to manage their proxy voting, policy implementation, recordkeeping, and reporting. Our industry leading [Proxy Paper](#) product provides comprehensive environmental, social, and governance research and voting recommendations weeks ahead of voting deadlines. Public companies can also use our innovative [Report Feedback Statement](#) to deliver their opinion on our proxy research directly to the voting decision makers at every investor client in time for voting decisions to be made or changed.

The research team engages extensively with public companies, investors, regulators, and other industry stakeholders to gain relevant context into the realities surrounding companies, sectors, and the market in general. This enables us to provide the most comprehensive and pragmatic insights to our customers.

Join the Conversation

Glass Lewis is committed to ongoing engagement with all market participants.

info@glasslewis.com | www.glasslewis.com

Guidelines Introduction

Summary of Changes for 2024

Glass Lewis evaluates these guidelines on an ongoing basis and formally updates them on an annual basis. This year we've made noteworthy revisions in the following areas, which are summarized below but discussed in greater detail in the relevant section of this document:

Material Weaknesses

We have included a new discussion on our approach to material weaknesses. Effective internal controls over financial reporting should ensure the integrity of companies' accounting and financial reporting. A material weakness occurs when a company identifies a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal controls over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.

We believe it is the responsibility of audit committees to ensure that material weaknesses are remediated in a timely manner and that companies disclose remediation plans that include detailed steps to resolve a given material weakness.

When a material weakness is reported and the company has not disclosed a remediation plan, or when a material weakness has been ongoing for more than one year and the company has not disclosed an updated remediation plan that clearly outlines the company's progress toward remediating the material weakness, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of a company's audit committee who served on the committee during the time when the material weakness was identified.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have updated our discussion on our approach to cyber risk oversight. On July 26, 2023, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced rules requiring public companies to report cybersecurity incidents deemed material within four days of identifying them; furthermore, in annual reports, they must disclose their processes for assessing, identifying, and managing material cybersecurity risks, along with their material effects and past incidents' impacts. Similar rules were also adopted for foreign private issuers. The final rules became effective on September 5, 2023. Given the continued regulatory focus on and the potential adverse outcomes from cyber-related issues, it is our view that cyber risk is material for all companies.

In the absence of material cybersecurity incidents, we will generally not make voting recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues. However, in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders, we will closely evaluate the board's oversight of cybersecurity as well as the company's response and disclosures.

Moreover, in instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we believe shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates from the company communicating its ongoing progress towards resolving and remediating the impact of the cyber-attack. These disclosures should focus on the company's response to address the impacts to affected stakeholders and should not reveal specific and/or

technical details that could impede the company's response or remediation of the incident or that could assist threat actors.

In instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosures concerning cybersecurity-related issues to be insufficient or are not provided to shareholders.

Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues

We have updated our discussion of board oversight of environmental and social issues. Given the importance of the board's role in overseeing environmental and social risks, we believe that this responsibility should be formally designated and codified in the appropriate committee charters or other governing documents.

When evaluating the board's role in overseeing environmental and/or social issues, we will examine a company's committee charters and governing documents to determine if the company has codified a meaningful level of oversight of and accountability for a company's material environmental and social impacts.

Board Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

We have updated our discussion of board accountability for climate-related issues, and how our policy is applied. In 2023, our policy on this topic was applied to the largest, most significant emitters; however beginning in 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to companies in the S&P 500 index operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that the companies' GHG emissions represent a financially material risk, as well as companies where we believe emissions or climate impacts, or stakeholder scrutiny thereof, represent an outsized, financially material risk.

We will assess whether such companies have produced disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We have further clarified that we will also assess whether these companies have disclosed explicit and clearly defined board-level oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. In instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

Clawback Provisions

In light of new NYSE and Nasdaq listing requirements to comply with SEC Rule 10D-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Glass Lewis has updated our views on the utility of clawback provisions. Although the negative impacts of excessive risk-taking do not always result in financial restatements, they may nonetheless prove harmful to shareholder value. In addition to meeting listing requirements, effective clawback policies should provide companies with the power to recoup incentive compensation from an executive when there is evidence of problematic decisions or actions, such as material misconduct, a material reputational failure, material risk management failure, or a material operational failure, the consequences of which have not already been reflected in incentive payments and where recovery is warranted. Such power to recoup should be provided regardless of whether the employment of the executive officer was terminated with or without cause. In these circumstances, rationale should be provided if the company determines ultimately to refrain from recouping compensation as well as disclosure of alternative measures that are instead pursued, such as the exercise of negative discretion on future payments.

Executive Ownership Guidelines

We have added a discussion to formally outline our approach to executive ownership guidelines. We believe that companies should facilitate an alignment between the interests of the executive leadership with those of long-term shareholders by adopting and enforcing minimum share ownership rules for their named executive officers. Companies should provide clear disclosure in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis section of the proxy statement of their executive share ownership requirements and how various outstanding equity awards are treated when determining an executive's level of ownership.

In the process of determining an executive's level of share ownership, counting unearned performance-based full value awards and/or unexercised stock options is inappropriate. Companies should provide a cogent rationale should they count these awards towards shares held by an executive.

Proposals for Equity Awards for Shareholders

Regarding proposals seeking approval for individual equity awards, we have included new discussion of provisions that require a non-vote, or vote of abstention, from a shareholder if the shareholder is also the recipient of the proposed grant. Such provisions help to address potential conflict of interest issues and provide disinterested shareholders with more meaningful say over the proposal. The inclusion of such provisions will be viewed positively during our holistic analysis, especially when a vote from the recipient of the proposed grant would materially influence the passage of the proposal.

Net Operating Loss (NOL) Pills

We have updated our discussion of NOL pills to include our concerns with acting in concert provisions. Over the past several years, the terms and structures of NOL pills have evolved to include features such as acting in concert provisions, among other concerning terms, that may disempower shareholders and insulate the board and management. When acting in concert provisions are present within the terms of a NOL pill, we believe this may raise concerns as to the true objective of the pill.

Acting in concert provisions broaden the definition of beneficial ownership to prohibit parallel conduct, or multiple shareholders party to a formal or informal agreement collaborating to influence the board and management of a company, and aggregate the ownership of such shareholders towards the triggering threshold.

As such, we have added the inclusion of an acting in concert provision and whether the pill is implemented following the filing of a Schedule 13D by a shareholder or there is evidence of hostile activity or shareholder activism as part of our considerations to recommend shareholders vote against a management proposed NOL pill.

Control Share Statutes

We have added a new discussion outlining our approach to control share statutes. Certain states, including Delaware, have adopted control share acquisition statutes as an anti-takeover defense for certain closed-end investment companies and business development companies. Control share statutes may prevent changes in control by limiting voting rights of a person that acquires the ownership of "control shares." Control shares are shares of stock equal to or exceeding specified percentages of company voting power, and a control share statute prevents shares in excess of the specified percentage from being voted, unless: (i) the board approves

them to be voted; or (ii) the holder of the “control shares” receives approval from a supermajority of “non-interested” shareholders.

Depending on the state of incorporation, companies may automatically rely on control share statutes unless the fund’s board of trustees eliminates the application of the control share statute to any or all fund share acquisitions, through adoption of a provision in the fund’s governing instrument or by fund board action alone. In certain other states, companies must adopt control share statutes.

In our view, control share statutes disenfranchise shareholders by reducing their voting power to a level less than their economic interest and effectively function as an anti-takeover device. We believe all shareholders should have an opportunity to vote all of their shares. Moreover, we generally believe anti-takeover measures prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock.

As such, we will generally recommend voting for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes, unless doing so would allow the completion of a takeover that is not in the best interests of shareholders; and recommend voting against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.

Further, in cases where a closed-end fund or business development company has received a public buyout offer and has relied on a control share statute as a defense mechanism in the prior year, we will generally recommend shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating and governance committee, absent a compelling rationale as to why a rejected acquisition was not in the best interests of shareholders.

Clarifying Amendments

The following clarifications of our existing policies are included this year:

Board Responsiveness

We have clarified our discussion of board responsiveness to remove a reference to shareholder proposals from our discussion of when 20% or more of shareholders vote contrary to management. In addition, we have clarified that our calculation of opposition includes votes cast as either AGAINST and/or ABSTAIN.

Interlocking Directorships

We have clarified our policy on interlocking directorships to reference that, on a case-by-case basis, we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships, such as interlocks with close family members of executives or within group companies.

Board Gender Diversity

We have clarified our policy on board gender diversity to emphasize that when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company’s disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline of when the board intends to appoint additional gender diverse directors (generally by the next annual meeting or as soon as is reasonably practicable).

Underrepresented Community Diversity

We have clarified our policy on underrepresented community diversity to emphasize that when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company's disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline of when the board intends to appoint additional directors from an underrepresented community (generally by the next annual meeting or as soon as is reasonably practicable).

Furthermore, we have revised our definition of "underrepresented community director" to replace our reference to an individual who self-identifies as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender with an individual who self-identifies as a member of the LGBTQIA+ community.

Non-GAAP to GAAP Reconciliation Disclosure

We have expanded the discussion of our approach to the use of non-GAAP measures in incentive programs in order to emphasize the need for thorough and transparent disclosure in the proxy statement that will assist shareholders in reconciling the difference between non-GAAP results used for incentive payout determinations and reported GAAP results. Particularly in situations where significant adjustments were applied and materially impacts incentive pay outcomes, the lack of such disclosure will impact Glass Lewis' assessment of the quality of executive pay disclosure and may be a factor in our recommendation for the say-on-pay.

Pay-Versus-Performance Disclosure

We have revised our discussion of the pay-for-performance analysis to note that the pay-versus-performance disclosure mandated by the SEC may be used as part of our supplemental quantitative assessments supporting our primary pay-for-performance grade.

Company Responsiveness for Say-on-Pay Opposition

For increased clarity, we amended our discussion of company responsiveness to significant levels of say-on-pay opposition to note that our calculation of opposition includes votes cast as either AGAINST and/or ABSTAIN, with opposition of 20% or higher treated as significant.

A Board of Directors that Serves Shareholder Interest

Election of Directors

The purpose of Glass Lewis' proxy research and advice is to facilitate shareholder voting in favor of governance structures that will drive performance, create shareholder value and maintain a proper tone at the top. Glass Lewis looks for talented boards with a record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. We believe that a board can best protect and enhance the interests of shareholders if it is

sufficiently independent, has a record of positive performance, and consists of individuals with diverse backgrounds and a breadth and depth of relevant experience.

Independence

The independence of directors, or lack thereof, is ultimately demonstrated through the decisions they make. In assessing the independence of directors, we will take into consideration, when appropriate, whether a director has a track record indicative of making objective decisions. Likewise, when assessing the independence of directors we will also examine when a director's track record on multiple boards indicates a lack of objective decision-making. Ultimately, we believe the determination of whether a director is independent or not must take into consideration both compliance with the applicable independence listing requirements as well as judgments made by the director.

We look at each director nominee to examine the director's relationships with the company, the company's executives, and other directors. We do this to evaluate whether personal, familial, or financial relationships (not including director compensation) may impact the director's decisions. We believe that such relationships make it difficult for a director to put shareholders' interests above the director's or the related party's interests. We also believe that a director who owns more than 20% of a company can exert disproportionate influence on the board, and therefore believe such a director's independence may be hampered, in particular when serving on the audit committee.

Thus, we put directors into three categories based on an examination of the type of relationship they have with the company:

Independent Director — An independent director has no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives, or other board members, except for board service and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that existed within three to five years¹ before the inquiry are usually considered "current" for purposes of this test. For material financial relationships with the company, we apply a three-year look back, and for former employment relationships with the company, we apply a five-year look back.

Affiliated Director — An affiliated director has, (or within the past three years, had) a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but is not an employee of the company.² This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the

¹ NASDAQ originally proposed a five-year look-back period but both it and the NYSE ultimately settled on a three-year look-back prior to finalizing their rules. A five-year standard for former employment relationships is more appropriate, in our view, because we believe that the unwinding of conflicting relationships between former management and board members is more likely to be complete and final after five years. However, Glass Lewis does not apply the five-year look-back period to directors who have previously served as executives of the company on an interim basis for less than one year.

² If a company does not consider a non-employee director to be independent, Glass Lewis will classify that director as an affiliate.

company.³ In addition, we view a director who either owns or controls 20% or more of the company's voting stock, or is an employee or affiliate of an entity that controls such amount, as an affiliate.⁴

We view 20% shareholders as affiliates because they typically have access to and involvement with the management of a company that is fundamentally different from that of ordinary shareholders. More importantly, 20% holders may have interests that diverge from those of ordinary holders, for reasons such as the liquidity (or lack thereof) of their holdings, personal tax issues, etc.

Glass Lewis applies a three-year look back period to all directors who have an affiliation with the company other than former employment, for which we apply a five-year look back.

Definition of **"Material"**: A material relationship is one in which the dollar value exceeds:

- \$50,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for directors who are paid for a service they have agreed to perform for the company, outside of their service as a director, including professional or other services. This threshold also applies to directors who are the majority or principal owner of a firm that receives such payments; or
- \$120,000 (or where no amount is disclosed) for those directors employed by a professional services firm such as a law firm, investment bank, or consulting firm and the company pays the firm, not the individual, for services.⁵ This dollar limit would also apply to charitable contributions to schools where a board member is a professor; or charities where a director serves on the board or is an executive;⁶ and any aircraft and real estate dealings between the company and the director's firm; or
- 1% of either company's consolidated gross revenue for other business relationships (e.g., where the director is an executive officer of a company that provides services or products to or receives services or products from the company).⁷

Definition of **"Familial"** — Familial relationships include a person's spouse, parents, children, siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces, nephews, in-laws, and anyone (other than domestic employees) who shares such person's home. A director is an affiliate if: i) he or she has a family member who is employed by

³ We allow a five-year grace period for former executives of the company or merged companies who have consulting agreements with the surviving company. (We do not automatically recommend voting against directors in such cases for the first five years.) If the consulting agreement persists after this five-year grace period, we apply the materiality thresholds outlined in the definition of "material."

⁴ This includes a director who serves on a board as a representative (as part of his or her basic responsibilities) of an investment firm with greater than 20% ownership. However, while we will generally consider him/her to be affiliated, we will not recommend voting against unless (i) the investment firm has disproportionate board representation or (ii) the director serves on the audit committee.

⁵ We may deem such a transaction to be immaterial where the amount represents less than 1% of the firm's annual revenues and the board provides a compelling rationale as to why the director's independence is not affected by the relationship.

⁶ We will generally take into consideration the size and nature of such charitable entities in relation to the company's size and industry along with any other relevant factors such as the director's role at the charity. However, unlike for other types of related party transactions, Glass Lewis generally does not apply a look-back period to affiliated relationships involving charitable contributions; if the relationship between the director and the school or charity ceases, or if the company discontinues its donations to the entity, we will consider the director to be independent.

⁷ This includes cases where a director is employed by, or closely affiliated with, a private equity firm that profits from an acquisition made by the company. Unless disclosure suggests otherwise, we presume the director is affiliated.

⁸ Pursuant to SEC rule Item 404 of Regulation S-K under the Securities Exchange Act, compensation exceeding \$120,000 is the minimum threshold deemed material for disclosure of transactions involving family members of directors.

the company and receives more than \$120,000⁸ in annual compensation; or, ii) he or she has a family member who is employed by the company and the company does not disclose this individual's compensation.

Definition of **"Company"** — A company includes any parent or subsidiary in a group with the company or any entity that merged with, was acquired by, or acquired the company.

Inside Director — An inside director simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a board chair who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company. In our view, an inside director who derives a greater amount of income as a result of affiliated transactions with the company rather than through compensation paid by the company (i.e., salary, bonus, etc. as a company employee) faces a conflict between making decisions that are in the best interests of the company versus those in the director's own best interests. Therefore, we will recommend voting against such a director.

Additionally, we believe a director who is currently serving in an interim management position should be considered an insider, while a director who previously served in an interim management position for less than one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered independent. Moreover, a director who previously served in an interim management position for over one year and is no longer serving in such capacity is considered an affiliate for five years following the date of the director's resignation or departure from the interim management position.

Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Board Independence

Glass Lewis believes a board will be most effective in protecting shareholders' interests if it is at least two-thirds independent. We note that each of the Business Roundtable, the Conference Board, and the Council of Institutional Investors advocates that two-thirds of the board be independent. Where more than one-third of the members are affiliated or inside directors, we typically⁸ recommend voting against some of the inside and/or affiliated directors in order to satisfy the two-thirds threshold.

In the case of a less than two-thirds independent board, Glass Lewis strongly supports the existence of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the meeting agendas and to lead sessions outside the insider chair's presence.

In addition, we scrutinize avowedly "independent" chairs and lead directors. We believe that they should be unquestionably independent, or the company should not tout them as such.

Committee Independence

We believe that only independent directors should serve on a company's audit, compensation, nominating, and governance committees.⁹ We typically recommend that shareholders vote against any affiliated or inside director seeking appointment to an audit, compensation, nominating, or governance committee, or who has served in that capacity in the past year.

⁸ With a staggered board, if the affiliates or insiders that we believe should not be on the board are not up for election, we will express our concern regarding those directors, but we will not recommend voting against the other affiliates or insiders who are up for election just to achieve two-thirds independence. However, we will consider recommending voting against the directors subject to our concern at their next election if the issue giving rise to the concern is not resolved.

⁹ We will recommend voting against an audit committee member who owns 20% or more of the company's stock, and we believe that there should be a maximum of one director (or no directors if the committee is composed of less than three directors) who owns 20% or more of the company's stock on the compensation, nominating, and governance committees.

Pursuant to Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved new listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require that boards apply enhanced standards of independence when making an affirmative determination of the independence of compensation committee members. Specifically, when making this determination, in addition to the factors considered when assessing general director independence, the board's considerations must include: (i) the source of compensation of the director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the listed company to the director (the "Fees Factor"); and (ii) whether the director is affiliated with the listing company, its subsidiaries, or affiliates of its subsidiaries (the "Affiliation Factor").

Glass Lewis believes it is important for boards to consider these enhanced independence factors when assessing compensation committee members. However, as discussed above in the section titled Independence, we apply our own standards when assessing the independence of directors, and these standards also take into account consulting and advisory fees paid to the director, as well as the director's affiliations with the company and its subsidiaries and affiliates. We may recommend voting against compensation committee members who are not independent based on our standards.

Independent Chair

Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of CEO (or, more rarely, another executive position) and chair creates a better governance structure than a combined CEO/chair position. An executive manages the business according to a course the board charts. Executives should report to the board regarding their performance in achieving goals set by the board. This is needlessly complicated when a CEO chairs the board, since a CEO/chair presumably will have a significant influence over the board.

While many companies have an independent lead or presiding director who performs many of the same functions of an independent chair (e.g., setting the board meeting agenda), we do not believe this alternate form of independent board leadership provides as robust protection for shareholders as an independent chair.

It can become difficult for a board to fulfill its role of overseer and policy setter when a CEO/chair controls the agenda and the boardroom discussion. Such control can allow a CEO to have an entrenched position, leading to longer-than-optimal terms, fewer checks on management, less scrutiny of the business operation, and limitations on independent, shareholder-focused goal-setting by the board.

A CEO should set the strategic course for the company, with the board's approval, and the board should enable the CEO to carry out the CEO's vision for accomplishing the board's objectives. Failure to achieve the board's objectives should lead the board to replace that CEO with someone in whom the board has confidence.

Likewise, an independent chair can better oversee executives and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. Such oversight and concern for shareholders allows for a more proactive and effective board of directors that is better able to look out for the interests of shareholders.

Further, it is the board's responsibility to select a chief executive who can best serve a company and its shareholders and to replace this person when his or her duties have not been appropriately fulfilled. Such a replacement becomes more difficult and happens less frequently when the chief executive is also in the position of overseeing the board.

Glass Lewis believes that the installation of an independent chair is almost always a positive step from a corporate governance perspective and promotes the best interests of shareholders. Further, the presence of an independent chair fosters the creation of a thoughtful and dynamic board, not dominated by the views of senior

management. Encouragingly, many companies appear to be moving in this direction — one study indicates that only 10 percent of incoming CEOs in 2014 were awarded the chair title, versus 48 percent in 2002.¹⁰ Another study finds that 53 percent of S&P 500 boards now separate the CEO and chair roles, up from 37 percent in 2009, although the same study found that only 34 percent of S&P 500 boards have truly independent chairs.¹¹

We do not recommend that shareholders vote against CEOs who chair the board. However, we typically recommend that our clients support separating the roles of chair and CEO whenever that question is posed in a proxy (typically in the form of a shareholder proposal), as we believe that it is in the long-term best interests of the company and its shareholders.

Further, where the company has neither an independent chair nor independent lead director, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee.

Performance

The most crucial test of a board's commitment to the company and its shareholders lies in the actions of the board and its members. We look at the performance of these individuals as directors and executives of the company and of other companies where they have served.

We find that a director's past conduct is often indicative of future conduct and performance. We often find directors with a history of overpaying executives or of serving on boards where avoidable disasters have occurred serving on the boards of companies with similar problems. Glass Lewis has a proprietary database of directors serving at over 8,000 of the most widely held U.S. companies. We use this database to track the performance of directors across companies.

Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Performance

We typically recommend that shareholders vote against directors who have served on boards or as executives of companies with records of poor performance, inadequate risk oversight, excessive compensation, audit- or accounting-related issues, and/or other indicators of mismanagement or actions against the interests of shareholders. We will reevaluate such directors based on, among other factors, the length of time passed since the incident giving rise to the concern, shareholder support for the director, the severity of the issue, the director's role (e.g., committee membership), director tenure at the subject company, whether ethical lapses accompanied the oversight lapse, and evidence of strong oversight at other companies.

Likewise, we examine the backgrounds of those who serve on key board committees to ensure that they have the required skills and diverse backgrounds to make informed judgments about the subject matter for which the committee is responsible.

We believe shareholders should avoid electing directors who have a record of not fulfilling their responsibilities to shareholders at any company where they have held a board or executive position. We typically recommend voting against:

¹⁰ Ken Favaro, Per-Ola Karlsson and Gary L. Nelson. "The \$112 Billion CEO Succession Problem." (*Strategy+Business*, Issue 79, Summer 2015).

¹¹ Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 6.

1. A director who fails to attend a minimum of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings, calculated in the aggregate.¹²
2. A director who belatedly filed a significant form(s) 4 or 5, or who has a pattern of late filings if the late filing was the director's fault (we look at these late filing situations on a case-by-case basis).
3. A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious and material restatement has occurred after the CEO had previously certified the pre-restatement financial statements.
4. A director who has received two against recommendations from Glass Lewis for identical reasons within the prior year at different companies (the same situation must also apply at the company being analyzed).

Furthermore, with consideration given to the company's overall corporate governance, pay-for-performance alignment and board responsiveness to shareholders, we may recommend voting against directors who served throughout a period in which the company performed significantly worse than peers and the directors have not taken reasonable steps to address the poor performance.

Board Responsiveness

Glass Lewis believes that boards should be responsive to shareholders when a significant percentage of shareholders vote contrary to the recommendation of management, depending on the issue.

When 20% of more of shareholders vote contrary to management (which occurs when more than 20% of votes on the proposal are cast as AGAINST and/or ABSTAIN), we believe that boards should engage with shareholders on the issue and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness. These include instances when 20% or more of shareholders:

- (i) withhold votes from (or vote against) a director nominee; or
- (ii) vote against a management-sponsored proposal.

In our view, a 20% threshold is significant enough to warrant a close examination of the underlying issues and an evaluation of whether the board responded appropriately following the vote, particularly in the case of a compensation or director election proposal. While the 20% threshold alone will not automatically generate a negative vote recommendation from Glass Lewis on a future proposal (e.g., to recommend against a director nominee, against a say-on-pay proposal, etc.), it may be a contributing factor to our recommendation to vote against management's recommendation in the event we determine that the board did not respond appropriately.

When a majority of shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders on the issue and provide a more robust response to fully address shareholder concerns. These include instances when a majority or more of shareholders:

- (i) withhold votes from (or vote against) a director nominee;
- (ii) vote against a management-sponsored proposal; or
- (iii) vote for a shareholder proposal.

¹² However, where a director has served for less than one full year, we will typically not recommend voting against for failure to attend 75% of meetings. Rather, we will note the poor attendance with a recommendation to track this issue going forward. We will also refrain from recommending to vote against directors when the proxy discloses that the director missed the meetings due to serious illness or other extenuating circumstances.

In the case of shareholder proposals, we believe clear action is warranted when such proposals receive support from a majority of votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes). In our view, this may include fully implementing the request of the shareholder proposal and/or engaging with shareholders on the issue and providing sufficient disclosures to address shareholder concerns.

At controlled companies and companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. In the case of companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will generally examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders on a “one share, one vote” basis. At controlled and multi-class companies, when at least 20% or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness, and when a majority or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and provide a more robust response to address shareholder concerns.

As a general framework, our evaluation of board responsiveness involves a review of publicly available disclosures (e.g., the proxy statement, annual report, 8-Ks, company website, etc.) released following the date of the company’s last annual meeting up through the publication date of our most current Proxy Paper. Depending on the specific issue, our focus typically includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- At the board level, any changes in directorships, committee memberships, disclosure of related party transactions, meeting attendance, or other responsibilities;
- Any revisions made to the company’s articles of incorporation, bylaws or other governance documents;
- Any press or news releases indicating changes in, or the adoption of, new company policies, business practices or special reports; and
- Any modifications made to the design and structure of the company’s compensation program, as well as an assessment of the company’s engagement with shareholders on compensation issues as discussed in the Compensation Discussion & Analysis (CD&A), particularly following a material vote against a company’s say-on-pay.
- Proxy statement disclosure discussing the board’s efforts to engage with shareholders and the actions taken to address shareholder concerns.

Our Proxy Paper analysis will include a case-by-case assessment of the specific elements of board responsiveness that we examined along with an explanation of how that assessment impacts our current voting recommendations.

The Role of a Committee Chair

Glass Lewis believes that a designated committee chair maintains primary responsibility for the actions of his or her respective committee. As such, many of our committee-specific voting recommendations are against the applicable committee chair rather than the entire committee (depending on the seriousness of the issue). In cases where the committee chair is not up for election due to a staggered board, and where we have identified multiple concerns, we will generally recommend voting against other members of the committee who are up for election, on a case-by-case basis.

In cases where we would ordinarily recommend voting against a committee chair but the chair is not specified, we apply the following general rules, which apply throughout our guidelines:

- If there is no committee chair, we recommend voting against the longest-serving committee member or, if the longest-serving committee member cannot be determined, the longest-serving board member serving on the committee (i.e., in either case, the “senior director”); and
- If there is no committee chair, but multiple senior directors serving on the committee, we recommend voting against both (or all) such senior directors.

In our view, companies should provide clear disclosure of which director is charged with overseeing each committee. In cases where that simple framework is ignored and a reasonable analysis cannot determine which committee member is the designated leader, we believe shareholder action against the longest serving committee member(s) is warranted. Again, this only applies if we would ordinarily recommend voting against the committee chair but there is either no such position or no designated director in such role.

Audit Committees and Performance

Audit committees play an integral role in overseeing the financial reporting process because stable capital markets depend on reliable, transparent, and objective financial information to support an efficient and effective capital market process. Audit committees play a vital role in providing this disclosure to shareholders.

When assessing an audit committee’s performance, we are aware that an audit committee does not prepare financial statements, is not responsible for making the key judgments and assumptions that affect the financial statements, and does not audit the numbers or the disclosures provided to investors. Rather, an audit committee member monitors and oversees the process and procedures that management and auditors perform. The 1999 Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees stated it best:

A proper and well-functioning system exists, therefore, when the three main groups responsible for financial reporting — the full board including the audit committee, financial management including the internal auditors, and the outside auditors — form a ‘three legged stool’ that supports responsible financial disclosure and active participatory oversight. However, in the view of the Committee, the audit committee must be ‘first among equals’ in this process, since the audit committee is an extension of the full board and hence the ultimate monitor of the process.

Standards for Assessing the Audit Committee

For an audit committee to function effectively on investors’ behalf, it must include members with sufficient knowledge to diligently carry out their responsibilities. In its audit and accounting recommendations, the Conference Board Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise said “members of the audit committee must be independent and have both knowledge and experience in auditing financial matters.”¹³

We are skeptical of audit committees where there are members that lack expertise as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA), Chief Financial Officer (CFO) or corporate controller, or similar experience. While we will not necessarily recommend voting against members of an audit committee when such expertise is lacking, we are more likely to recommend voting against committee members when a problem such as a restatement occurs and such expertise is lacking.

Glass Lewis generally assesses audit committees against the decisions they make with respect to their oversight and monitoring role. The quality and integrity of the financial statements and earnings reports, the

¹³ Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise. The Conference Board. 2003.

completeness of disclosures necessary for investors to make informed decisions, and the effectiveness of the internal controls should provide reasonable assurance that the financial statements are materially free from errors. The independence of the external auditors and the results of their work all provide useful information by which to assess the audit committee.

When assessing the decisions and actions of the audit committee, we typically defer to its judgment and generally recommend voting in favor of its members. However, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

1. All members of the audit committee when options were backdated, there is a lack of adequate controls in place, there was a resulting restatement, and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation with respect to the option grants.
2. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee does not have a financial expert or the committee's financial expert does not have a demonstrable financial background sufficient to understand the financial issues unique to public companies.
3. The audit committee chair, if the audit committee did not meet at least four times during the year.
4. The audit committee chair, if the committee has less than three members.
5. Any audit committee member who sits on more than three public company audit committees, unless the audit committee member is a retired CPA, CFO, controller or has similar experience, in which case the limit shall be four committees, taking time and availability into consideration including a review of the audit committee member's attendance at all board and committee meetings.¹⁴
6. All members of an audit committee who are up for election and who served on the committee at the time of the audit, if audit and audit-related fees total one-third or less of the total fees billed by the auditor.
7. The audit committee chair when tax and/or other fees are greater than audit and audit-related fees paid to the auditor for more than one year in a row (in which case we also recommend against ratification of the auditor).
8. The audit committee chair when fees paid to the auditor are not disclosed.
9. All members of an audit committee where non-audit fees include fees for tax services (including, but not limited to, such things as tax avoidance or shelter schemes) for senior executives of the company. Such services are prohibited by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).
10. All members of an audit committee that reappointed an auditor that we no longer consider to be independent for reasons unrelated to fee proportions.
11. All members of an audit committee when audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
12. The audit committee chair if the committee failed to put auditor ratification on the ballot for shareholder approval. However, if the non-audit fees or tax fees exceed audit plus audit-related fees in either the current or the prior year, then Glass Lewis will recommend voting against the entire audit committee.

¹⁴ Glass Lewis may exempt certain audit committee members from the above threshold if, upon further analysis of relevant factors such as the director's experience, the size, industry-mix and location of the companies involved and the director's attendance at all the companies, we can reasonably determine that the audit committee member is likely not hindered by multiple audit committee commitments.

13. All members of an audit committee where the auditor has resigned and reported that a section 10A¹⁵ letter has been issued.
14. All members of an audit committee at a time when material accounting fraud occurred at the company.¹⁶
15. All members of an audit committee at a time when annual and/or multiple quarterly financial statements had to be restated, and any of the following factors apply:¹⁷
 - a. The restatement involves fraud or manipulation by insiders;
 - b. The restatement is accompanied by an SEC inquiry or investigation;
 - c. The restatement involves revenue recognition;
 - d. The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to costs of goods sold, operating expense, or operating cash flows; or
 - e. The restatement results in a greater than 5% adjustment to net income, 10% adjustment to assets or shareholders equity, or cash flows from financing or investing activities.
16. All members of an audit committee if the company repeatedly fails to file its financial reports in a timely fashion. For example, the company has filed two or more quarterly or annual financial statements late within the last five quarters.
17. All members of an audit committee when it has been disclosed that a law enforcement agency has charged the company and/or its employees with a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).
18. All members of an audit committee when the company has aggressive accounting policies and/or poor disclosure or lack of sufficient transparency in its financial statements.
19. All members of the audit committee when there is a disagreement with the auditor and the auditor resigns or is dismissed (e.g., the company receives an adverse opinion on its financial statements from the auditor).
20. All members of the audit committee if the contract with the auditor specifically limits the auditor's liability to the company for damages.¹⁸
21. All members of the audit committee who served since the date of the company's last annual meeting if, since the last annual meeting, the company has reported a material weakness that has not yet been corrected and the company has not disclosed a remediation plan; or when a material weakness has been ongoing for more than one year and the company has not disclosed an updated remediation plan that clearly outlines the company's progress toward remediating the material weakness.

Material Weaknesses

¹⁵ Auditors are required to report all potential illegal acts to management and the audit committee unless they are clearly inconsequential in nature. If the audit committee or the board fails to take appropriate action on an act that has been determined to be a violation of the law, the independent auditor is required to send a section 10A letter to the SEC. Such letters are rare and therefore we believe should be taken seriously.

¹⁶ Research indicates that revenue fraud now accounts for over 60% of SEC fraud cases, and that companies that engage in fraud experience significant negative abnormal stock price declines—facing bankruptcy, delisting, and material asset sales at much higher rates than do non-fraud firms (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. "Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007." May 2010).

¹⁷ The SEC issued guidance in March 2021 related to classification of warrants as liabilities at special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs). We will generally refrain from recommending against audit committee members when the restatement in question is solely as a result of the aforementioned SEC guidance.

¹⁸ The Council of Institutional Investors. "Corporate Governance Policies," p. 4, April 5, 2006; and "Letter from Council of Institutional Investors to the AICPA," November 8, 2006.

Effective internal controls over financial reporting should ensure the integrity of companies' accounting and financial reporting.

The SEC guidance regarding Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting requires that reports on internal control should include: (i) a statement of management's responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate internal control over financial reporting for the company; (ii) management's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting as of the end of the company's most recent fiscal year; (iii) a statement identifying the framework used by management to evaluate the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting; and (iv) a statement that the registered public accounting firm that audited the company's financial statements included in the annual report has issued an attestation report on management's assessment of the company's internal control over financial reporting.

A material weakness occurs when a company identifies a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal controls over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Failure to maintain effective internal controls can create doubts regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP and may lead to companies publishing financial statements that are not free of errors or misstatements.

We believe it is the responsibility of audit committees to ensure that material weaknesses are remediated in a timely manner and that companies disclose remediation plans that include detailed steps to resolve a given material weakness. In cases where a material weakness has been ongoing for more than one fiscal year, we expect the company to disclose an updated remediation plan at least annually thereafter. Updates to existing remediation plans should state the progress the company has made toward remediating the material weakness and the remaining actions the company plans to take until the material weakness is fully remediated. As such, we are critical of audit committees when companies disclose remediation plans that remain unchanged from a prior period.

When a material weakness is reported and the company has not disclosed a remediation plan, or when a material weakness has been ongoing for more than one year and the company has not disclosed an updated remediation plan that clearly outlines the company's progress toward remediating the material weakness, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of a company's audit committee who served on the committee during the time when the material weakness was identified.

We also take a dim view of audit committee reports that are boilerplate, and which provide little or no information or transparency to investors. When a problem such as a material weakness, restatement or late filings occurs, in forming our judgment with respect to the audit committee we take into consideration the transparency of the audit committee report.

Compensation Committee Performance

Compensation committees have a critical role in determining the compensation of executives. This includes deciding the basis on which compensation is determined, as well as the amounts and types of compensation to be paid. This process begins with the hiring and initial establishment of employment agreements, including the terms for such items as pay, pensions and severance arrangements. It is important in establishing compensation arrangements that compensation be consistent with, and based on the long-term economic performance of, the business's long-term shareholders returns.

Compensation committees are also responsible for the oversight of the transparency of compensation. This oversight includes disclosure of compensation arrangements, the matrix used in assessing pay for performance, and the use of compensation consultants. In order to ensure the independence of the board's compensation consultant, we believe the compensation committee should only engage a compensation consultant that is not also providing any services to the company or management apart from their contract with the compensation committee. It is important to investors that they have clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements in order to make informed decisions with respect to the oversight and decisions of the compensation committee.

Finally, compensation committees are responsible for oversight of internal controls over the executive compensation process. This includes controls over gathering information used to determine compensation, establishment of equity award plans, and granting of equity awards. For example, the use of a compensation consultant who maintains a business relationship with company management may cause the committee to make decisions based on information that is compromised by the consultant's conflict of interests. Lax controls can also contribute to improper awards of compensation such as through granting of backdated or spring-loaded options, or granting of bonuses when triggers for bonus payments have not been met.

Central to understanding the actions of compensation committee is a careful review of the CD&A report included in each company's proxy. We review the CD&A in our evaluation of the overall compensation practices of a company, as overseen by the compensation committee. The CD&A is also integral to the evaluation of compensation proposals at companies, such as advisory votes on executive compensation, which allow shareholders to vote on the compensation paid to a company's top executives.

When assessing the performance of compensation committees, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

1. All members of a compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to address shareholder concerns following majority shareholder rejection of the say-on-pay proposal in the previous year. Where the proposal was approved but there was a significant shareholder vote (i.e., greater than 20% of votes cast) against the say-on-pay proposal in the prior year, if the board did not respond sufficiently to the vote including actively engaging shareholders on this issue, we will also consider recommending voting against the chair of the compensation committee or all members of the compensation committee, depending on the severity and history of the compensation problems and the level of shareholder opposition.
2. All members of the compensation committee who are up for election and served when the company failed to align pay with performance if shareholders are not provided with an advisory vote on executive compensation at the annual meeting.¹⁹
3. Any member of the compensation committee who has served on the compensation committee of at least two other public companies that have consistently failed to align pay with performance and whose oversight of compensation at the company in question is suspect.
4. All members of the compensation committee (during the relevant time period) if the company entered into excessive employment agreements and/or severance agreements.

¹⁹ If a company provides shareholders with a say-on-pay proposal, we will initially only recommend voting against the company's say-on-pay proposal and will not recommend voting against the members of the compensation committee unless there is a pattern of failing to align pay and performance and/or the company exhibits egregious compensation practices. For cases in which the disconnect between pay and performance is marginal and the company has outperformed its peers, we will consider not recommending against compensation committee members.

5. All members of the compensation committee when performance goals were changed (i.e., lowered) when employees failed or were unlikely to meet original goals, or performance-based compensation was paid despite goals not being attained.
6. All members of the compensation committee if excessive employee perquisites and benefits were allowed.
7. The compensation committee chair if the compensation committee did not meet during the year.
8. All members of the compensation committee when the company repriced options or completed a “self tender offer” without shareholder approval within the past two years.
9. All members of the compensation committee when vesting of in-the-money options is accelerated.
10. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were backdated. Glass Lewis will recommend voting against an executive director who played a role in and participated in option backdating.
11. All members of the compensation committee when option exercise prices were spring-loaded or otherwise timed around the release of material information.
12. All members of the compensation committee when a new employment contract is given to an executive that does not include a clawback provision and the company had a material restatement, especially if the restatement was due to fraud.
13. The chair of the compensation committee where the CD&A provides insufficient or unclear information about performance metrics and goals, where the CD&A indicates that pay is not tied to performance, or where the compensation committee or management has excessive discretion to alter performance terms or increase amounts of awards in contravention of previously defined targets.
14. All members of the compensation committee during whose tenure the committee failed to implement a shareholder proposal regarding a compensation-related issue, where the proposal received the affirmative vote of a majority of the voting shares at a shareholder meeting, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) should have taken steps to implement the request.²⁰
15. All members of the compensation committee when the board has materially decreased proxy statement disclosure regarding executive compensation policies and procedures in a manner which substantially impacts shareholders’ ability to make an informed assessment of the company’s executive pay practices.
16. All members of the compensation committee when new excise tax gross-up provisions are adopted in employment agreements with executives, particularly in cases where the company previously committed not to provide any such entitlements in the future.
17. All members of the compensation committee when the board adopts a frequency for future advisory votes on executive compensation that differs from the frequency approved by shareholders.
18. The chair of the compensation committee when “mega-grants” have been granted and the awards present concerns such as excessive quantum, lack of sufficient performance conditions, and/or are excessively dilutive, among others.

Nominating and Governance Committee Performance

The nominating and governance committee is responsible for the governance by the board of the company and its executives. In performing this role, the committee is responsible and accountable for selection of objective and competent board members. It is also responsible for providing leadership on governance policies adopted by the company, such as decisions to implement shareholder proposals that have received a majority vote. At

²⁰ In all other instances (i.e., a non-compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented) we recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the governance committee.

most companies, a single committee is charged with these oversight functions; at others, the governance and nominating responsibilities are apportioned among two separate committees.

Consistent with Glass Lewis' philosophy that boards should have diverse backgrounds and members with a breadth and depth of relevant experience, we believe that nominating and governance committees should consider diversity when making director nominations within the context of each specific company and its industry. In our view, shareholders are best served when boards make an effort to ensure a constituency that is not only reasonably diverse on the basis of age, race, gender and ethnicity, but also on the basis of geographic knowledge, industry experience, board tenure and culture.

Regarding the committee responsible for governance, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

1. All members of the governance committee²¹ during whose tenure a shareholder proposal relating to important shareholder rights received support from a majority of the votes cast (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes) and the board has not begun to implement or enact the proposal's subject matter.²² Examples of such shareholder proposals include those seeking a declassified board structure, a majority vote standard for director elections, or a right to call a special meeting. In determining whether a board has sufficiently implemented such a proposal, we will examine the quality of the right enacted or proffered by the board for any conditions that may unreasonably interfere with the shareholders' ability to exercise the right (e.g., overly restrictive procedural requirements for calling a special meeting).
2. All members of the governance committee when a shareholder resolution is excluded from the meeting agenda but the SEC has declined to state a view on whether such resolution should be excluded, or when the SEC has verbally permitted a company to exclude a shareholder proposal but there is no written record provided by the SEC about such determination and the company has not provided any disclosure concerning this no-action relief.
3. The governance committee chair when the chair is not independent and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.²³
4. The governance committee chair at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less).
5. In the absence of a nominating committee, the governance committee chair when there are fewer than five, or the whole governance committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.
6. The governance committee chair when the committee fails to meet at all during the year.
7. The governance committee chair, when for two consecutive years the company provides what we consider to be "inadequate" related party transaction disclosure (i.e., the nature of such transactions

²¹ If the board does not have a committee responsible for governance oversight and the board did not implement a shareholder proposal that received the requisite support, we will recommend voting against the entire board. If the shareholder proposal at issue requested that the board adopt a declassified structure, we will recommend voting against all director nominees up for election.

²² Where a compensation-related shareholder proposal should have been implemented, and when a reasonable analysis suggests that the members of the compensation committee (rather than the governance committee) bear the responsibility for failing to implement the request, we recommend that shareholders only vote against members of the compensation committee.

²³ We believe that one independent individual should be appointed to serve as the lead or presiding director. When such a position is rotated among directors from meeting to meeting, we will recommend voting against the governance committee chair as we believe the lack of fixed lead or presiding director means that, effectively, the board does not have an independent board leader.

and/or the monetary amounts involved are unclear or excessively vague, thereby preventing a shareholder from being able to reasonably interpret the independence status of multiple directors above and beyond what the company maintains is compliant with SEC or applicable stock exchange listing requirements).

8. The governance committee chair, when during the past year the board adopted a forum selection clause (i.e., an exclusive forum provision)²⁴ designating either a state's courts for intra-corporate disputes, and/or federal courts for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933 without shareholder approval,²⁵ or if the board is currently seeking shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal.
9. All members of the governance committee during whose tenure the board adopted, without shareholder approval, provisions in its charter or bylaws that, through rules on director compensation, may inhibit the ability of shareholders to nominate directors.
10. The governance committee chair when the board takes actions to limit shareholders' ability to vote on matters material to shareholder rights (e.g., through the practice of excluding a shareholder proposal by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal).
11. The governance committee chair when directors' records for board and committee meeting attendance are not disclosed, or when it is indicated that a director attended less than 75% of board and committee meetings but disclosure is sufficiently vague that it is not possible to determine which specific director's attendance was lacking.
12. The governance committee chair when a detailed record of proxy voting results from the prior annual meeting has not been disclosed.
13. The governance committee chair when a company does not clearly disclose the identity of a shareholder proponent (or lead proponent when there are multiple filers) in their proxy statement. For a detailed explanation of this policy, please refer to our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals & ESG-Related Issues*, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.

In addition, we may recommend that shareholders vote against the chair of the governance committee, or the entire committee, where the board has amended the company's governing documents to reduce or remove important shareholder rights, or to otherwise impede the ability of shareholders to exercise such right, and has done so without seeking shareholder approval. Examples of board actions that may cause such a recommendation include: the elimination of the ability of shareholders to call a special meeting or to act by written consent; an increase to the ownership threshold required for shareholders to call a special meeting; an increase to vote requirements for charter or bylaw amendments; the adoption of provisions that limit the ability of shareholders to pursue full legal recourse — such as bylaws that require arbitration of shareholder claims or that require shareholder plaintiffs to pay the company's legal expenses in the absence of a court victory (i.e., "fee-shifting" or "loser pays" bylaws); the adoption of a classified board structure; and the elimination of the ability of shareholders to remove a director without cause.

Regarding the nominating committee, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the following:

²⁴ A forum selection clause is a bylaw provision stipulating that a certain state or federal jurisdiction is the exclusive forum for specified legal matters. Such a clause effectively limits a shareholder's legal remedy regarding appropriate choice of venue and related relief.

²⁵ Glass Lewis will evaluate the circumstances surrounding the adoption of any forum selection clause as well as the general provisions contained therein. Where it can be reasonably determined that a forum selection clause is narrowly crafted to suit the particular circumstances facing the company and/or a reasonable sunset provision is included, we may make an exception to this policy.

1. All members of the nominating committee, when the committee nominated or renominated an individual who had a significant conflict of interest or whose past actions demonstrated a lack of integrity or inability to represent shareholder interests.
2. The nominating committee chair, if the nominating committee did not meet during the year.
3. In the absence of a governance committee, the nominating committee chair when the chair is not independent, and an independent lead or presiding director has not been appointed.
4. The nominating committee chair, when there are fewer than five, or the whole nominating committee when there are more than 20 members on the board.
5. The nominating committee chair, when a director received a greater than 50% against vote the prior year and not only was the director not removed, but the issues that raised shareholder concern were not corrected.²⁶
6. The chair of the nominating committee of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse,²⁷ or all members of the nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside of the Russell 3000 index, we will recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee if there are no gender diverse directors.
7. The chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than one director from an underrepresented community on the board, at companies within the Russell 1000 index.
8. The nominating committee chair when, alongside other governance or board performance concerns, the average tenure of non-executive directors is 10 years or more and no new independent directors have joined the board in the past five years. We will not be making voting recommendations solely on this basis; rather, insufficient board refreshment may be a contributing factor in our recommendations when additional board-related concerns have been identified.

In addition, we may consider recommending shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating committee where the board's failure to ensure the board has directors with relevant experience, either through periodic director assessment or board refreshment, has contributed to a company's poor performance. Where these issues warrant an against vote in the absence of both a governance and a nominating committee, we will recommend voting against the board chair, unless the chair also serves as the CEO, in which case we will recommend voting against the longest-serving director.

Board-Level Risk Management Oversight

Glass Lewis evaluates the risk management function of a public company board on a strictly case-by-case basis. Sound risk management, while necessary at all companies, is particularly important at financial firms which inherently maintain significant exposure to financial risk. We believe such financial firms should have a chief risk officer reporting directly to the board and a dedicated risk committee or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight. Moreover, many non-financial firms maintain strategies which involve a high level of exposure to financial risk. Similarly, since many non-financial firms have complex hedging or trading strategies, those firms should also have a chief risk officer and a risk committee.

Our views on risk oversight are consistent with those expressed by various regulatory bodies. In its December 2009 Final Rule release on Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, the SEC noted that risk oversight is a key

²⁶ Considering that shareholder disapproval clearly relates to the director who received a greater than 50% against vote rather than the nominating chair, we review the severity of the issue(s) that initially raised shareholder concern as well as company responsiveness to such matters, and will only recommend voting against the nominating chair if a reasonable analysis suggests that it would be most appropriate. In rare cases, we will consider recommending against the nominating chair when a director receives a substantial (i.e., 20% or more) vote against based on the same analysis.

²⁷ Women and directors that identify with a gender other than male or female.

competence of the board and that additional disclosures would improve investor and shareholder understanding of the role of the board in the organization's risk management practices. The final rules, which became effective on February 28, 2010, now explicitly require companies and mutual funds to describe (while allowing for some degree of flexibility) the board's role in the oversight of risk.

When analyzing the risk management practices of public companies, we take note of any significant losses or writedowns on financial assets and/or structured transactions. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where we find that the company's board-level risk committee's poor oversight contributed to the loss, we will recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise),²⁸ we will consider recommending to vote against the board chair on that basis. However, we generally would not recommend voting against a combined chair/CEO, except in egregious cases.

Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues

Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring the sustainability of companies' operations. We believe that insufficient oversight of material environmental and social issues can present direct legal, financial, regulatory and reputational risks that could serve to harm shareholder interests. Therefore, we believe that these issues should be carefully monitored and managed by companies, and that all companies should have an appropriate oversight structure in place to ensure that they are mitigating attendant risks and capitalizing on related opportunities to the best extent possible.

To that end, Glass Lewis believes that companies should ensure that boards maintain clear oversight of material risks to their operations, including those that are environmental and social in nature. These risks could include, but are not limited to, matters related to climate change, human capital management, diversity, stakeholder relations, and health, safety & environment. Given the importance of the board's role in overseeing environmental and social risks, we believe this responsibility should be formally designated and codified in the appropriate committee charters or other governing documents.

While we believe that it is important that these issues are overseen at the board level and that shareholders are afforded meaningful disclosure of these oversight responsibilities, we believe that companies should determine the best structure for this oversight. In our view, this oversight can be effectively conducted by specific directors, the entire board, a separate committee, or combined with the responsibilities of a key committee.

For companies in the Russell 3000 index and in instances where we identify material oversight concerns, Glass Lewis will review a company's overall governance practices and identify which directors or board-level committees have been charged with oversight of environmental and/or social issues. Furthermore, given the importance of the board's role in overseeing environmental and social risks, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against the governance committee chair of a company in the Russell 1000 index that fails to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board's role in overseeing these issues.

When evaluating the board's role in overseeing environmental and/or social issues, we will examine a company's committee charters and governing documents to determine if the company has codified and

²⁸ A committee responsible for risk management could be a dedicated risk committee, the audit committee, or the finance committee, depending on a given company's board structure and method of disclosure. At some companies, the entire board is charged with risk management.

maintained a meaningful level of oversight of and accountability for a company's material environmental and social impacts.

Cyber Risk Oversight

Companies and consumers are exposed to a growing risk of cyber-attacks. These attacks can result in customer or employee data breaches, harm to a company's reputation, significant fines or penalties, and interruption to a company's operations. Further, in some instances, cyber breaches can result in national security concerns, such as those impacting companies operating as utilities, defense contractors, and energy companies.

In response to these issues, regulators have increasingly been focused on ensuring companies are providing appropriate and timely disclosures and protections to stakeholders that could have been adversely impacted by a breach in a company's cyber infrastructure.

On July 26, 2023, the SEC approved final rules requiring public companies to report cybersecurity incidents deemed material within four days of identifying them, detailing their nature, scope, timing, and material impact under Item 1.05 on Form 8-K.

Furthermore, in annual reports, companies must disclose their processes for assessing, identifying, and managing material cybersecurity risks, along with their material effects; and describe whether any risks from prior incidents have materially affected its business strategy, results of operations, or financial condition (or are reasonably likely to), pursuant to Regulation S-K Item 106. Item 106 will also require registrants to describe the board of directors' oversight of risks from cybersecurity threats and management's role and expertise in assessing and managing material risks from cybersecurity threats. Similar rules were also adopted for foreign private issuers. The final rules became effective on September 5, 2023.

Given the regulatory focus on, and the potential adverse outcomes from, cyber-related issues, it is our view that cyber risk is material for all companies. We therefore believe that it is critical that companies evaluate and mitigate these risks to the greatest extent possible. With that view, we encourage all issuers to provide clear disclosure concerning the role of the board in overseeing issues related to cybersecurity, including how companies are ensuring directors are fully versed on this rapidly evolving and dynamic issue. We believe such disclosure can help shareholders understand the seriousness with which companies take this issue.

In the absence of material cyber incidents, we will generally not make voting recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues. However, in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders we will closely evaluate the board's oversight of cybersecurity as well as the company's response and disclosures.

Moreover, in instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we believe shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates communicating the company's ongoing progress towards resolving and remediating the impact of the cyber-attack. We generally believe shareholders are best served when such updates include (but are not necessarily limited to) details such as when the company has fully restored its information systems, when the company has returned to normal operations, what resources the company is providing for affected stakeholders, and any other potentially relevant information, until the company considers the impact of the cyber-attack to be fully remediated. These disclosures should focus on the company's response to address the impacts to affected stakeholders and should not reveal specific and/or technical details that could impede the company's response or remediation of the incident or that could assist threat actors.

In such instances, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosure concerning cybersecurity-related issues to be insufficient, or are not provided to shareholders.

Board Accountability for Environmental and Social Performance

Glass Lewis carefully monitors companies' performance with respect to environmental and social issues, including those related to climate and human capital management. In situations where we believe that a company has not properly managed or mitigated material environmental or social risks to the detriment of shareholder value, or when such mismanagement has threatened shareholder value, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the board who are responsible for oversight of environmental and social risks. In the absence of explicit board oversight of environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against members of the audit committee. In making these determinations, Glass Lewis will carefully review the situation, its effect on shareholder value, as well as any corrective action or other response made by the company.

For more information on how Glass Lewis evaluates environmental and social issues, please see Glass Lewis' Overall Approach to ESG as well as our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals & ESG-Related Issues*, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.

Board Accountability for Climate-related Issues

Given the exceptionally broad impacts of a changing climate on companies, the economy, and society in general, we view climate risk as a material risk for all companies. We therefore believe that boards should be considering and evaluating their operational resilience under lower-carbon scenarios. While all companies maintain exposure to climate-related risks, we believe that additional consideration should be given to, and that disclosure should be provided by those companies whose GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

We believe that companies with this increased risk exposure should provide clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding these risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen. We believe such information is crucial to allow investors to understand the company's management of this issue, as well as the impact of a lower carbon future on the company's operations.

In line with this view, Glass Lewis will carefully examine the climate-related disclosures provided by companies in the S&P 500 index with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations²⁹, as well as companies where we believe emissions or climate impacts, or stakeholder scrutiny thereof, represent an outsized, financially material risk, in order to assess whether they have produced disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We will also assess whether these companies have disclosed explicit and clearly defined board-level oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. In instances where we find either (or both) of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against the chair of the committee (or board) charged with oversight of climate-related issues, or if no committee has been charged with such oversight, the chair of the governance committee. Further, we may extend our recommendation on this basis to additional members of the responsible

²⁹ This policy will generally apply to companies in the following SASB-defined industries: agricultural products, air freight & logistics, airlines, chemicals, construction materials, containers & packaging, cruise lines, electric utilities & power generators, food retailers & distributors, health care distributors, iron & steel producers, marine transportation, meat, poultry & dairy, metals & mining, non-alcoholic beverages, oil & gas, pulp & paper products, rail transportation, road transportation, semiconductors, waste management.

committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company's size, industry and its overall governance profile.

Director Commitments

We believe that directors should have the necessary time to fulfill their duties to shareholders. In our view, an overcommitted director can pose a material risk to a company's shareholders, particularly during periods of crisis. In addition, recent research indicates that the time commitment associated with being a director has been on a significant upward trend in the past decade.³⁰ As a result, we generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves as an executive officer (other than executive chair) of any public company³¹ while serving on more than one external public company board, a director who serves as an executive chair of any public company while serving on more than two external public company boards, and any other director who serves on more than five public company boards.

Because we believe that executives will primarily devote their attention to executive duties, we generally will not recommend that shareholders vote against overcommitted directors at the companies where they serve as an executive.

When determining whether a director's service on an excessive number of boards may limit the ability of the director to devote sufficient time to board duties, we may consider relevant factors such as the size and location of the other companies where the director serves on the board, the director's board roles at the companies in question, whether the director serves on the board of any large privately-held companies, the director's tenure on the boards in question, and the director's attendance record at all companies. In the case of directors who serve in executive roles other than CEO (e.g., executive chair), we will evaluate the specific duties and responsibilities of that role in determining whether an exception is warranted.

We may also refrain from recommending against certain directors if the company provides sufficient rationale for their continued board service. The rationale should allow shareholders to evaluate the scope of the directors' other commitments, as well as their contributions to the board including specialized knowledge of the company's industry, strategy or key markets, the diversity of skills, perspective and background they provide, and other relevant factors. We will also generally refrain from recommending to vote against a director who serves on an excessive number of boards within a consolidated group of companies in related industries, or a director that represents a firm whose sole purpose is to manage a portfolio of investments which include the company.

Other Considerations

In addition to the three key characteristics — independence, performance, experience — that we use to evaluate board members, we consider conflict-of-interest issues as well as the size of the board of directors when making voting recommendations.

Conflicts of Interest

³⁰ For example, the 2015-2016 NACD Public Company Governance Survey states that, on average, directors spent a total of 248.2 hours annual on board-related matters during the past year, which it describes as a "historically high level" that is significantly above the average hours recorded in 2006. Additionally, the 2020 Spencer Stuart Board Index indicates that, while 39% of S&P 500 CEOs serve on one additional public board, just 2% of S&P 500 CEOs serve on two additional public boards and only one CEO serves on three.

³¹ When the executive officer in question serves only as an executive at a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) we will generally apply the higher threshold of five public company directorships.

We believe board members should be wholly free of identifiable and substantial conflicts of interest, regardless of the overall level of independent directors on the board. Accordingly, we recommend that shareholders vote against the following types of directors:

1. A CFO who is on the board: In our view, the CFO holds a unique position relative to financial reporting and disclosure to shareholders. Due to the critical importance of financial disclosure and reporting, we believe the CFO should report to the board and not be a member of it.
2. A director who provides — or a director who has an immediate family member who provides — material consulting or other material professional services to the company. These services may include legal, consulting,³² or financial services. We question the need for the company to have consulting relationships with its directors. We view such relationships as creating conflicts for directors, since they may be forced to weigh their own interests against shareholder interests when making board decisions. In addition, a company's decisions regarding where to turn for the best professional services may be compromised when doing business with the professional services firm of one of the company's directors.
3. A director, or a director who has an immediate family member, engaging in airplane, real estate, or similar deals, including perquisite-type grants from the company, amounting to more than \$50,000. Directors who receive these sorts of payments from the company will have to make unnecessarily complicated decisions that may pit their interests against shareholder interests.
4. Interlocking directorships: CEOs or other top executives who serve on each other's boards create an interlock that poses conflicts that should be avoided to ensure the promotion of shareholder interests above all else.³³
5. All board members who served at a time when a poison pill with a term of longer than one year was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months.³⁴ In the event a board is classified and shareholders are therefore unable to vote against all directors, we will recommend voting against the remaining directors the next year they are up for a shareholder vote. If a poison pill with a term of one year or less was adopted without shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of the governance committee. If the board has, without seeking shareholder approval, and without adequate justification, extended the term of a poison pill by one year or less in two consecutive years, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against the entire board.

Size of the Board of Directors

While we do not believe there is a universally applicable optimal board size, we do believe boards should have at least five directors to ensure sufficient diversity in decision-making and to enable the formation of key board committees with independent directors. Conversely, we believe that boards with more than 20 members will typically suffer under the weight of “too many cooks in the kitchen” and have difficulty reaching consensus and making timely decisions. Sometimes the presence of too many voices can make it difficult to draw on the

³² We will generally refrain from recommending against a director who provides consulting services for the company if the director is excluded from membership on the board's key committees and we have not identified significant governance concerns with the board.

³³ We do not apply a look-back period for this situation. The interlock policy applies to both public and private companies. On a case-by-case basis, we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships, such as interlocks with close family members of executives or within group companies. Further, we will also evaluate multiple board interlocks among non-insiders (i.e., multiple directors serving on the same boards at other companies), for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

³⁴ Refer to the “Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise” section for further discussion of our policies regarding anti-takeover measures, including poison pills.

wisdom and experience in the room by virtue of the need to limit the discussion so that each voice may be heard.

To that end, we typically recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee (or the governance committee, in the absence of a nominating committee) at a board with fewer than five directors or more than 20 directors.

Controlled Companies

We believe controlled companies warrant certain exceptions to our independence standards. The board's function is to protect shareholder interests; however, when an individual, entity (or group of shareholders party to a formal agreement) owns more than 50% of the voting shares, the interests of the majority of shareholders are the interests of that entity or individual. Consequently, Glass Lewis does not apply our usual two-thirds board independence rule and therefore we will not recommend voting against boards whose composition reflects the makeup of the shareholder population.

Independence Exceptions

The independence exceptions that we make for controlled companies are as follows:

1. We do not require that controlled companies have boards that are at least two-thirds independent. So long as the insiders and/or affiliates are connected with the controlling entity, we accept the presence of non-independent board members.
2. The compensation committee and nominating and governance committees do not need to consist solely of independent directors.
 - a. We believe that standing nominating and corporate governance committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although having a committee charged with the duties of searching for, selecting, and nominating independent directors can be beneficial, the unique composition of a controlled company's shareholder base makes such committees weak and irrelevant.
 - b. Likewise, we believe that independent compensation committees at controlled companies are unnecessary. Although independent directors are the best choice for approving and monitoring senior executives' pay, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests. As such, we believe that having affiliated directors on a controlled company's compensation committee is acceptable. However, given that a controlled company has certain obligations to minority shareholders we feel that an insider should not serve on the compensation committee. Therefore, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against any insider (the CEO or otherwise) serving on the compensation committee.
3. Controlled companies do not need an independent chair or an independent lead or presiding director. Although an independent director in a position of authority on the board — such as chair or presiding director — can best carry out the board's duties, controlled companies serve a unique shareholder population whose voting power ensures the protection of its interests.

Size of the Board of Directors

We have no board size requirements for controlled companies.

Audit Committee Independence

Despite a controlled company's status, unlike for the other key committees, we nevertheless believe that audit committees should consist solely of independent directors. Regardless of a company's controlled status, the

interests of all shareholders must be protected by ensuring the integrity and accuracy of the company's financial statements. Allowing affiliated directors to oversee the preparation of financial reports could create an insurmountable conflict of interest.

Board Responsiveness at Multi-Class Companies

At controlled companies and companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. In the case of companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will generally examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders on a "one share, one vote" basis. At controlled and multi-class companies, when at least 20% or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness, and when a majority or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and provide a more robust response to fully address shareholder concerns.

Significant Shareholders

Where an individual or entity holds between 20-50% of a company's voting power, we believe it is reasonable to allow proportional representation on the board and committees (excluding the audit committee) based on the individual or entity's percentage of ownership.

Governance Following an IPO, Spin-Off, or Direct Listing

We believe companies that have recently completed an initial public offering (IPO), spin-off, or direct listing should be allowed adequate time to fully comply with marketplace listing requirements and meet basic corporate governance standards. Generally speaking, we refrain from making recommendations on the basis of governance standards (e.g., board independence, committee membership and structure, meeting attendance, etc.) during the one-year period following an IPO.

However, some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year. When evaluating companies that have recently gone public, Glass Lewis will review the terms of the applicable governing documents in order to determine whether shareholder rights are being severely restricted indefinitely. We believe boards that approve highly restrictive governing documents have demonstrated that they may subvert shareholder interests following the IPO. In conducting this evaluation, Glass Lewis will consider:

1. The adoption of anti-takeover provisions such as a poison pill or classified board
2. Supermajority vote requirements to amend governing documents
3. The presence of exclusive forum or fee-shifting provisions
4. Whether shareholders can call special meetings or act by written consent
5. The voting standard provided for the election of directors
6. The ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause
7. The presence of evergreen provisions in the company's equity compensation arrangements
8. The presence of a multi-class share structure which does not afford common shareholders voting power that is aligned with their economic interest

In cases where Glass Lewis determines that the board has approved overly restrictive governing documents, we will generally recommend voting against members of the governance committee. If there is no governance

committee, or if a portion of such committee members are not standing for election due to a classified board structure, we will expand our recommendations to additional director nominees, based on who is standing for election.

In cases where, preceding an IPO, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure). In the case of a multi-class share structure, if these provisions are put to a shareholder vote, we will examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining the vote outcome.

In our view, adopting an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest. This notion is strengthened when a board adopts a classified board with an infinite duration or a poison pill with a five- to ten-year term immediately prior to going public, thereby insulating management for a substantial amount of time.

In addition, shareholders should also be wary of companies that adopt supermajority voting requirements before their IPO. Absent explicit provisions in the articles or bylaws stipulating that certain policies will be phased out over a certain period of time, long-term shareholders could find themselves in the predicament of having to attain a supermajority vote to approve future proposals seeking to eliminate such policies.

Governance Following a Business Combination with a Special Purpose Acquisition Company

The business combination of a private company with a publicly traded special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) facilitates the private entity becoming a publicly traded corporation. Thus, the business combination represents the private company's de-facto IPO. We believe that some cases warrant shareholder action against the board of a company that have completed a business combination with a SPAC within the past year.

At meetings where shareholders vote on the business combination of a SPAC with a private company, shareholders are generally voting on a new corporate charter for the post-combination company as a condition to approval of the business combination. In many cases, shareholders are faced with the dilemma of having to approve corporate charters that severely restrict shareholder rights to facilitate the business combination. Therefore, when shareholders are required to approve binding charters as a condition to approval of a business combination with a SPAC, we believe shareholders should also be provided with advisory votes on material charter amendments as a means to voice their opinions on such restrictive governance provisions.

When evaluating companies that have recently gone public via business combination with a SPAC, Glass Lewis will review the terms of the applicable governing documents to determine whether shareholder rights are being severely restricted indefinitely and whether these restrictive provisions were put forth for a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination.

In cases where, prior to the combined company becoming publicly traded, the board adopts a multi-class share structure where voting rights are not aligned with economic interest, or an anti-takeover provision, such as a poison pill or classified board, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served

at the time of the combined company becoming publicly traded if the board: (i) did not also submit these provisions to a shareholder vote on an advisory basis at the prior meeting where shareholders voted on the business combination; (ii) did not also commit to submitting these provisions to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the company becoming publicly traded; or (iii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of these provisions (generally three to five years in the case of a classified board or poison pill; or seven years or less in the case of a multi-class share structure).

Consistent with our view on IPOs, adopting an anti-takeover device unfairly penalizes future shareholders who (except for electing to buy or sell the stock) are unable to weigh in on a matter that could potentially negatively impact their ownership interest.

Dual-Listed or Foreign-Incorporated Companies

For companies that trade on multiple exchanges or are incorporated in foreign jurisdictions but trade only in the U.S., we will apply the governance standard most relevant in each situation. We will consider a number of factors in determining which Glass Lewis country-specific policy to apply, including but not limited to: (i) the corporate governance structure and features of the company including whether the board structure is unique to a particular market; (ii) the nature of the proposals; (iii) the location of the company's primary listing, if one can be determined; (iv) the regulatory/governance regime that the board is reporting against; and (v) the availability and completeness of the company's SEC filings.

OTC-listed Companies

Companies trading on the OTC Bulletin Board are not considered "listed companies" under SEC rules and therefore not subject to the same governance standards as listed companies. However, we believe that more stringent corporate governance standards should be applied to these companies given that their shares are still publicly traded.

When reviewing OTC companies, Glass Lewis will review the available disclosure relating to the shareholder meeting to determine whether shareholders are able to evaluate several key pieces of information, including: (i) the composition of the board's key committees, if any; (ii) the level of share ownership of company insiders or directors; (iii) the board meeting attendance record of directors; (iv) executive and non-employee director compensation; (v) related-party transactions conducted during the past year; and (vi) the board's leadership structure and determinations regarding director independence.

We are particularly concerned when company disclosure lacks any information regarding the board's key committees. We believe that committees of the board are an essential tool for clarifying how the responsibilities of the board are being delegated, and specifically for indicating which directors are accountable for ensuring: (i) the independence and quality of directors, and the transparency and integrity of the nominating process; (ii) compensation programs that are fair and appropriate; (iii) proper oversight of the company's accounting, financial reporting, and internal and external audits; and (iv) general adherence to principles of good corporate governance.

In cases where shareholders are unable to identify which board members are responsible for ensuring oversight of the above-mentioned responsibilities, we may consider recommending against certain members of the board. Ordinarily, we believe it is the responsibility of the corporate governance committee to provide thorough disclosure of the board's governance practices. In the absence of such a committee, we believe it is appropriate

to hold the board's chair or, if such individual is an executive of the company, the longest-serving non-executive board member accountable.

Mutual Fund Boards

Mutual funds, or investment companies, are structured differently from regular public companies (i.e., operating companies). Typically, members of a fund's advisor are on the board and management takes on a different role from that of regular public companies. Thus, we focus on a short list of requirements, although many of our guidelines remain the same.

The following mutual fund policies are similar to the policies for regular public companies:

1. **Size of the board of directors** — The board should be made up of between five and twenty directors.
2. **The CFO on the board** — Neither the CFO of the fund nor the CFO of the fund's registered investment advisor should serve on the board.
3. **Independence of the audit committee** — The audit committee should consist solely of independent directors.
4. **Audit committee financial expert** — At least one member of the audit committee should be designated as the audit committee financial expert.

The following differences from regular public companies apply at mutual funds:

1. **Independence of the board** — We believe that three-fourths of an investment company's board should be made up of independent directors. This is consistent with a proposed SEC rule on investment company boards. The Investment Company Act requires 40% of the board to be independent, but in 2001, the SEC amended the Exemptive Rules to require that a majority of a mutual fund board be independent. In 2005, the SEC proposed increasing the independence threshold to 75%. In 2006, a federal appeals court ordered that this rule amendment be put back out for public comment, putting it back into "proposed rule" status. Since mutual fund boards play a vital role in overseeing the relationship between the fund and its investment manager, there is greater need for independent oversight than there is for an operating company board.
2. **When the auditor is not up for ratification** — We do not recommend voting against the audit committee if the auditor is not up for ratification. Due to the different legal structure of an investment company compared to an operating company, the auditor for the investment company (i.e., mutual fund) does not conduct the same level of financial review for each investment company as for an operating company.
3. **Non-independent chair** — The SEC has proposed that the chair of the fund board be independent. We agree that the roles of a mutual fund's chair and CEO should be separate. Although we believe this would be best at all companies, we recommend voting against the chair of an investment company's nominating committee as well as the board chair if the chair and CEO of a mutual fund are the same person and the fund does not have an independent lead or presiding director. Seven former SEC commissioners support the appointment of an independent chair and we agree with them that "an independent board chair would be better able to create conditions favoring the long-term interests of fund shareholders than would a chair who is an executive of the advisor." (See the comment letter sent to the SEC in support of the proposed rule at <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/indchair.pdf>.)
4. **Multiple funds overseen by the same director** — Unlike service on a public company board, mutual fund boards require much less of a time commitment. Mutual fund directors typically serve on dozens of other mutual fund boards, often within the same fund complex. The Investment Company Institute's

(ICI) Overview of Fund Governance Practices, 1994-2012, indicates that the average number of funds served by an independent director in 2012 was 53. Absent evidence that a specific director is hindered from being an effective board member at a fund due to service on other funds' boards, we refrain from maintaining a cap on the number of outside mutual fund boards that we believe a director can serve on.

Declassified Boards

Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards and the annual election of directors. We believe staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than boards that are elected annually. Furthermore, we feel the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on shareholder interests.

Empirical studies have shown: (i) staggered boards are associated with a reduction in a firm's valuation; and (ii) in the context of hostile takeovers, staggered boards operate as a takeover defense, which entrenches management, discourages potential acquirers, and delivers a lower return to target shareholders.

In our view, there is no evidence to demonstrate that staggered boards improve shareholder returns in a takeover context. Some research has indicated that shareholders are worse off when a staggered board blocks a transaction; further, when a staggered board negotiates a friendly transaction, no statistically significant difference in premium occurs.³⁵ Additional research found that charter-based staggered boards "reduce the market value of a firm by 4% to 6% of its market capitalization" and that "staggered boards bring about and not merely reflect this reduction in market value."³⁶ A subsequent study reaffirmed that classified boards reduce shareholder value, finding "that the ongoing process of dismantling staggered boards, encouraged by institutional investors, could well contribute to increasing shareholder wealth."³⁷

Shareholders have increasingly come to agree with this view. In 2019, 90% of S&P 500 companies had declassified boards, up from 68% in 2009.³⁸ Management proposals to declassify boards are approved with near unanimity and shareholder proposals on the topic also receive strong shareholder support; in 2014, shareholder proposals requesting that companies declassify their boards received average support of 84% (excluding abstentions and broker non-votes), whereas in 1987, only 16.4% of votes cast favored board declassification.³⁹ Further, a growing number of companies, nearly half of all those targeted by shareholder proposals requesting that all directors stand for election annually, either recommended shareholders support the proposal or made no recommendation, a departure from the more traditional management recommendation to vote against shareholder proposals.

Given our belief that declassified boards promote director accountability, the empirical evidence suggesting staggered boards reduce a company's value and the established shareholder opposition to such a structure, Glass Lewis supports the declassification of boards and the annual election of directors.

³⁵ Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV, Guhan Subramanian, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants," 55 Stanford Law Review 885-917 (2002).

³⁶ Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, "The Costs of Entrenched Boards" (2004).

³⁷ Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen and Charles C.Y. Wang, "Staggered Boards and the Wealth of Shareholders: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,"

SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1706806> (2010), p. 26.

³⁸ Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 15.

³⁹ Lucian Bebchuk, John Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian, "The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy".

Board Composition and Refreshment

Glass Lewis strongly supports routine director evaluation, including independent external reviews, and periodic board refreshment to foster the sharing of diverse perspectives in the boardroom and the generation of new ideas and business strategies. Further, we believe the board should evaluate the need for changes to board composition based on an analysis of skills and experience necessary for the company, as well as the results of the director evaluations, as opposed to relying solely on age or tenure limits. When necessary, shareholders can address concerns regarding proper board composition through director elections.

In our view, a director's experience can be a valuable asset to shareholders because of the complex, critical issues that boards face. This said, we recognize that in rare circumstances, a lack of refreshment can contribute to a lack of board responsiveness to poor company performance.

We will note as a potential concern instances where the average tenure of non-executive directors is 10 years or more and no new directors have joined the board in the past five years. While we will be highlighting this as a potential area of concern, we will not be making voting recommendations strictly on this basis, unless we have identified other governance or board performance concerns.

On occasion, age or term limits can be used as a means to remove a director for boards that are unwilling to police their membership and enforce turnover. Some shareholders support term limits as a way to force change in such circumstances.

While we understand that age limits can aid board succession planning, the long-term impact of age limits restricts experienced and potentially valuable board members from service through an arbitrary means. We believe that shareholders are better off monitoring the board's overall composition, including the diversity of its members, the alignment of the board's areas of expertise with a company's strategy, the board's approach to corporate governance, and its stewardship of company performance, rather than imposing inflexible rules that don't necessarily correlate with returns or benefits for shareholders.

However, if a board adopts term/age limits, it should follow through and not waive such limits. In cases where the board waives its term/age limits for two or more consecutive years, Glass Lewis will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the nominating and/or governance committee chair, unless a compelling rationale is provided for why the board is proposing to waive this rule, such as consummation of a corporate transaction.

Board Diversity

Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring that the board is composed of directors who have a diversity of skills, thought and experience, as such diversity benefits companies by providing a broad range of perspectives and insights. Glass Lewis closely reviews the composition of the board for representation of diverse director candidates.

Board Gender Diversity

We consider the nominating and governance committee to be responsible for ensuring sufficient board diversity, or for publicly communicating its rationale or a plan for increasing diversity. As such, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee of a board that is not at least 30 percent gender diverse, or all members of the nominating committee of a board with no gender diverse directors, at

companies within the Russell 3000 index. For companies outside the Russell 3000 index, our policy requires a minimum of one gender diverse director.

When making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company's disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided sufficient rationale for the lack of diversity or a plan to address the lack of diversity, including a timeline of when the board intends to appoint additional gender diverse directors (generally by the next annual meeting or as soon as reasonably practicable).

We may extend our gender diversity recommendations to additional members of the nominating committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company's size and industry, applicable laws in its state of headquarters, and its overall governance profile.

Board Underrepresented Community Diversity

We will generally recommend against the chair of the nominating committee of a board with fewer than one director from an underrepresented community on the board at companies within the Russell 1000 index.

We define "underrepresented community director" as an individual who self-identifies as Black, African American, North African, Middle Eastern, Hispanic, Latino, Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American, Native Hawaiian, or Alaskan Native, or who self-identifies as a member of the LGBTQIA+ community. For the purposes of this evaluation, we will rely solely on self-identified demographic information as disclosed in company proxy statements.

When making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company's disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline to appoint additional directors from an underrepresented community (generally by the next annual meeting or as soon as reasonably practicable).

We may extend our underrepresented community diversity recommendations to additional members of the nominating committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company's size and industry, applicable laws in its state of headquarters, and its overall governance profile.

State Laws on Diversity

Several states have begun to encourage board diversity through legislation. Some state laws imposed mandatory board composition requirements, while other states have enacted or are considering legislation that encourages companies to diversify their boards but does not mandate board composition requirements. Furthermore, several states have enacted or are considering enacting certain disclosure or reporting requirements in filings made with each respective state annually.

Glass Lewis will recommend in accordance with mandatory board composition requirements set forth in applicable state laws when they come into effect. We will generally refrain from recommending against directors when applicable state laws do not mandate board composition requirements, are non-binding, or solely impose disclosure or reporting requirements.

We note that during 2022, California’s Senate Bill 826 and Assembly Bill 979 regarding board gender and “underrepresented community” diversity, respectively, were both deemed to violate the equal protection clause of the California state constitution. These laws are currently in the appeals process.

Accordingly, where we previously recommended in accordance with mandatory board composition requirements set forth in California’s SB 826 and AB 979, we will refrain from providing recommendations pursuant to these state board composition requirements until further notice while we continue to monitor the appeals process. However, we will continue to monitor compliance with these requirements.

Disclosure of Director Diversity and Skills

Because company disclosure is critical when measuring the mix of diverse attributes and skills of directors, Glass Lewis assesses the quality of such disclosure in companies’ proxy statements. Accordingly, we reflect how a company’s proxy statement presents: (i) the board’s current percentage of racial/ethnic diversity; (ii) whether the board’s definition of diversity explicitly includes gender and/or race/ethnicity; (iii) whether the board has adopted a policy requiring women and minorities to be included in the initial pool of candidates when selecting new director nominees (aka “Rooney Rule”); and (iv) board skills disclosure. Such ratings will help inform our assessment of a company’s overall governance and may be a contributing factor in our recommendations when additional board-related concerns have been identified.

At companies in the Russell 1000 index that have not provided any disclosure in any of the above categories, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee. Further, when companies in the Russell 1000 index have not provided any disclosure of individual or aggregate racial/ethnic minority board demographic information, we will generally recommend voting against the chair of the nominating and/or governance committee.

Stock Exchange Diversity Disclosure Requirements

On August 6, 2021, the SEC approved new listing rules regarding board diversity and disclosure for Nasdaq-listed companies. Beginning in 2022, companies listed on the Nasdaq stock exchange are required to disclose certain board diversity statistics annually in a standardized format in the proxy statement or on the company’s website. Nasdaq-listed companies are required to provide this disclosure by the later of (i) August 8, 2022, or (ii) the date the company files its proxy statement for its 2022 annual meeting. Accordingly, for annual meetings held after August 8, 2022, of applicable Nasdaq-listed companies, we will recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee when the required disclosure has not been provided.

Proxy Access

In lieu of running their own contested election, proxy access would not only allow certain shareholders to nominate directors to company boards but the shareholder nominees would be included on the company’s ballot, significantly enhancing the ability of shareholders to play a meaningful role in selecting their representatives. Glass Lewis generally supports affording shareholders the right to nominate director candidates to management’s proxy as a means to ensure that significant, long-term shareholders have an ability to nominate candidates to the board.

Companies generally seek shareholder approval to amend company bylaws to adopt proxy access in response to shareholder engagement or pressure, usually in the form of a shareholder proposal requesting proxy access,

although some companies may adopt some elements of proxy access without prompting. Glass Lewis considers several factors when evaluating whether to support proposals for companies to adopt proxy access including the specified minimum ownership and holding requirement for shareholders to nominate one or more directors, as well as company size, performance and responsiveness to shareholders.

For a discussion of recent regulatory events in this area, along with a detailed overview of the Glass Lewis approach to shareholder proposals regarding Proxy Access, refer to Glass Lewis' *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals & ESG-Related Issues*, available at www.glasslewis.com.

Majority Vote for Election of Directors

Majority voting for the election of directors is fast becoming the de facto standard in corporate board elections. In our view, the majority voting proposals are an effort to make the case for shareholder impact on director elections on a company-specific basis.

While this proposal would not give shareholders the opportunity to nominate directors or lead to elections where shareholders have a choice among director candidates, if implemented, the proposal would allow shareholders to have a voice in determining whether the nominees proposed by the board should actually serve as the overseer-representatives of shareholders in the boardroom. We believe this would be a favorable outcome for shareholders.

The number of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a majority voting standard has declined significantly during the past decade, largely as a result of widespread adoption of majority voting or director resignation policies at U.S. companies. In 2019, 89% of the S&P 500 Index had implemented a resignation policy for directors failing to receive majority shareholder support, compared to 65% in 2009.⁴⁰

The Plurality Vote Standard

Today, most U.S. companies still elect directors by a plurality vote standard. Under that standard, if one shareholder holding only one share votes in favor of a nominee (including that director, if the director is a shareholder), that nominee “wins” the election and assumes a seat on the board. The common concern among companies with a plurality voting standard is the possibility that one or more directors would not receive a majority of votes, resulting in “failed elections.”

Advantages of a Majority Vote Standard

If a majority vote standard were implemented, a nominee would have to receive the support of a majority of the shares voted in order to be elected. Thus, shareholders could collectively vote to reject a director they believe will not pursue their best interests. Given that so few directors (less than 100 a year) do not receive majority support from shareholders, we think that a majority vote standard is reasonable since it will neither result in many failed director elections nor reduce the willingness of qualified, shareholder-focused directors to serve in the future. Further, most directors who fail to receive a majority shareholder vote in favor of their election do not step down, underscoring the need for true majority voting.

We believe that a majority vote standard will likely lead to more attentive directors. Although shareholders only rarely fail to support directors, the occasional majority vote against a director's election will likely deter the

⁴⁰ Spencer Stuart Board Index, 2019, p. 15.

election of directors with a record of ignoring shareholder interests. Glass Lewis will therefore generally support proposals calling for the election of directors by a majority vote, excepting contested director elections.

In response to the high level of support majority voting has garnered, many companies have voluntarily taken steps to implement majority voting or modified approaches to majority voting. These steps range from a modified approach requiring directors that receive a majority of withheld votes to resign (i.e., a resignation policy) to actually requiring a majority vote of outstanding shares to elect directors.

We feel that the modified approach does not go far enough because requiring a director to resign is not the same as requiring a majority vote to elect a director and does not allow shareholders a definitive voice in the election process. Further, under the modified approach, the corporate governance committee could reject a resignation and, even if it accepts the resignation, the corporate governance committee decides on the director's replacement. And since the modified approach is usually adopted as a policy by the board or a board committee, it could be altered by the same board or committee at any time.

Conflicting and Excluded Proposals

SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(9) allows companies to exclude shareholder proposals "if the proposal directly conflicts with one of the company's own proposals to be submitted to shareholders at the same meeting." On October 22, 2015, the SEC issued Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14H (SLB 14H) clarifying its rule concerning the exclusion of certain shareholder proposals when similar items are also on the ballot. SLB 14H increased the burden on companies to prove to SEC staff that a conflict exists; therefore, many companies still chose to place management proposals alongside similar shareholder proposals in many cases.

During the 2018 proxy season, a new trend in the SEC's interpretation of this rule emerged. Upon submission of shareholder proposals requesting that companies adopt a lower special meeting threshold, several companies petitioned the SEC for no-action relief under the premise that the shareholder proposals conflicted with management's own special meeting proposals, even though the management proposals set a higher threshold than those requested by the proponent. No-action relief was granted to these companies; however, the SEC stipulated that the companies must state in the rationale for the management proposals that a vote in favor of management's proposal was tantamount to a vote against the adoption of a lower special meeting threshold. In certain instances, shareholder proposals to lower an existing special meeting right threshold were excluded on the basis that they conflicted with management proposals seeking to ratify the existing special meeting rights. We find the exclusion of these shareholder proposals to be especially problematic as, in these instances, shareholders are not offered any enhanced shareholder right, nor would the approval (or rejection) of the ratification proposal initiate any type of meaningful change to shareholders' rights.

In instances where companies have excluded shareholder proposals, such as those instances where special meeting shareholder proposals are excluded as a result of "conflicting" management proposals, Glass Lewis will take a case-by-case approach, taking into account the following issues:

- The threshold proposed by the shareholder resolution;
- The threshold proposed or established by management and the attendant rationale for the threshold;
- Whether management's proposal is seeking to ratify an existing special meeting right or adopt a bylaw that would establish a special meeting right; and
- The company's overall governance profile, including its overall responsiveness to and engagement with shareholders.

Glass Lewis generally favors a 10-15% special meeting right. Accordingly, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting for management or shareholder proposals that fall within this range. When faced with conflicting proposals, Glass Lewis will generally recommend in favor of the lower special meeting right and will recommend voting against the proposal with the higher threshold. However, in instances where there are conflicting management and shareholder proposals and a company has not established a special meeting right, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote in favor of the shareholder proposal and that they abstain from a management-proposed bylaw amendment seeking to establish a special meeting right. We believe that an abstention is appropriate in this instance in order to ensure that shareholders are sending a clear signal regarding their preference for the appropriate threshold for a special meeting right, while not directly opposing the establishment of such a right.

In cases where the company excludes a shareholder proposal seeking a reduced special meeting right by means of ratifying a management proposal that is materially different from the shareholder proposal, we will generally recommend voting against the chair or members of the governance committee.

In other instances of conflicting management and shareholder proposals, Glass Lewis will consider the following:

- The nature of the underlying issue;
- The benefit to shareholders of implementing the proposal;
- The materiality of the differences between the terms of the shareholder proposal and management proposal;
- The context of a company's shareholder base, corporate structure and other relevant circumstances; and
- A company's overall governance profile and, specifically, its responsiveness to shareholders as evidenced by a company's response to previous shareholder proposals and its adoption of progressive shareholder rights provisions.

In recent years, we have seen the dynamic nature of the considerations given by the SEC when determining whether companies may exclude certain shareholder proposals. We understand that not all shareholder proposals serve the long-term interests of shareholders, and value and respect the limitations placed on shareholder proponents, as certain shareholder proposals can unduly burden companies. However, Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should be able to vote on issues of material importance.

We view the shareholder proposal process as an important part of advancing shareholder rights and encouraging responsible and financially sustainable business practices. While recognizing that certain proposals cross the line between the purview of shareholders and that of the board, we generally believe that companies should not limit investors' ability to vote on shareholder proposals that advance certain rights or promote beneficial disclosure. Accordingly, Glass Lewis will make note of instances where a company has successfully petitioned the SEC to exclude shareholder proposals. If after review we believe that the exclusion of a shareholder proposal is detrimental to shareholders, we may, in certain very limited circumstances, recommend against members of the governance committee.

Transparency and Integrity in Financial Reporting

Auditor Ratification

The auditor's role as gatekeeper is crucial in ensuring the integrity and transparency of the financial information necessary for protecting shareholder value. Shareholders rely on the auditor to ask tough questions and to do a thorough analysis of a company's books to ensure that the information provided to shareholders is complete, accurate, fair, and that it is a reasonable representation of a company's financial position. The only way shareholders can make rational investment decisions is if the market is equipped with accurate information about a company's fiscal health. As stated in the October 6, 2008 Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury:

"The auditor is expected to offer critical and objective judgment on the financial matters under consideration, and actual and perceived absence of conflicts is critical to that expectation. The Committee believes that auditors, investors, public companies, and other market participants must understand the independence requirements and their objectives, and that auditors must adopt a mindset of skepticism when facing situations that may compromise their independence."

As such, shareholders should demand an objective, competent and diligent auditor who performs at or above professional standards at every company in which the investors hold an interest. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should avoid situations requiring a choice between the auditor's interests and the public's interests. Almost without exception, shareholders should be able to annually review an auditor's performance and to annually ratify a board's auditor selection. Moreover, in October 2008, the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession went even further, and recommended that "to further enhance audit committee oversight and auditor accountability ... disclosure in the company proxy statement regarding shareholder ratification [should] include the name(s) of the senior auditing partner(s) staffed on the engagement."⁴¹

On August 16, 2011, the PCAOB issued a Concept Release seeking public comment on ways that auditor independence, objectivity and professional skepticism could be enhanced, with a specific emphasis on mandatory audit firm rotation. The PCAOB convened several public roundtable meetings during 2012 to further discuss such matters. Glass Lewis believes auditor rotation can ensure both the independence of the auditor and the integrity of the audit; we will typically recommend supporting proposals to require auditor rotation when the proposal uses a reasonable period of time (usually not less than 5-7 years), particularly at companies with a history of accounting problems.

On June 1, 2017, the PCAOB adopted new standards to enhance auditor reports by providing additional important information to investors. For companies with fiscal year end dates on or after December 15, 2017, reports were required to include the year in which the auditor began serving consecutively as the company's auditor. For large accelerated filers with fiscal year ends of June 30, 2019 or later, and for all other companies with fiscal year ends of December 15, 2020 or later, communication of critical audit matters (CAMs) will also be

⁴¹ "Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession to the U.S. Department of the Treasury." p. VIII:20, October 6, 2008.

required. CAMs are matters that have been communicated to the audit committee, are related to accounts or disclosures that are material to the financial statements, and involve especially challenging, subjective, or complex auditor judgment.

Glass Lewis believes the additional reporting requirements are beneficial for investors. The additional disclosures can provide investors with information that is critical to making an informed judgment about an auditor's independence and performance. Furthermore, we believe the additional requirements are an important step toward enhancing the relevance and usefulness of auditor reports, which too often are seen as boilerplate compliance documents that lack the relevant details to provide meaningful insight into a particular audit.

Voting Recommendations on Auditor Ratification

We generally support management's choice of auditor except when we believe the auditor's independence or audit integrity has been compromised. Where a board has not allowed shareholders to review and ratify an auditor, we typically recommend voting against the audit committee chair. When there have been material restatements of annual financial statements or material weaknesses in internal controls, we usually recommend voting against the entire audit committee.

Reasons why we may not recommend ratification of an auditor include:

1. When audit fees plus audit-related fees total less than the tax fees and/or other non-audit fees.
2. Recent material restatements of annual financial statements, including those resulting in the reporting of material weaknesses in internal controls and including late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing.⁴²
3. When the auditor performs prohibited services such as tax-shelter work, tax services for the CEO or CFO, or contingent-fee work, such as a fee based on a percentage of economic benefit to the company.
4. When audit fees are excessively low, especially when compared with other companies in the same industry.
5. When the company has aggressive accounting policies.
6. When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in its financial statements.
7. Where the auditor limited its liability through its contract with the company or the audit contract requires the corporation to use alternative dispute resolution procedures without adequate justification.
8. We also look for other relationships or concerns with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between the auditor's interests and shareholder interests.
9. In determining whether shareholders would benefit from rotating the company's auditor, where relevant we will consider factors that may call into question an auditor's effectiveness, including auditor tenure, a pattern of inaccurate audits, and any ongoing litigation or significant controversies. When Glass Lewis considers ongoing litigation and significant controversies, it is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or that the law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such lawsuits or other significant controversies reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted."

⁴² An auditor does not audit interim financial statements. Thus, we generally do not believe that an auditor should be opposed due to a restatement of interim financial statements unless the nature of the misstatement is clear from a reading of the incorrect financial statements.

Pension Accounting Issues

A pension accounting question occasionally raised in proxy proposals is what effect, if any, projected returns on employee pension assets should have on a company's net income. This issue often arises in the executive-compensation context in a discussion of the extent to which pension accounting should be reflected in business performance for purposes of calculating payments to executives.

Glass Lewis believes that pension credits should not be included in measuring income that is used to award performance-based compensation. Because many of the assumptions used in accounting for retirement plans are subject to the company's discretion, management would have an obvious conflict of interest if pay were tied to pension income. In our view, projected income from pensions does not truly reflect a company's performance.

The Link Between Compensation and Performance

Glass Lewis carefully reviews the compensation awarded to senior executives, as we believe that this is an important area in which the board's priorities are revealed. Glass Lewis strongly believes executive compensation should be linked directly with the performance of the business the executive is charged with managing. We believe the most effective compensation arrangements provide for an appropriate mix of performance-based short- and long-term incentives in addition to fixed pay elements while promoting a prudent and sustainable level of risk-taking.

Glass Lewis believes that comprehensive, timely and transparent disclosure of executive pay is critical to allowing shareholders to evaluate the extent to which pay is aligned with company performance. When reviewing proxy materials, Glass Lewis examines whether the company discloses the performance metrics used to determine executive compensation. We recognize performance metrics must necessarily vary depending on the company and industry, among other factors, and may include a wide variety of financial measures as well as industry-specific performance indicators. However, we believe companies should disclose why the specific performance metrics were selected and how the actions they are designed to incentivize will lead to better corporate performance.

Moreover, it is rarely in shareholders' interests to disclose competitive data about individual salaries below the senior executive level. Such disclosure could create internal personnel discord that would be counterproductive for the company and its shareholders. While we favor full disclosure for senior executives and we view pay disclosure at the aggregate level (e.g., the number of employees being paid over a certain amount or in certain categories) as potentially useful, we do not believe shareholders need or will benefit from detailed reports about individual management employees other than the most senior executives.

Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation (Say-on-Pay)

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) required companies to hold an advisory vote on executive compensation at the first shareholder meeting that occurs six months after enactment of the bill (January 21, 2011).

This practice of allowing shareholders a non-binding vote on a company’s compensation report is standard practice in many non-U.S. countries, and has been a requirement for most companies in the United Kingdom since 2003 and in Australia since 2005. Although say-on-pay proposals are non-binding, a high level of “against” or “abstain” votes indicates substantial shareholder concern about a company’s compensation policies and procedures.

Given the complexity of most companies’ compensation programs, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach when analyzing advisory votes on executive compensation. We review each company’s compensation on a case-by-case basis, recognizing that each company must be examined in the context of industry, size, maturity, performance, financial condition, its historic pay for performance practices, and any other relevant internal or external factors.

We believe that each company should design and apply specific compensation policies and practices that are appropriate to the circumstances of the company and, in particular, will attract and retain competent executives and other staff, while motivating them to grow the company’s long-term shareholder value.

Where we find those specific policies and practices serve to reasonably align compensation with performance, and such practices are adequately disclosed, Glass Lewis will recommend supporting the company’s approach. If, however, those specific policies and practices fail to demonstrably link compensation with performance, Glass Lewis will generally recommend voting against the say-on-pay proposal.

Glass Lewis reviews say-on-pay proposals on both a qualitative basis and a quantitative basis, with a focus on several main areas:

- The overall design and structure of the company’s executive compensation programs including selection and challenging nature of performance metrics;
- The implementation and effectiveness of the company’s executive compensation programs including pay mix and use of performance metrics in determining pay levels;
- The quality and content of the company’s disclosure;
- The quantum paid to executives; and
- The link between compensation and performance as indicated by the company’s current and past pay-for-performance grades.

We also review any significant changes or modifications, including post fiscal year-end changes and one-time awards, particularly where the changes touch upon issues that are material to Glass Lewis recommendations. Additionally, while we recognize their rarity in the U.S. market, beneficial features such as but not limited to post-vesting and/or post-termination holding requirements may be viewed positively in our holistic analysis.

Say-on-Pay Voting Recommendations

In cases where we find deficiencies in a company’s compensation program’s design, implementation or management, we will recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. Generally, such instances include:

- Evidence of a pattern of poor pay-for-performance practices (i.e., deficient or failing pay-for-performance grades),

- Unclear or questionable disclosure regarding the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited information regarding benchmarking processes, limited rationale for bonus performance metrics and targets, etc.),
- Questionable adjustments to certain aspects of the overall compensation structure (e.g., limited rationale for significant changes to performance targets or metrics, the payout of guaranteed bonuses or sizable retention grants, etc.), and/or
- Other egregious compensation practices.

Although not an exhaustive list, the following issues when weighed together may cause Glass Lewis to recommend voting against a say-on-pay vote:

- Inappropriate or outsized self-selected peer groups and/or benchmarking issues such as compensation targets set well above the median without adequate justification;
- Egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments, including golden handshakes and golden parachutes;
- Insufficient response to low shareholder support;
- Problematic contractual payments, such as guaranteed bonuses;
- Insufficiently challenging performance targets and/or high potential payout opportunities;
- Performance targets lowered without justification;
- Discretionary bonuses paid when short- or long-term incentive plan targets were not met;
- High executive pay relative to peers that is not justified by outstanding company performance; and
- The terms of the long-term incentive plans are inappropriate (please see “Long-Term Incentives”).

The aforementioned issues may also influence Glass Lewis’ assessment of the structure of a company’s compensation program. We evaluate structure on a “Good, Fair, Poor” rating scale whereby a “Good” rating represents a compensation program with little to no concerns, a “Fair” rating represents a compensation program with some concerns and a “Poor” rating represents a compensation program that deviates significantly from best practice or contains one or more egregious compensation practices.

We believe that it is important for companies to provide investors with clear and complete disclosure of all the significant terms of compensation arrangements. Similar to structure, we evaluate disclosure on a “Good, Fair, Poor” rating scale whereby a “Good” rating represents a thorough discussion of all elements of compensation, a “Fair” rating represents an adequate discussion of all or most elements of compensation and a “Poor” rating represents an incomplete or absent discussion of compensation. In instances where a company has simply failed to provide sufficient disclosure of its policies, we may recommend shareholders vote against this proposal solely on this basis, regardless of the appropriateness of compensation levels.

In general, most companies will fall within the “Fair” range for both structure and disclosure, and Glass Lewis largely uses the “Good” and “Poor” ratings to highlight outliers.

Where we identify egregious compensation practices, we may also recommend voting against the compensation committee based on the practices or actions of its members during the year. Such practices may include approving large one-off payments, the inappropriate, unjustified use of discretion, or sustained poor pay for performance practices. (Refer to the section on “Compensation Committee Performance” for more information.)

Company Responsiveness

When companies receive a significant level of shareholder opposition to a say-on-pay proposal, which occurs when more than 20% of votes on the proposal are cast as AGAINST and/or ABSTAIN, we believe the board

should demonstrate a commensurate level of engagement and responsiveness to the concerns behind the disapproval, with a particular focus on responding to shareholder feedback. When assessing the level of opposition to say-on-pay proposals, we may further examine the level of opposition among disinterested shareholders as an independent group. While we recognize that sweeping changes cannot be made to a compensation program without due consideration, and that often a majority of shareholders may have voted in favor of the proposal, given that the average approval rate for say-on-pay proposals is about 90%, we believe the compensation committee should provide some level of response to a significant vote against. In general, our expectations regarding the minimum appropriate levels of responsiveness will correspond with the level of shareholder opposition, as expressed both through the magnitude of opposition in a single year, and through the persistence of shareholder disapproval over time.

Responses we consider appropriate include engaging with large shareholders, especially dissenting shareholders, to identify their concerns, and, where reasonable, implementing changes and/or making commitments that directly address those concerns within the company's compensation program. In cases where particularly egregious pay decisions caused the say on pay proposal to fail, Glass Lewis will closely consider whether any changes were made directly relating to the pay decision that may address structural concerns that shareholders have. In the absence of any evidence in the disclosure that the board is actively engaging shareholders on these issues and responding accordingly, we may recommend holding compensation committee members accountable for failing to adequately respond to shareholder opposition. Regarding such recommendations, careful consideration will be given to the level of shareholder protest and the severity and history of compensation practices.

Pay for Performance

Glass Lewis believes an integral part of a well-structured compensation package is a successful link between pay and performance. Our proprietary pay-for-performance model was developed to better evaluate the link between pay and performance. Generally, compensation and performance are measured against a peer group of appropriate companies that may overlap, to a certain extent, with a company's self-disclosed peers. This quantitative analysis provides a consistent framework and historical context for our clients to determine how well companies link executive compensation to relative performance. Companies that demonstrate a weaker link are more likely to receive a negative recommendation; however, other qualitative factors such as overall incentive structure, significant forthcoming changes to the compensation program or reasonable long-term payout levels may mitigate our concerns to a certain extent.

While we assign companies a letter grade of A, B, C, D or F based on the alignment between pay and performance, the grades derived from the Glass Lewis pay-for-performance analysis do not follow the traditional U.S. school letter grade system. Rather, the grades are generally interpreted as follows:

Grade of A: The company's percentile rank for pay is significantly less than its percentile rank for performance

Grade of B: The company's percentile rank for pay is moderately less than its percentile rank for performance

Grade of C: The company's percentile rank for pay is approximately aligned with its percentile rank for performance

Grade of D: The company's percentile rank for pay is higher than its percentile rank for performance

Grade of F: The company's percentile rank for pay is significantly higher than its percentile rank for performance

Separately, a specific comparison between the company's executive pay and its peers' executive pay levels may be discussed in the analysis for additional insight into the grade. Likewise, a specific comparison between the company's performance and its peers' performance is reflected in the analysis for further context.

We also use this analysis to inform our voting decisions on say-on-pay proposals. As such, if a company receives a “D” or “F” from our proprietary model, we are more likely to recommend that shareholders vote against the say-on-pay proposal. However, supplemental quantitative factors like analyses of realized pay levels and the “compensation actually paid” data mandated by the SEC’s 2022 final rule regarding pay versus performance may be considered, and other qualitative factors such as an effective overall incentive structure, the relevance of selected performance metrics, significant forthcoming enhancements or reasonable long-term payout levels may give us cause to recommend in favor of a proposal even when we have identified a disconnect between pay and performance.

In determining the peer groups used in our A-F pay-for-performance letter grades, Glass Lewis utilizes a proprietary methodology that considers both market and industry peers, along with each company’s network of self-disclosed peers. Each component is considered on a weighted basis and is subject to size-based ranking and screening. The peer groups used are provided to Glass Lewis by Diligent Intel based on Glass Lewis’ methodology and using Diligent Intel’s data.

Selecting an appropriate peer group to analyze a company’s compensation program is a subjective determination, requiring significant judgment and on which there is not a “correct” answer. Since the peer group used is based on an independent, proprietary technique, it will often differ from the one used by the company which, in turn, will affect the resulting analyses. While Glass Lewis believes that the independent, rigorous methodology it uses provides a valuable perspective on the company’s compensation program, the company’s self-selected peer group may also be presented in the Proxy Paper for comparative purposes.

Short-Term Incentives

A short-term bonus or incentive (STI) should be demonstrably tied to performance. Whenever possible, we believe a mix of corporate and individual performance measures is appropriate. We would normally expect performance measures for STI plans to be based on company-wide or divisional financial measures as well as non-financial, qualitative or non-formulaic factors such as those related to safety, environmental issues, and customer satisfaction. While we recognize that companies operating in different sectors or markets may seek to utilize a wide range of metrics, we expect such measures to be appropriately tied to a company’s business drivers.

Further, the threshold, target and maximum performance goals and corresponding payout levels that can be achieved under STI plans should be disclosed. Shareholders should expect stretching performance targets for the maximum award to be achieved. Any increase in the potential target and maximum award should be clearly justified to shareholders, as should any decrease in target and maximum performance levels from the previous year.

Glass Lewis recognizes that disclosure of some measures or performance targets may include commercially confidential information. Therefore, we believe it may be reasonable to exclude such information in some cases as long as the company provides sufficient justification for non-disclosure. However, where a short-term bonus has been paid, companies should disclose the extent to which performance has been achieved against relevant targets, including disclosure of the actual target achieved.

Where management has received significant short-term incentive payments but overall performance and/or the shareholder experience over the measurement year *prima facie* appears to be poor or negative, we believe the company should provide a clear explanation of why these significant short-term payments were made. We also believe any significant changes to the program structure should be accompanied by rationalizing disclosure. Further, where a company has applied upward discretion, which includes lowering goals mid-year, increasing

calculated payouts or retroactively pro-rating performance periods, we expect a robust discussion of why the decision was necessary. In addition, we believe that where companies use non-GAAP or bespoke metrics, clear reconciliations between these figures and GAAP figures in audited financial statements should be provided. Adjustments to GAAP figures may be considered in Glass Lewis' assessment of the effectiveness of the incentive at tying executive pay with performance. Moreover, Glass Lewis believes that in circumstances where significant adjustments were applied to performance results, thorough, detailed discussion of adjustments akin to a GAAP-to-non-GAAP reconciliation and their impact on payouts within the proxy statement is warranted. The absence of such enhanced disclosure for significant adjustments will impact Glass Lewis' assessment of the quality of disclosure and, in turn, may play a role in the overall recommendation for the advisory vote on executive compensation. Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of the compensation committee's judicious and responsible exercise of discretion over incentive pay outcomes to account for significant, material events that would otherwise be excluded from performance results of selected metrics of incentive programs. For instance, major litigation settlement charges may be removed from non-GAAP results before the determination of formulaic incentive payouts, or health and safety failures may not be reflected in performance results where companies do not expressly include health and safety metrics in incentive plans; such events may nevertheless be consequential to corporate performance results, impact the shareholder experience, and, in some cases, may present material risks. Conversely, certain events may adversely impact formulaic payout results despite being outside executives' control. We believe that companies should provide thorough discussion of how such events were considered in the committee's decisions to exercise discretion or refrain from applying discretion over incentive pay outcomes. The inclusion of this disclosure may be helpful when we consider concerns around the exercise or absence of committee discretion.

We do not generally recommend against a pay program due to the use of a non-formulaic plan. If a company has chosen to rely primarily on a subjective assessment or the board's discretion in determining short-term bonuses, we believe that the proxy statement should provide a meaningful discussion of the board's rationale in determining the bonuses paid as well as a rationale for the use of a non-formulaic mechanism. Particularly where the aforementioned disclosures are substantial and satisfactory, such a structure will not provoke serious concern in our analysis on its own. However, in conjunction with other significant issues in a program's design or operation, such as a disconnect between pay and performance, the absence of a cap on payouts, or a lack of performance-based long-term awards, the use of a non-formulaic bonus may help drive a negative recommendation.

Long-Term Incentives

Glass Lewis recognizes the value of equity-based incentive programs, which are often the primary long-term incentive for executives. When used appropriately, they can provide a vehicle for linking an executive's pay to company performance, thereby aligning their interests with those of shareholders. In addition, equity-based compensation can be an effective way to attract, retain and motivate key employees.

There are certain elements that Glass Lewis believes are common to most well-structured long-term incentive (LTI) plans. These include:

- No re-testing or lowering of performance conditions;
- Performance metrics that cannot be easily manipulated by management;
- Two or more performance metrics;
- At least one relative performance metric that compares the company's performance to a relevant peer group or index;
- Performance periods of at least three years;

- Stretching metrics that incentivize executives to strive for outstanding performance while not encouraging excessive risk-taking;
- Reasonable individual award limits; and
- Equity granting practices that are clearly disclosed.

In evaluating long-term incentive grants, Glass Lewis generally believes that at least half of the grant should consist of performance-based awards, putting a material portion of executive compensation at-risk and demonstrably linked to the performance of the company. While we will consistently raise concern with programs that do not meet this criterion, we may refrain from a negative recommendation in the absence of other significant issues with the program's design or operation. However, in cases where performance-based awards are significantly rolled back or eliminated from a company's long-term incentive plan, such decisions will generally be viewed negatively outside of exceptional circumstances and may lead to a recommendation against the proposal.

As with the short-term incentive, Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of the compensation committee's judicious and responsible exercise of discretion over incentive pay outcomes to account for significant events that would otherwise be excluded from performance results of selected metrics of incentive programs. We believe that companies should provide thorough discussion of how such events were considered in the committee's decisions to exercise discretion or refrain from applying discretion over incentive pay outcomes. Furthermore, considerations related to the use of non-GAAP metrics under the STI plan similarly apply to the long-term incentive program.

Performance measures should be carefully selected and should relate to the specific business/industry in which the company operates and, especially, to the key value drivers of the company's business. As with short-term incentive plans, the basis for any adjustments to metrics or results should be clearly explained, as should the company's judgment on the use of discretion and any significant changes to the performance program structure.

While cognizant of the inherent complexity of certain performance metrics, Glass Lewis generally believes that measuring a company's performance with multiple metrics serves to provide a more complete picture of the company's performance than a single metric. Further, reliance on just one metric may focus too much management attention on a single target and is therefore more susceptible to manipulation. When utilized for relative measurements, external benchmarks such as a sector index or peer group should be disclosed and transparent. The rationale behind the selection of a specific index or peer group should also be disclosed. Internal performance benchmarks should also be disclosed and transparent, unless a cogent case for confidentiality is made and fully explained. Similarly, actual performance and vesting levels for previous grants earned during the fiscal year should be disclosed.

We also believe shareholders should evaluate the relative success of a company's compensation programs, particularly with regard to existing equity-based incentive plans, in linking pay and performance when evaluating potential changes to LTI plans and determining the impact of additional stock awards. We will therefore review the company's pay-for-performance grade (see above for more information) and specifically the proportion of total compensation that is stock-based.

Grants of Front-Loaded Awards

Many U.S. companies have chosen to provide large grants, usually in the form of equity awards, that are intended to serve as compensation for multiple years. This practice, often called front-loading, is taken up either in the regular course of business or as a response to specific business conditions and with a predetermined objective. The so-called "mega-grant", an outsized award to one individual sometimes valued at over \$100

million is sometimes but not always provided as a front-loaded award. We believe shareholders should generally be wary of this approach, and we accordingly weigh these grants with particular scrutiny.

While the use of front-loaded awards is intended to lock-in executive service and incentives, the same rigidity also raises the risk of effectively tying the hands of the compensation committee. As compared with a more responsive annual granting schedule program, front-loaded awards may preclude improvements or changes to reflect evolving business strategies or to respond to other unforeseen factors. Additionally, if structured poorly, early vesting of such awards may reduce or eliminate the retentive power at great cost to shareholders. The considerable emphasis on a single grant can place intense pressures on every facet of its design, amplifying any potential perverse incentives and creating greater room for unintended consequences. In particular, provisions around changes of control or separations of service must ensure that executives do not receive excessive payouts that do not reflect shareholder experience or company performance.

We consider a company's rationale for granting awards under this structure and also expect any front-loaded awards to include a firm commitment not to grant additional awards for a defined period, as is commonly associated with this practice. Even when such a commitment is provided, unexpected circumstances may lead the board to make additional payments or awards for retention purposes, or to incentivize management towards more realistic goals or a revised strategy. If a company breaks its commitment not to grant further awards, we may recommend against the pay program unless a convincing rationale is provided. In situations where the front-loaded award was meant to cover a certain portion of the regular long-term incentive grant for each year during the covered period, our analysis of the value of the remaining portion of the regular long-term incentives granted during the period covered by the award will account for the annualized value of the front-loaded portion, and we expect no supplemental grant be awarded during the vesting period of the front-loaded portion.

The multiyear nature of these awards generally lends itself to significantly higher compensation figures in the year of grant than might otherwise be expected. In our qualitative analysis of the grants of front-loaded awards to executives, Glass Lewis considers the quantum of the award on an annualized basis and may compare this result to the prior practice and peer data, among other benchmarks. Additionally, for awards that are granted in the form of equity, Glass Lewis may consider the total potential dilutive effect of such award on shareholders.

Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria

Glass Lewis believes that explicit environmental and/or social (E&S) criteria in executive incentive plans, when used appropriately, can serve to provide both executives and shareholders a clear line of sight into a company's ESG strategy, ambitions, and targets. Although we are strongly supportive of companies' incorporation of material E&S risks and opportunities in their long-term strategic planning, we believe that the inclusion of E&S metrics in compensation programs should be predicated on each company's unique circumstances. In order to establish a meaningful link between pay and performance, companies must consider factors including their industry, size, risk profile, maturity, performance, financial condition, and any other relevant internal or external factors.

When a company is introducing E&S criteria into executive incentive plans, we believe it is important that companies provide shareholders with sufficient disclosure to allow them to understand how these criteria align with its strategy. Additionally, Glass Lewis recognizes that there may be situations where certain E&S performance criteria are reasonably viewed as prerequisites for executive performance, as opposed to behaviors and conditions that need to be incentivized. For example, we believe that shareholders should interrogate the use of metrics that award executives for ethical behavior or compliance with policies and regulations. It is our

view that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that clearly lay out the rationale for selecting specific E&S metrics, the target-setting process, and corresponding payout opportunities. Further, particularly in the case of qualitative metrics, we believe that shareholders should be provided with a clear understanding of the basis on which the criteria will be assessed. Where quantitative targets have been set, we believe that shareholders are best served when these are disclosed on an ex-ante basis, or the board should outline why it believes it is unable to do so.

While we believe that companies should generally set long-term targets for their environmental and social ambitions, we are mindful that not all compensation schemes lend themselves to the inclusion of E&S metrics. We also are of the view that companies should retain flexibility in not only choosing to incorporate E&S metrics in their compensation plans, but also in the placement of these metrics. For example, some companies may resolve that including E&S criteria in the annual bonus may help to incentivize the achievement of short-term milestones and allow for more maneuverability in strategic adjustments to long-term goals. Other companies may determine that their long-term sustainability targets are best achieved by incentivizing executives through metrics included in their long-term incentive plans.

One-Time Awards

Glass Lewis believes shareholders should generally be wary of awards granted outside of the standard incentive schemes, as such awards have the potential to undermine the integrity of a company's regular incentive plans or the link between pay and performance, or both. We generally believe that if the existing incentive programs fail to provide adequate incentives to executives, companies should redesign their compensation programs rather than make additional grants.

However, we recognize that in certain circumstances, additional incentives may be appropriate. In these cases, companies should provide a thorough description of the awards, including a cogent and convincing explanation of their necessity and why existing awards do not provide sufficient motivation and a discussion of how the quantum of the award and its structure were determined. Further, such awards should be tied to future service and performance whenever possible.

Additionally, we believe companies making supplemental or one-time awards should also describe if and how the regular compensation arrangements will be affected by these additional grants. In reviewing a company's use of supplemental awards, Glass Lewis will evaluate the terms and size of the grants in the context of the company's overall incentive strategy and granting practices, as well as the current operating environment.

Contractual Payments and Arrangements

Beyond the quantum of contractual payments, Glass Lewis will also consider the design of any entitlements. Certain executive employment terms may help to drive a negative recommendation, including, but not limited to:

- Excessively broad change in control triggers;
- Inappropriate severance entitlements;
- Inadequately explained or excessive sign-on arrangements;
- Guaranteed bonuses (especially as a multiyear occurrence); and
- Failure to address any concerning practices in amended employment agreements.

In general, we are wary of terms that are excessively restrictive in favor of the executive, or that could potentially incentivize behaviors that are not in a company's best interest.

Sign-on Awards and Severance Benefits

We acknowledge that there may be certain costs associated with transitions at the executive level. In evaluating the size of severance and sign-on arrangements, we may consider the executive's regular target compensation level, or the sums paid to other executives (including the recipient's predecessor, where applicable) in evaluating the appropriateness of such an arrangement.

We believe sign-on arrangements should be clearly disclosed and accompanied by a meaningful explanation of the payments and the process by which the amounts were reached. Further, the details of and basis for any "make-whole" payments (paid as compensation for awards forfeited from a previous employer) should be provided.

With respect to severance, we believe companies should abide by predetermined payouts in most circumstances. While in limited circumstances some deviations may not be inappropriate, we believe shareholders should be provided with a meaningful explanation of any additional or increased benefits agreed upon outside of regular arrangements. However, where Glass Lewis determines that such predetermined payouts are particularly problematic or unfavorable to shareholders, we may consider the execution of such payments in a negative recommendation for the advisory vote on executive compensation.

In the U.S. market, most companies maintain severance entitlements based on a multiple of salary and, in many cases, bonus. In almost all instances we see, the relevant multiple is three or less, even in the case of a change in control. We believe the basis and total value of severance should be reasonable and should not exceed the upper limit of general market practice. We consider the inclusion of long-term incentives in cash severance calculations to be inappropriate, particularly given the commonality of accelerated vesting and the proportional weight of long-term incentives as a component of total pay. Additional considerations, however, will be accounted for when reviewing atypically structured compensation approaches.

Change in Control

Glass Lewis considers double-trigger change in control arrangements, which require both a change in control and termination or constructive termination, to be best practice. Any arrangement that is not explicitly double-trigger may be considered a single-trigger or modified single-trigger arrangement.

Further, we believe that excessively broad definitions of change in control are potentially problematic as they may lead to situations where executives receive additional compensation where no meaningful change in status or duties has occurred.

Excise Tax Gross-ups

Among other entitlements, Glass Lewis is strongly opposed to excise tax gross-ups related to IRC § 4999 and their expansion, especially where no consideration is given to the safe harbor limit. We believe that under no normal circumstance is the inclusion of excise tax gross-up provisions in new agreements or the addition of such provisions to amended agreements acceptable. In consideration of the fact that minor increases in change-in-control payments can lead to disproportionately large excise taxes, the potential negative impact of tax gross-ups far outweighs any retentive benefit.

Depending on the circumstances, the addition of new gross-ups around this excise tax may lead to negative recommendations for a company's say-on-pay proposal, the chair of the compensation committee, or the entire committee, particularly in cases where a company had committed not to provide any such entitlements in the

future. For situations in which the addition of new excise tax gross ups will be provided in connection with a specific change-in-control transaction, this policy may be applied to the say-on-pay proposal, the golden parachute proposal and recommendations related to the compensation committee for all involved corporate parties, as appropriate.

Amended Employment Agreements

Any contractual arrangements providing for problematic pay practices which are not addressed in materially amended employment agreements will potentially be viewed by Glass Lewis as a missed opportunity on the part of the company to align its policies with current best practices. Such problematic pay practices include, but are not limited to, excessive change in control entitlements, modified single-trigger change in control entitlements, excise tax gross-ups, and multi-year guaranteed awards.

Recoupment Provisions (Clawbacks)

On October 26, 2022, the SEC adopted Rule 10D-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The rule mandates national securities exchanges and associations to promulgate new listing standards requiring companies to maintain recoupment policies (“clawback provisions”). The final clawback listing standards were approved by the SEC, effective October 2, 2023 and required listed companies to adopt a compliant policy by December 1, 2023. Glass Lewis believes that clawback provisions play an important role in mitigating excessive risk-taking that may be encouraged by poorly structured variable incentive programs. Current listing standards require recoupment of erroneously awarded payouts to current and former executive officers in the event of an accounting restatement or correction to previous financial statements that is material to the current period, regardless of fault or misconduct.

Glass Lewis recognizes that excessive risk-taking that can materially and adversely impact shareholders may not necessarily result in such restatements. We believe that clawback policies should allow recovery from current and former executive officers in the event of a restatement of financial results or similar revision of performance indicators upon which the awards were based. Additionally, recoupment policies should provide companies with the ability to claw back variable incentive payments (whether time-based or performance-based) when there is evidence of problematic decisions or actions, such as material misconduct, a material reputational failure, material risk management failure, or a material operational failure, the consequences of which have not already been reflected in incentive payments and where recovery is warranted.

In situations where the company ultimately determines not to follow through with recovery, Glass Lewis will assess the appropriateness of such determination for each case. A thorough, detailed discussion of the company's decision to not pursue recoupment and, if applicable, how the company has otherwise rectified the disconnect between executive pay outcomes and negative impacts of their actions on the company and the shareholder experience will be considered. The absence of such enhanced disclosure may impact Glass Lewis' assessment of the quality of disclosure and, in turn, may play a role in Glass Lewis' overall recommendation for the advisory vote on executive compensation. The clawback policy should provide recoupment authority regardless of whether the employment of the executive officer was terminated with or without cause.

Hedging of Stock

Glass Lewis believes that the hedging of shares by executives in the shares of the companies where they are employed severs the alignment of interests of the executive with shareholders. We believe companies should

adopt strict policies to prohibit executives from hedging the economic risk associated with their share ownership in the company.

Pledging of Stock

Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should examine the facts and circumstances of each company rather than apply a one-size-fits-all policy regarding employee stock pledging. Glass Lewis believes that shareholders benefit when employees, particularly senior executives, have meaningful financial interest in the success of the company under their management, and therefore we recognize the benefits of measures designed to encourage employees to both buy shares out of their own pocket and to retain shares they have been granted; blanket policies prohibiting stock pledging may discourage executives and employees from doing either.

However, we also recognize that the pledging of shares can present a risk that, depending on a host of factors, an executive with significant pledged shares and limited other assets may have an incentive to take steps to avoid a forced sale of shares in the face of a rapid stock price decline. Therefore, to avoid substantial losses from a forced sale to meet the terms of the loan, the executive may have an incentive to boost the stock price in the short term in a manner that is unsustainable, thus hurting shareholders in the long-term. We also recognize concerns regarding pledging may not apply to less senior employees, given the latter group's significantly more limited influence over a company's stock price. Therefore, we believe that the issue of pledging shares should be reviewed in that context, as should policies that distinguish between the two groups.

Glass Lewis believes that the benefits of stock ownership by executives and employees may outweigh the risks of stock pledging, depending on many factors. As such, Glass Lewis reviews all relevant factors in evaluating proposed policies, limitations and prohibitions on pledging stock, including:

- The number of shares pledged;
- The percentage executives' pledged shares are of outstanding shares;
- The percentage executives' pledged shares are of each executive's shares and total assets;
- Whether the pledged shares were purchased by the employee or granted by the company;
- Whether there are different policies for purchased and granted shares;
- Whether the granted shares were time-based or performance-based;
- The overall governance profile of the company;
- The volatility of the company's stock (in order to determine the likelihood of a sudden stock price drop);
- The nature and cyclical, if applicable, of the company's industry;
- The participation and eligibility of executives and employees in pledging;
- The company's current policies regarding pledging and any waiver from these policies for employees and executives; and
- Disclosure of the extent of any pledging, particularly among senior executives.

Executive Ownership Guidelines

The alignment between shareholder interests and those of executives represents an important assurance to disinterested shareholders that executives are acting in their best long-term interests. Companies should facilitate this relationship through the adoption and enforcement of minimum executive share ownership requirements. Companies should clearly disclose their executive ownership requirements in their Compensation Discussion and Analysis section and how the various types of outstanding equity awards are counted or excluded from the ownership level calculation.

In determining whether executives have met the requirements or not, the inclusion of unearned performance-based full value awards and/or unexercised stock options without cogent rationale may be viewed as problematic. While Glass Lewis views the inclusion of unearned performance-based equity in the ownership determination as problematic, we continue to believe that performance-based equity compensation plays an important role in aligning executive pay with performance.

Compensation Consultant Independence

As mandated by Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act, as of January 11, 2013, the SEC approved listing requirements for both the NYSE and NASDAQ which require compensation committees to consider six factors (<https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/33-9330.pdf>, p.31-32) in assessing compensation advisor independence. According to the SEC, “no one factor should be viewed as a determinative factor.” Glass Lewis believes this six-factor assessment is an important process for every compensation committee to undertake but believes companies employing a consultant for board compensation, consulting and other corporate services should provide clear disclosure beyond just a reference to examining the six points, in order to allow shareholders to review the specific aspects of the various consultant relationships.

We believe compensation consultants are engaged to provide objective, disinterested, expert advice to the compensation committee. When the consultant or its affiliates receive substantial income from providing other services to the company, we believe the potential for a conflict of interest arises and the independence of the consultant may be jeopardized. Therefore, Glass Lewis will, when relevant, note the potential for a conflict of interest when the fees paid to the advisor or its affiliates for other services exceed those paid for compensation consulting.

CEO Pay Ratio

As mandated by Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Consumer and Protection Act, beginning in 2018, issuers will be required to disclose the median annual total compensation of all employees except the CEO, the total annual compensation of the CEO or equivalent position, and the ratio between the two amounts. Glass Lewis will display the pay ratio as a data point in our Proxy Papers, as available. While we recognize that the pay ratio has the potential to provide additional insight when assessing a company’s pay practices, at this time it will not be a determinative factor in our voting recommendations.

Frequency of Say-on-Pay

The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to allow shareholders a non-binding vote on the frequency of say-on-pay votes (i.e., every one, two or three years). Additionally, Dodd-Frank requires companies to hold such votes on the frequency of say-on-pay votes at least once every six years.

We believe companies should submit say-on-pay votes to shareholders every year. We believe that the time and financial burdens to a company with regard to an annual vote are relatively small and incremental and are outweighed by the benefits to shareholders through more frequent accountability. Implementing biannual or triennial votes on executive compensation limits shareholders’ ability to hold the board accountable for its compensation practices through means other than voting against the compensation committee. Unless a company provides a compelling rationale or unique circumstances for say-on-pay votes less frequent than annually, we will generally recommend that shareholders support annual votes on compensation.

Vote on Golden Parachute Arrangements

The Dodd-Frank Act also requires companies to provide shareholders with a separate non-binding vote on approval of golden parachute compensation arrangements in connection with certain change-in-control transactions. However, if the golden parachute arrangements have previously been subject to a say-on-pay vote which shareholders approved, then this required vote is waived.

Glass Lewis believes the narrative and tabular disclosure of golden parachute arrangements benefits all shareholders. Glass Lewis analyzes each golden parachute arrangement on a case-by-case basis, taking into account, among other items: the nature of the change-in-control transaction, the ultimate value of the payments particularly compared to the value of the transaction, any excise tax gross-up obligations, the tenure and position of the executives in question before and after the transaction, any new or amended employment agreements entered into in connection with the transaction, and the type of triggers involved (i.e., single vs. double). In cases where new problematic features, such as excise tax gross-up obligations, are introduced in a golden parachute proposal, such features may contribute to a negative recommendation not only for the golden parachute proposal under review, but for the next say-on-pay proposal of any involved corporate parties, as well as recommendations against their compensation committee as appropriate.

Equity-Based Compensation Proposals

We believe that equity compensation awards, when not abused, are useful for retaining employees and providing an incentive for them to act in a way that will improve company performance. Glass Lewis recognizes that equity-based compensation plans are critical components of a company's overall compensation program, and we analyze such plans accordingly based on both quantitative and qualitative factors.

Our quantitative analysis assesses the plan's cost and the company's pace of granting utilizing a number of different analyses, comparing the program with absolute limits we believe are key to equity value creation and with a carefully chosen peer group. In general, our model seeks to determine whether the proposed plan is either absolutely excessive or is more than one standard deviation away from the average plan for the peer group on a range of criteria, including dilution to shareholders and the projected annual cost relative to the company's financial performance. Each of the analyses (and their constituent parts) is weighted and the plan is scored in accordance with that weight.

We compare the program's expected annual expense with the business's operating metrics to help determine whether the plan is excessive in light of company performance. We also compare the plan's expected annual cost to the enterprise value of the firm rather than to market capitalization because the employees, managers and directors of the firm contribute to the creation of enterprise value but not necessarily market capitalization (the biggest difference is seen where cash represents the vast majority of market capitalization). Finally, we do not rely exclusively on relative comparisons with averages because, in addition to creeping averages serving to inflate compensation, we believe that some absolute limits are warranted.

We then consider qualitative aspects of the plan such as plan administration, the method and terms of exercise, repricing history, express or implied rights to reprice, and the presence of evergreen provisions. We also closely review the choice and use of, and difficulty in meeting, the awards' performance metrics and targets, if any. We believe significant changes to the terms of a plan should be explained for shareholders and clearly indicated. Other factors such as a company's size and operating environment may also be relevant in assessing the severity of concerns or the benefits of certain changes. Finally, we may consider a company's executive compensation practices in certain situations, as applicable.

We evaluate equity plans based on certain overarching principles:

- Companies should seek more shares only when needed;
- Requested share amounts or share reserves should be conservative in size so that companies must seek shareholder approval every three to four years (or more frequently);
- If a plan is relatively expensive, it should not grant options solely to senior executives and board members;
- Dilution of annual net share count or voting power, along with the “overhang” of incentive plans, should be limited;
- Annual cost of the plan (especially if not shown on the income statement) should be reasonable as a percentage of financial results and should be in line with the peer group;
- The expected annual cost of the plan should be proportional to the business’s value;
- The intrinsic value that option grantees received in the past should be reasonable compared with the business’s financial results;
- Plans should not permit repricing of stock options without shareholder approval;
- Plans should not contain excessively liberal administrative or payment terms;
- Plans should not count shares in ways that understate the potential dilution, or cost, to common shareholders. This refers to “inverse” full-value award multipliers;
- Selected performance metrics should be challenging and appropriate, and should be subject to relative performance measurements; and
- Stock grants should be subject to minimum vesting and/or holding periods sufficient to ensure sustainable performance and promote retention.

Meanwhile, for individual equity award proposals where the recipient of the proposed grant is also a large shareholder of the company whose vote can materially affect the passage of the proposal, we believe that the company should strongly consider the level of approval from disinterested shareholders before proceeding with the proposed grant. Glass Lewis recognizes potential conflicts of interests when vote outcomes can be heavily influenced by the recipient of the grant. A required abstention vote or non-vote from the recipient for an equity award proposal in these situations can help to avoid such conflicts. This favorable feature will be weighed alongside the structure, disclosure, dilution, provided rationale, and other provisions related to the individual award to assess the award’s alignment with long-term shareholder interests.

Option Exchanges and Repricing

Glass Lewis is generally opposed to the repricing of employee and director options regardless of how it is accomplished. Employees should have some downside risk in their equity-based compensation program and repricing eliminates any such risk. As shareholders have substantial risk in owning stock, we believe that the equity compensation of employees and directors should be similarly situated to align their interests with those of shareholders. We believe this will facilitate appropriate risk- and opportunity-taking for the company by employees.

We are concerned that option grantees who believe they will be “rescued” from underwater options will be more inclined to take unjustifiable risks. Moreover, a predictable pattern of repricing or exchanges substantially alters a stock option’s value because options that will practically never expire deeply out of the money are worth far more than options that carry a risk of expiration.

In short, repricings and option exchange programs change the bargain between shareholders and employees after the bargain has been struck.

There is one circumstance in which a repricing or option exchange program may be acceptable: if macroeconomic or industry trends, rather than specific company issues, cause a stock's value to decline dramatically and the repricing is necessary to motivate and retain employees. In viewing the company's stock decline as part of a larger trend, we would expect the impact to approximately reflect the market or industry price decline in terms of timing and magnitude. In this circumstance, we think it fair to conclude that option grantees may be suffering from a risk that was not foreseeable when the original "bargain" was struck. In such a scenario, we may opt to support a repricing or option exchange program only if sufficient conditions are met. We are largely concerned with the inclusion of the following features:

- Officers and board members cannot participate in the program; and
- The exchange is value-neutral or value-creative to shareholders using very conservative assumptions.
- In our evaluation of the appropriateness of the program design, we also consider the inclusion of the following features:
- The vesting requirements on exchanged or repriced options are extended beyond one year;
- Shares reserved for options that are reacquired in an option exchange will permanently retire (i.e., will not be available for future grants) so as to prevent additional shareholder dilution in the future; and
- Management and the board make a cogent case for needing to motivate and retain existing employees, such as being in a competitive employment market.

Option Backdating, Spring-Loading and Bullet-Dodging

Glass Lewis views option backdating, and the related practices of spring-loading and bullet-dodging, as egregious actions that warrant holding the appropriate management and board members responsible. These practices are similar to repricing options and eliminate much of the downside risk inherent in an option grant that is designed to induce recipients to maximize shareholder return.

Backdating an option is the act of changing an option's grant date from the actual grant date to an earlier date when the market price of the underlying stock was lower, resulting in a lower exercise price for the option. In past studies, Glass Lewis identified over 270 companies that have disclosed internal or government investigations into their past stock-option grants.

Spring-loading is granting stock options while in possession of material, positive information that has not been disclosed publicly. Bullet-dodging is delaying the grants of stock options until after the release of material, negative information. This can allow option grants to be made at a lower price either before the release of positive news or following the release of negative news, assuming the stock's price will move up or down in response to the information. This raises a concern similar to that of insider trading, or the trading on material non-public information.

The exercise price for an option is determined on the day of grant, providing the recipient with the same market risk as an investor who bought shares on that date. However, where options were backdated, the executive or the board (or the compensation committee) changed the grant date retroactively. The new date may be at or near the lowest price for the year or period. This would be like allowing an investor to look back and select the lowest price of the year at which to buy shares.

A 2006 study of option grants made between 1996 and 2005 at 8,000 companies found that option backdating can be an indication of poor internal controls. The study found that option backdating was more likely to occur at companies without a majority independent board and with a long-serving CEO; both factors, the study

concluded, were associated with greater CEO influence on the company's compensation and governance practices.⁴³

Where a company granted backdated options to an executive who is also a director, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against that executive/director, regardless of who decided to make the award. In addition, Glass Lewis will recommend voting against those directors who either approved or allowed the backdating. Glass Lewis feels that executives and directors who either benefited from backdated options or authorized the practice have failed to act in the best interests of shareholders.

Given the severe tax and legal liabilities to the company from backdating, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against members of the audit committee who served when options were backdated, a restatement occurs, material weaknesses in internal controls exist and disclosures indicate there was a lack of documentation. These committee members failed in their responsibility to ensure the integrity of the company's financial reports.

When a company has engaged in spring-loading or bullet-dodging, Glass Lewis will consider recommending voting against the compensation committee members where there has been a pattern of granting options at or near historic lows. Glass Lewis will also recommend voting against executives serving on the board who benefited from the spring-loading or bullet-dodging.

Director Compensation Plans

Glass Lewis believes that non-employee directors should receive reasonable and appropriate compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. However, a balance is required. Fees should be competitive in order to retain and attract qualified individuals, but excessive fees represent a financial cost to the company and potentially compromise the objectivity and independence of non-employee directors. We will consider recommending support for compensation plans that include option grants or other equity-based awards that help to align the interests of outside directors with those of shareholders. However, to ensure directors are not incentivized in the same manner as executives but rather serve as a check on imprudent risk-taking in executive compensation plan design, equity grants to directors should not be performance-based. Where an equity plan exclusively or primarily covers non-employee directors as participants, we do not believe that the plan should provide for performance-based awards in any capacity.

When non-employee director equity grants are covered by the same equity plan that applies to a company's broader employee base, we will use our proprietary model and analyst review of this model to guide our voting recommendations. If such a plan broadly allows for performance-based awards to directors or explicitly provides for such grants, we may recommend against the overall plan on this basis, particularly if the company has granted performance-based awards to directors in past.

Employee Stock Purchase Plans

Glass Lewis believes that employee stock purchase plans (ESPPs) can provide employees with a sense of ownership in their company and help strengthen the alignment between the interests of employees and shareholders. We evaluate ESPPs by assessing the expected discount, purchase period, expected purchase

⁴³ Lucian Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein and Urs Peyer. "LUCKY CEOs." November, 2006.

activity (if previous activity has been disclosed) and whether the plan has a “lookback” feature. Except for the most extreme cases, Glass Lewis will generally support these plans given the regulatory purchase limit of \$25,000 per employee per year, which we believe is reasonable. We also look at the number of shares requested to see if a ESPP will significantly contribute to overall shareholder dilution or if shareholders will not have a chance to approve the program for an excessive period of time. As such, we will generally recommend against ESPPs that contain “evergreen” provisions that automatically increase the number of shares available under the ESPP each year.

Executive Compensation Tax Deductibility — Amendment to IRC 162(M)

The “Tax Cut and Jobs Act” had significant implications on Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, a provision that allowed companies to deduct compensation in excess of \$1 million for the CEO and the next three most highly compensated executive officers, excluding the CFO, if the compensation is performance-based and is paid under shareholder-approved plans. Glass Lewis does not generally view amendments to equity plans and changes to compensation programs in response to the elimination of tax deductions under 162(m) as problematic. This specifically holds true if such modifications contribute to the maintenance of a sound performance-based compensation program.

As grandfathered contracts may continue to be eligible for tax deductions under the transition rule for Section 162(m), companies may therefore submit incentive plans for shareholder approval to take advantage of the tax deductibility afforded under 162(m) for certain types of compensation.

We believe the best practice for companies is to provide robust disclosure to shareholders so that they can make fully informed judgments about the reasonableness of the proposed compensation plan. To allow for meaningful shareholder review, we prefer that disclosure should include specific performance metrics, a maximum award pool, and a maximum award amount per employee. We also believe it is important to analyze the estimated grants to see if they are reasonable and in line with the company’s peers.

We typically recommend voting against a 162(m) proposal where: (i) a company fails to provide at least a list of performance targets; (ii) a company fails to provide one of either a total maximum or an individual maximum; or (iii) the proposed plan or individual maximum award limit is excessive when compared with the plans of the company’s peers.

The company’s record of aligning pay with performance (as evaluated using our proprietary pay-for-performance model) also plays a role in our recommendation. Where a company has a record of setting reasonable pay relative to business performance, we generally recommend voting in favor of a plan even if the plan caps seem large relative to peers because we recognize the value in special pay arrangements for continued exceptional performance.

As with all other issues we review, our goal is to provide consistent but contextual advice given the specifics of the company and ongoing performance. Overall, we recognize that it is generally not in shareholders’ best interests to vote against such a plan and forgo the potential tax benefit since shareholder rejection of such plans will not curtail the awards; it will only prevent the tax deduction associated with them.

Governance Structure and the Shareholder Franchise

Anti-Takeover Measures

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans are not generally in shareholders' best interests. They can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. Typically we recommend that shareholders vote against these plans to protect their financial interests and ensure that they have an opportunity to consider any offer for their shares, especially those at a premium.

We believe boards should be given wide latitude in directing company activities and in charting the company's course. However, on an issue such as this, where the link between the shareholders' financial interests and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether they support such a plan's implementation. This issue is different from other matters that are typically left to board discretion. Its potential impact on and relation to shareholders is direct and substantial. It is also an issue in which management interests may be different from those of shareholders; thus, ensuring that shareholders have a voice is the only way to safeguard their interests.

In certain circumstances, we will support a poison pill that is limited in scope to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable qualifying offer clause. We will consider supporting a poison pill plan if the qualifying offer clause includes each of the following attributes:

- The form of offer is not required to be an all-cash transaction;
- The offer is not required to remain open for more than 90 business days;
- The offeror is permitted to amend the offer, reduce the offer, or otherwise change the terms;
- There is no fairness opinion requirement; and
- There is a low to no premium requirement.

Where these requirements are met, we typically feel comfortable that shareholders will have the opportunity to voice their opinion on any legitimate offer.

NOL Poison Pills

Similarly, Glass Lewis may consider supporting a limited poison pill in the event that a company seeks shareholder approval of a rights plan for the express purpose of preserving Net Operating Losses (NOLs). While companies with NOLs can generally carry these losses forward to offset future taxable income, Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code limits companies' ability to use NOLs in the event of a "change of ownership."⁴⁴ In this case, a company may adopt or amend a poison pill (NOL pill) in order to prevent an inadvertent change of

⁴⁴ Section 382 of the Internal Revenue Code refers to a "change of ownership" of more than 50 percentage points by one or more 5% shareholders within a three-year period. The statute is intended to deter the "trafficking" of net operating losses.

ownership by multiple investors purchasing small chunks of stock at the same time, and thereby preserve the ability to carry the NOLs forward. Often such NOL pills have trigger thresholds much lower than the common 15% or 20% thresholds, with some NOL pill triggers as low as 5%.

In many cases, companies will propose the adoption of bylaw amendments specifically restricting certain share transfers, in addition to proposing the adoption of a NOL pill. In general, if we support the terms of a particular NOL pill, we will generally support the additional protective amendment in the absence of significant concerns with the specific terms of that proposal.

As with traditional poison pills, NOL pills may deter shareholders and potentially serve as entrenchment mechanisms. Certain features such as low thresholds combined with acting in concert provisions, among other concerning terms, may disempower shareholders and insulate the board and management. When acting in concert provisions are present within the terms of a NOL pill, we believe this may raise concerns as to the true objective of the pill.

Acting in concert provisions broaden the definition of beneficial ownership to prohibit parallel conduct, or multiple shareholders party to a formal or informal agreement collaborating to influence the board and management of a company, and aggregate the ownership of such shareholders towards the triggering threshold. In our view, acting in concert provisions broadly limit the voice of shareholders and may diminish their ability to engage in a productive dialogue with the company and with other shareholders. When a board adopts defensive measures without engaging with shareholders, we take a dim view of the board and the overall governance of the company.

As such, Glass Lewis evaluates NOL pills on a strictly case-by-case basis, taking into consideration, among other factors: (i) the value of the NOLs to the company; (ii) the likelihood of a change of ownership based on the size of the holdings and the nature of the larger shareholders; (iii) the trigger threshold; (iv) the duration of the plan (i.e., whether it contains a reasonable “sunset” provision, generally one year or less); (v) the inclusion of an acting in concert provision; (vi) whether the pill is implemented following the filing of a Schedule 13D by a shareholder or there is evidence of hostile activity or shareholder activism; and (vii) if the pill is subject to periodic board review and/or shareholder ratification.

We believe that shareholders should be offered the opportunity to vote on any adoption or renewal of a NOL pill regardless of any potential tax benefit that it offers a company. As such, we will consider recommending voting against those members of the board who served at the time when an NOL pill was adopted without shareholder approval within the prior twelve months and where the NOL pill is not subject to shareholder ratification.

Fair Price Provisions

Fair price provisions, which are rare, require that certain minimum price and procedural requirements be observed by any party that acquires more than a specified percentage of a corporation’s common stock. The provision is intended to protect minority shareholder value when an acquirer seeks to accomplish a merger or other transaction which would eliminate or change the interests of the minority shareholders. The provision is generally applied against the acquirer unless the takeover is approved by a majority of “continuing directors” and holders of a majority, in some cases a supermajority as high as 80%, of the combined voting power of all stock entitled to vote to alter, amend, or repeal the above provisions.

The effect of a fair price provision is to require approval of any merger or business combination with an “interested shareholder” by 51% of the voting stock of the company, excluding the shares held by the interested

shareholder. An interested shareholder is generally considered to be a holder of 10% or more of the company's outstanding stock, but the trigger can vary.

Generally, provisions are put in place for the ostensible purpose of preventing a back-end merger where the interested shareholder would be able to pay a lower price for the remaining shares of the company than he or she paid to gain control. The effect of a fair price provision on shareholders, however, is to limit their ability to gain a premium for their shares through a partial tender offer or open market acquisition which typically raise the share price, often significantly. A fair price provision discourages such transactions because of the potential costs of seeking shareholder approval and because of the restrictions on purchase price for completing a merger or other transaction at a later time.

Glass Lewis believes that fair price provisions, while sometimes protecting shareholders from abuse in a takeover situation, more often act as an impediment to takeovers, potentially limiting gains to shareholders from a variety of transactions that could significantly increase share price. In some cases, even the independent directors of the board cannot make exceptions when such exceptions may be in the best interests of shareholders. Given the existence of state law protections for minority shareholders such as Section 203 of the Delaware Corporations Code, we believe it is in the best interests of shareholders to remove fair price provisions.

Control Share Statutes

Certain states, including Delaware, have adopted control share acquisition statutes as an anti-takeover defense for certain closed-end investment companies and business development companies. Control share statutes may prevent changes in control by limiting voting rights of a person that acquires the ownership of "control shares." Control shares are shares of stock equal to or exceeding specified percentages of company voting power, and a control share statute prevents shares in excess of the specified percentage from being voted, unless: (i) the board approves them to be voted; or (ii) the holder of the "control shares" receives approval from a supermajority of "non-interested" shareholders.

Depending on the state of incorporation, companies may automatically rely on control share statutes unless the fund's board of trustees eliminates the application of the control share statute to any or all fund share acquisitions, through adoption of a provision in the fund's governing instrument or by fund board action alone. In certain other states, companies must adopt control share statutes.

In our view, control share statutes disenfranchise shareholders by reducing their voting power to a level less than their economic interest and effectively function as an anti-takeover device. We believe all shareholders should have an opportunity to vote all of their shares. Moreover, anti-takeover measures may prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock.

As such, we will generally recommend voting for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes, unless doing so would allow the completion of a takeover that is not in the best interests of shareholders; and against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.

Further, in cases where a closed-end fund or business development company has received a public buyout offer and has relied on a control share statute as a defense mechanism in the prior year, we will generally recommend shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating and governance committee, absent a compelling rationale as to why a rejected acquisition was not in the best interests of shareholders.

Quorum Requirements

Glass Lewis believes that a company's quorum requirement should be set at a level high enough to ensure that a broad range of shareholders are represented in person or by proxy, but low enough that the company can transact necessary business. Companies in the U.S. are generally subject to quorum requirements under the laws of their specific state of incorporation. Additionally, those companies listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market are required to specify a quorum in their bylaws, provided however that such quorum may not be less than one-third of outstanding shares. Prior to 2013, the New York Stock Exchange required a quorum of 50% for listed companies, although this requirement was dropped in recognition of individual state requirements and potential confusion for issuers. Delaware, for example, required companies to provide for a quorum of no less than one-third of outstanding shares; otherwise such quorum shall default to a majority.

We generally believe a majority of outstanding shares entitled to vote is an appropriate quorum for the transaction of business at shareholder meetings. However, should a company seek shareholder approval of a lower quorum requirement we will generally support a reduced quorum of at least one-third of shares entitled to vote, either in person or by proxy. When evaluating such proposals, we also consider the specific facts and circumstances of the company, such as size and shareholder base.

Director and Officer Indemnification

While Glass Lewis strongly believes that directors and officers should be held to the highest standard when carrying out their duties to shareholders, some protection from liability is reasonable to protect them against certain suits so that these officers feel comfortable taking measured risks that may benefit shareholders. As such, we find it appropriate for a company to provide indemnification and/or enroll in liability insurance to cover its directors and officers so long as the terms of such agreements are reasonable.

Officer Exculpation

In August 2022, the Delaware General Assembly amended Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law ("DGCL") to authorize corporations to adopt a provision in their certificate of incorporation to eliminate or limit monetary liability of certain corporate officers for breach of fiduciary duty of care. Previously, the DGCL allowed only exculpation of corporate directors from breach of fiduciary duty of care claims if the corporation's certificate of incorporation includes an exculpation provision.

The amendment authorizes corporations to provide for exculpation of the following officers: (i) the corporation's president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief legal officer, controller, treasurer or chief accounting officer, (ii) "named executive officers" identified in the corporation's SEC filings, and (iii) individuals who have agreed to be identified as officers of the corporation.

Corporate exculpation provisions under the DGCL only apply to claims for breach of the duty of care, and not to breaches of the duty of loyalty. Exculpation provisions also do not apply to acts or omissions not in good faith or that involve intentional misconduct, knowing violations of the law, or transactions involving the receipt of any improper personal benefits. Furthermore, officers may not be exculpated from claims brought against them by, or in the right of, the corporation (i.e., derivative actions).

Under Section 102(b)(7), a corporation must affirmatively elect to include an exculpation provision in its certificate of incorporation. We will closely evaluate proposals to adopt officer exculpation provisions on a case-by-case basis. We will generally recommend voting against such proposals eliminating monetary liability for

breaches of the duty of care for certain corporate officers, unless compelling rationale for the adoption is provided by the board, and the provisions are reasonable.

Reincorporation

In general, Glass Lewis believes that the board is in the best position to determine the appropriate jurisdiction of incorporation for the company. When examining a management proposal to reincorporate to a different state or country, we review the relevant financial benefits, generally related to improved corporate tax treatment, as well as changes in corporate governance provisions, especially those relating to shareholder rights, resulting from the change in domicile. Where the financial benefits are de minimis and there is a decrease in shareholder rights, we will recommend voting against the transaction.

However, costly, shareholder-initiated reincorporations are typically not the best route to achieve the furtherance of shareholder rights. We believe shareholders are generally better served by proposing specific shareholder resolutions addressing pertinent issues which may be implemented at a lower cost, and perhaps even with board approval. However, when shareholders propose a shift into a jurisdiction with enhanced shareholder rights, Glass Lewis examines the significant ways would the company benefit from shifting jurisdictions including the following:

- Is the board sufficiently independent?
- Does the company have anti-takeover protections such as a poison pill or classified board in place?
- Has the board been previously unresponsive to shareholders (such as failing to implement a shareholder proposal that received majority shareholder support)?
- Do shareholders have the right to call special meetings of shareholders?
- Are there other material governance issues of concern at the company?
- Has the company's performance matched or exceeded its peers in the past one and three years?
- How has the company ranked in Glass Lewis' pay-for-performance analysis during the last three years?
- Does the company have an independent chair?

We note, however, that we will only support shareholder proposals to change a company's place of incorporation in exceptional circumstances.

Exclusive Forum and Fee-Shifting Bylaw Provisions

Glass Lewis recognizes that companies may be subject to frivolous and opportunistic lawsuits, particularly in conjunction with a merger or acquisition, that are expensive and distracting. In response, companies have sought ways to prevent or limit the risk of such suits by adopting bylaws regarding where the suits must be brought or shifting the burden of the legal expenses to the plaintiff, if unsuccessful at trial.

Glass Lewis believes that charter or bylaw provisions limiting a shareholder's choice of legal venue are not in the best interests of shareholders. Such clauses may effectively discourage the use of shareholder claims by increasing their associated costs and making them more difficult to pursue. As such, shareholders should be wary about approving any limitation on their legal recourse including limiting themselves to a single jurisdiction (e.g., Delaware or federal courts for matters arising under the Securities Act of 1933) without compelling evidence that it will benefit shareholders.

For this reason, we recommend that shareholders vote against any bylaw or charter amendment seeking to adopt an exclusive forum provision unless the company: (i) provides a compelling argument on why the

provision would directly benefit shareholders; (ii) provides evidence of abuse of legal process in other, non-favored jurisdictions; (iii) narrowly tailors such provision to the risks involved; and (iv) maintains a strong record of good corporate governance practices.

Moreover, in the event a board seeks shareholder approval of a forum selection clause pursuant to a bundled bylaw amendment rather than as a separate proposal, we will weigh the importance of the other bundled provisions when determining the vote recommendation on the proposal. We will nonetheless recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee for bundling disparate proposals into a single proposal (refer to our discussion of nominating and governance committee performance in Section I of the guidelines).

Similarly, some companies have adopted bylaws requiring plaintiffs who sue the company and fail to receive a judgment in their favor pay the legal expenses of the company. These bylaws, also known as “fee-shifting” or “loser pays” bylaws, will likely have a chilling effect on even meritorious shareholder lawsuits as shareholders would face a strong financial disincentive not to sue a company. Glass Lewis therefore strongly opposes the adoption of such fee-shifting bylaws and, if adopted without shareholder approval, will recommend voting against the governance committee. While we note that in June of 2015 the State of Delaware banned the adoption of fee-shifting bylaws, such provisions could still be adopted by companies incorporated in other states.

Authorized Shares

Glass Lewis believes that adequate capital stock is important to a company’s operation. When analyzing a request for additional shares, we typically review four common reasons why a company might need additional capital stock:

1. **Stock Split** — We typically consider three metrics when evaluating whether we think a stock split is likely or necessary: The historical stock pre-split price, if any; the current price relative to the company’s most common trading price over the past 52 weeks; and some absolute limits on stock price that, in our view, either always make a stock split appropriate if desired by management or would almost never be a reasonable price at which to split a stock.
2. **Shareholder Defenses** — Additional authorized shares could be used to bolster takeover defenses such as a poison pill. Proxy filings often discuss the usefulness of additional shares in defending against or discouraging a hostile takeover as a reason for a requested increase. Glass Lewis is typically against such defenses and will oppose actions intended to bolster such defenses.
3. **Financing for Acquisitions** — We look at whether the company has a history of using stock for acquisitions and attempt to determine what levels of stock have typically been required to accomplish such transactions. Likewise, we look to see whether this is discussed as a reason for additional shares in the proxy.
4. **Financing for Operations** — We review the company’s cash position and its ability to secure financing through borrowing or other means. We look at the company’s history of capitalization and whether the company has had to use stock in the recent past as a means of raising capital.

Issuing additional shares generally dilutes existing holders in most circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. Accordingly, where we find that the company has not detailed a plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares far exceeds those needed to accomplish a detailed plan, we typically recommend against the authorization of additional shares. Similar concerns may also lead us to recommend

against a proposal to conduct a reverse stock split if the board does not state that it will reduce the number of authorized common shares in a ratio proportionate to the split.

With regard to authorizations and/or increases in preferred shares, Glass Lewis is generally against such authorizations, which allow the board to determine the preferences, limitations and rights of the preferred shares (known as “blank-check preferred stock”). We believe that granting such broad discretion should be of concern to common shareholders, since blank-check preferred stock could be used as an anti-takeover device or in some other fashion that adversely affects the voting power or financial interests of common shareholders. Therefore, we will generally recommend voting against such requests, unless the company discloses a commitment to not use such shares as an anti-takeover defense or in a shareholder rights plan, or discloses a commitment to submit any shareholder rights plan to a shareholder vote prior to its adoption.

While we think that having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical, we prefer that, for significant transactions, management come to shareholders to justify their use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of a large pool of unallocated shares available for any purpose.

Advance Notice Requirements

We typically recommend that shareholders vote against proposals that would require advance notice of shareholder proposals or of director nominees.

These proposals typically attempt to require a certain amount of notice before shareholders are allowed to place proposals on the ballot. Notice requirements typically range between three to six months prior to the annual meeting. Advance notice requirements typically make it impossible for a shareholder who misses the deadline to present a shareholder proposal or a director nominee that might be in the best interests of the company and its shareholders.

We believe shareholders should be able to review and vote on all proposals and director nominees. Shareholders can always vote against proposals that appear with little prior notice. Shareholders, as owners of a business, are capable of identifying issues on which they have sufficient information and ignoring issues on which they have insufficient information. Setting arbitrary notice restrictions limits the opportunity for shareholders to raise issues that may come up after the window closes.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings

A growing contingent of companies have elected to hold shareholder meetings by virtual means only. Glass Lewis believes that virtual meeting technology can be a useful complement to a traditional, in-person shareholder meeting by expanding participation of shareholders who are unable to attend a shareholder meeting in person (i.e., a “hybrid meeting”). However, we also believe that virtual-only meetings have the potential to curb the ability of a company’s shareholders to meaningfully communicate with the company’s management.

Prominent shareholder rights advocates, including the Council of Institutional Investors, have expressed concerns that such virtual-only meetings do not approximate an in-person experience and may serve to reduce the board’s accountability to shareholders. When analyzing the governance profile of companies that choose to hold virtual-only meetings, we look for robust disclosure in a company’s proxy statement which assures

shareholders that they will be afforded the same rights and opportunities to participate as they would at an in-person meeting.

Examples of effective disclosure include: (i) addressing the ability of shareholders to ask questions during the meeting, including time guidelines for shareholder questions, rules around what types of questions are allowed, and rules for how questions and comments will be recognized and disclosed to meeting participants; (ii) procedures, if any, for posting appropriate questions received during the meeting and the company's answers, on the investor page of their website as soon as is practical after the meeting; (iii) addressing technical and logistical issues related to accessing the virtual meeting platform; and (iv) procedures for accessing technical support to assist in the event of any difficulties accessing the virtual meeting.

We will generally recommend voting against members of the governance committee where the board is planning to hold a virtual-only shareholder meeting and the company does not provide such disclosure.

Voting Structure

Multi-Class Share Structures

Glass Lewis believes multi-class voting structures are typically not in the best interests of common shareholders. Allowing one vote per share generally operates as a safeguard for common shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares are able to weigh in on issues set forth by the board.

Furthermore, we believe that the economic stake of each shareholder should match their voting power and that no small group of shareholders, family or otherwise, should have voting rights different from those of other shareholders. On matters of governance and shareholder rights, we believe shareholders should have the power to speak and the opportunity to effect change. That power should not be concentrated in the hands of a few for reasons other than economic stake.

We generally consider a multi-class share structure to reflect negatively on a company's overall corporate governance. Because we believe that companies should have share capital structures that protect the interests of non-controlling shareholders as well as any controlling entity, we typically recommend that shareholders vote in favor of recapitalization proposals to eliminate dual-class share structures. Similarly, we will generally recommend against proposals to adopt a new class of common stock. We will generally recommend voting against the chair of the governance committee at companies with a multi-class share structure and unequal voting rights when the company does not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class share structure (generally seven years or less).

In the case of a board that adopts a multi-class share structure in connection with an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year, we will generally recommend voting against all members of the board who served at the time of the IPO if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting the multi-class structure to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class structure (generally seven years or less). If the multi-class share structure is put to a shareholder vote, we will examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining the vote outcome.

At companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting rights, we will carefully examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders when determining whether board responsiveness is warranted. In the case of companies that have multi-class share structures with unequal voting

rights, we will generally examine the level of approval or disapproval attributed to unaffiliated shareholders on a “one share, one vote” basis. At controlled and multi-class companies, when at least 20% or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management, we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and demonstrate some initial level of responsiveness, and when a majority or more of unaffiliated shareholders vote contrary to management we believe that boards should engage with shareholders and provide a more robust response to fully address shareholder concerns.

Cumulative Voting

Cumulative voting increases the ability of minority shareholders to elect a director by allowing shareholders to cast as many shares of the stock they own multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. As companies generally have multiple nominees up for election, cumulative voting allows shareholders to cast all of their votes for a single nominee, or a smaller number of nominees than up for election, thereby raising the likelihood of electing one or more of their preferred nominees to the board. It can be important when a board is controlled by insiders or affiliates and where the company’s ownership structure includes one or more shareholders who control a majority-voting block of company stock.

Glass Lewis believes that cumulative voting generally acts as a safeguard for shareholders by ensuring that those who hold a significant minority of shares can elect a candidate of their choosing to the board. This allows the creation of boards that are responsive to the interests of all shareholders rather than just a small group of large holders.

We review cumulative voting proposals on a case-by-case basis, factoring in the independence of the board and the status of the company’s governance structure. But we typically find these proposals on ballots at companies where independence is lacking and where the appropriate checks and balances favoring shareholders are not in place. In those instances we typically recommend in favor of cumulative voting.

Where a company has adopted a true majority vote standard (i.e., where a director must receive a majority of votes cast to be elected, as opposed to a modified policy indicated by a resignation policy only), Glass Lewis will recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals due to the incompatibility of the two election methods. For companies that have not adopted a true majority voting standard but have adopted some form of majority voting, Glass Lewis will also generally recommend voting against cumulative voting proposals if the company has not adopted anti-takeover protections and has been responsive to shareholders.

Where a company has not adopted a majority voting standard and is facing both a shareholder proposal to adopt majority voting and a shareholder proposal to adopt cumulative voting, Glass Lewis will support only the majority voting proposal. When a company has both majority voting and cumulative voting in place, there is a higher likelihood of one or more directors not being elected as a result of not receiving a majority vote. This is because shareholders exercising the right to cumulate their votes could unintentionally cause the failed election of one or more directors for whom shareholders do not cumulate votes.

Supermajority Vote Requirements

Glass Lewis believes that supermajority vote requirements impede shareholder action on ballot items critical to shareholder interests. An example is in the takeover context, where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit the voice of shareholders in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business. This in turn degrades share value and can limit the possibility of buyout premiums to shareholders. Moreover, we believe that a supermajority vote requirement can enable a small group of shareholders to overrule the will

of the majority shareholders. We believe that a simple majority is appropriate to approve all matters presented to shareholders.

Transaction of Other Business

We typically recommend that shareholders not give their proxy to management to vote on any other business items that may properly come before an annual or special meeting. In our opinion, granting unfettered discretion is unwise.

Anti-Greenmail Proposals

Glass Lewis will support proposals to adopt a provision preventing the payment of greenmail, which would serve to prevent companies from buying back company stock at significant premiums from a certain shareholder. Since a large or majority shareholder could attempt to compel a board into purchasing its shares at a large premium, the anti-greenmail provision would generally require that a majority of shareholders other than the majority shareholder approve the buyback.

Mutual Funds: Investment Policies and Advisory Agreements

Glass Lewis believes that decisions about a fund's structure and/or a fund's relationship with its investment advisor or sub-advisors are generally best left to management and the members of the board, absent a showing of egregious or illegal conduct that might threaten shareholder value. As such, we focus our analyses of such proposals on the following main areas:

- The terms of any amended advisory or sub-advisory agreement;
- Any changes in the fee structure paid to the investment advisor; and
- Any material changes to the fund's investment objective or strategy.

We generally support amendments to a fund's investment advisory agreement absent a material change that is not in the best interests of shareholders. A significant increase in the fees paid to an investment advisor would be reason for us to consider recommending voting against a proposed amendment to an investment advisory agreement or fund reorganization. However, in certain cases, we are more inclined to support an increase in advisory fees if such increases result from being performance-based rather than asset-based. Furthermore, we generally support sub-advisory agreements between a fund's advisor and sub-advisor, primarily because the fees received by the sub-advisor are paid by the advisor, and not by the fund.

In matters pertaining to a fund's investment objective or strategy, we believe shareholders are best served when a fund's objective or strategy closely resembles the investment discipline shareholders understood and selected when they initially bought into the fund. As such, we generally recommend voting against amendments to a fund's investment objective or strategy when the proposed changes would leave shareholders with stakes in a fund that is noticeably different than when originally purchased, and which could therefore potentially negatively impact some investors' diversification strategies.

Real Estate Investment Trusts

The complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) provide for a unique shareholder evaluation. In simple terms, a REIT must have a minimum of 100 shareholders (the 100 Shareholder Test) and no more than 50% of the value of its shares can be held by five or fewer individuals (the “5/50 Test”). At least 75% of a REITs’ assets must be in real estate, it must derive 75% of its gross income from rents or mortgage interest, and it must pay out 90% of its taxable earnings as dividends. In addition, as a publicly traded security listed on a stock exchange, a REIT must comply with the same general listing requirements as a publicly traded equity.

In order to comply with such requirements, REITs typically include percentage ownership limitations in their organizational documents, usually in the range of 5% to 10% of the REITs outstanding shares. Given the complexities of REITs as an asset class, Glass Lewis applies a highly nuanced approach in our evaluation of REIT proposals, especially regarding changes in authorized share capital, including preferred stock.

Preferred Stock Issuances at REITs

Glass Lewis is generally against the authorization of "blank-check preferred stock." However, given the requirement that a REIT must distribute 90% of its net income annually, it is inhibited from retaining capital to make investments in its business. As such, we recognize that equity financing likely plays a key role in a REIT’s growth and creation of shareholder value. Moreover, shareholder concern regarding the use of preferred stock as an anti-takeover mechanism may be allayed by the fact that most REITs maintain ownership limitations in their certificates of incorporation. For these reasons, along with the fact that REITs typically do not engage in private placements of preferred stock (which result in the rights of common shareholders being adversely impacted), we may support requests to authorize shares of blank-check preferred stock at REITs.

Business Development Companies

Business Development Companies (BDCs) were created by the U.S. Congress in 1980; they are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and are taxed as regulated investment companies (RICs) under the Internal Revenue Code. BDCs typically operate as publicly traded private equity firms that invest in early stage to mature private companies as well as small public companies. BDCs realize operating income when their investments are sold off, and therefore maintain complex organizational, operational, tax and compliance requirements that are similar to those of REITs—the most evident of which is that BDCs must distribute at least 90% of their taxable earnings as dividends.

Authorization to Sell Shares at a Price Below Net Asset Value

Considering that BDCs are required to distribute nearly all their earnings to shareholders, they sometimes need to offer additional shares of common stock in the public markets to finance operations and acquisitions. However, shareholder approval is required in order for a BDC to sell shares of common stock at a price below Net Asset Value (NAV). Glass Lewis evaluates these proposals using a case-by-case approach, but will recommend supporting such requests if the following conditions are met:

- The authorization to allow share issuances below NAV has an expiration date of one year or less from the date that shareholders approve the underlying proposal (i.e., the meeting date);
- The proposed discount below NAV is minimal (ideally no greater than 20%);
- The board specifies that the issuance will have a minimal or modest dilutive effect (ideally no greater than 25% of the company’s then-outstanding common stock prior to the issuance); and

- A majority of the company's independent directors who do not have a financial interest in the issuance approve the sale.

In short, we believe BDCs should demonstrate a responsible approach to issuing shares below NAV, by proactively addressing shareholder concerns regarding the potential dilution of the requested share issuance, and explaining if and how the company's past below-NAV share issuances have benefitted the company.

Auditor Ratification and Below-NAV Issuances

When a BDC submits a below-NAV issuance for shareholder approval, we will refrain from recommending against the audit committee chair for not including auditor ratification on the same ballot. Because of the unique way these proposals interact, votes may be tabulated in a manner that is not in shareholders' interests. In cases where these proposals appear on the same ballot, auditor ratification is generally the only "routine proposal," the presence of which triggers a scenario where broker non-votes may be counted toward shareholder quorum, with unintended consequences.

Under the 1940 Act, below-NAV issuance proposals require relatively high shareholder approval. Specifically, these proposals must be approved by the lesser of: (i) 67% of votes cast if a majority of shares are represented at the meeting; or (ii) a majority of outstanding shares. Meanwhile, any broker non-votes counted toward quorum will automatically be registered as "against" votes for purposes of this proposal. The unintended result can be a case where the issuance proposal is not approved, despite sufficient voting shares being cast in favor. Because broker non-votes result from a lack of voting instruction by the shareholder, we do not believe shareholders' ability to weigh in on the selection of auditor outweighs the consequences of failing to approve an issuance proposal due to such technicality.

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs), also known as "blank check companies," are publicly traded entities with no commercial operations and are formed specifically to pool funds in order to complete a merger or acquisition within a set time frame. In general, the acquisition target of a SPAC is either not yet identified or otherwise not explicitly disclosed to the public even when the founders of the SPAC may have at least one target in mind. Consequently, IPO investors often do not know what company they will ultimately be investing in.

SPACs are therefore very different from typical operating companies. Shareholders do not have the same expectations associated with an ordinary publicly traded company and executive officers of a SPAC typically do not continue in employment roles with an acquired company.

Extension of Business Combination Deadline

Governing documents of SPACs typically provide for the return of IPO proceeds to common shareholders if no qualifying business combination is consummated before a certain date. Because the time frames for the consummation of such transactions are relatively short, SPACs will sometimes hold special shareholder meetings at which shareholders are asked to extend the business combination deadline. In such cases, an acquisition target will typically have been identified, but additional time is required to allow management of the SPAC to finalize the terms of the deal.

Glass Lewis believes management and the board are generally in the best position to determine when the extension of a business combination deadline is needed. We therefore generally defer to the recommendation of management and support reasonable extension requests.

SPAC Board Independence

The board of directors of a SPAC's acquisition target is in many cases already established prior to the business combination. In some cases, however, the board's composition may change in connection with the business combination, including the potential addition of individuals who served in management roles with the SPAC. The role of a SPAC executive is unlike that of a typical operating company executive. Because the SPAC's only business is identifying and executing an acquisition deal, the interests of a former SPAC executive are also different. Glass Lewis does not automatically consider a former SPAC executive to be affiliated with the acquired operating entity when their only position on the board of the combined entity is that of an otherwise independent director. Absent any evidence of an employment relationship or continuing material financial interest in the combined entity, we will therefore consider such directors to be independent.

Director Commitments of SPAC Executives

We believe the primary role of executive officers at SPACs is identifying acquisition targets for the SPAC and consummating a business combination. Given the nature of these executive roles and the limited business operations of SPACs, when a directors' only executive role is at a SPAC, we will generally apply our higher limit for company directorships. As a result, we generally recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves in an executive role only at a SPAC while serving on more than five public company boards.

Shareholder Proposals

Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders, support effective ESG oversight and reporting, and encourage director accountability. Accordingly, Glass Lewis places a significant emphasis on promoting transparency, robust governance structures and companies' responsiveness to and engagement with shareholders. We also believe that companies should be transparent on how they are mitigating material ESG risks, including those related to climate change, human capital management, and stakeholder relations.

To that end, we evaluate all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis with a view to promoting long-term shareholder value. While we are generally supportive of those that promote board accountability, shareholder rights, and transparency, we consider all proposals in the context of a company's unique operations and risk profile.

For a detailed review of our policies concerning compensation, environmental, social, and governance shareholder proposals, please refer to our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Shareholder Proposals & ESG-Related Issues*, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.

Overall Approach to Environmental, Social & Governance Issues

Glass Lewis evaluates all environmental and social issues through the lens of long-term shareholder value. We believe that companies should be considering material environmental and social factors in all aspects of their operations and that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that allow them to understand how these factors are being considered and how attendant risks are being mitigated. We also are of the view that governance is a critical factor in how companies manage environmental and social risks and opportunities and that a well-governed company will be generally managing these issues better than one without a governance structure that promotes board independence and accountability.

We believe part of the board's role is to ensure that management conducts a complete risk analysis of company operations, including those that have material environmental and social implications. We believe that directors should monitor management's performance in both capitalizing on environmental and social opportunities and mitigating environmental and social risks related to operations in order to best serve the interests of shareholders. Companies face significant financial, legal and reputational risks resulting from poor environmental and social practices, or negligent oversight thereof. Therefore, in cases where the board or management has neglected to take action on a pressing issue that could negatively impact shareholder value, we believe that shareholders should take necessary action in order to effect changes that will safeguard their financial interests.

Given the importance of the role of the board in executing a sustainable business strategy that allows for the realization of environmental and social opportunities and the mitigation of related risks, relating to environmental risks and opportunities, we believe shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders and promote director accountability. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental or social risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental and social risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. In such instances, we will generally recommend against responsible members of the board that are specifically charged with oversight of the issue in question.

When evaluating environmental and social factors that may be relevant to a given company, Glass Lewis does so in the context of the financial materiality of the issue to the company's operations. We believe that all companies face risks associated with environmental and social issues. However, we recognize that these risks manifest themselves differently at each company as a result of a company's operations, workforce, structure, and geography, among other factors. Accordingly, we place a significant emphasis on the financial implications of a company's actions with regard to impacts on its stakeholders and the environment.

When evaluating environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis examines companies':

Direct environmental and social risk — Companies should evaluate financial exposure to direct environmental risks associated with their operations. Examples of direct environmental risks include those associated with oil or gas spills, contamination, hazardous leakages, explosions, or reduced water or air quality, among others. Social risks may include non-inclusive employment policies, inadequate human rights policies, or issues that adversely affect the company's stakeholders. Further, we believe that firms should consider their exposure to risks

emanating from a broad range of issues, over which they may have no or only limited control, such as insurance companies being affected by increased storm severity and frequency resulting from climate change

Risk due to legislation and regulation — Companies should evaluate their exposure to changes or potential changes in regulation that affect current and planned operations. Regulation should be carefully monitored in all jurisdictions in which the company operates. We look closely at relevant and proposed legislation and evaluate whether the company has responded proactively.

Legal and reputational risk — Failure to take action on important environmental or social issues may carry the risk of inciting negative publicity and potentially costly litigation. While the effect of high-profile campaigns on shareholder value may not be directly measurable, we believe it is prudent for companies to carefully evaluate the potential impacts of the public perception of their impacts on stakeholders and the environment. When considering investigations and lawsuits, Glass Lewis is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations or other charges that have not been resolved. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or charges or that the law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such concerns, lawsuits or investigations reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted.

Governance risk — Inadequate oversight of environmental and social issues carries significant risks to companies. When leadership is ineffective or fails to thoroughly consider potential risks, such risks are likely unmitigated and could thus present substantial risks to the company, ultimately leading to loss of shareholder value.

Glass Lewis believes that one of the most crucial factors in analyzing the risks presented to companies in the form of environmental and social issues is the level and quality of oversight over such issues. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. When companies have not provided for explicit, board-level oversight of environmental and social matters and/or when a substantial environmental or social risk has been ignored or inadequately addressed, we may recommend voting against members of the board. In addition, or alternatively, depending on the proposals presented, we may also consider recommending voting in favor of relevant shareholder proposals or against other relevant management-proposed items, such as the ratification of auditor, a company's accounts and reports, or ratification of management and board acts.

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Global Overview



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Benchmark Policy Guideline Updates

2024

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About Glass Lewis

Glass Lewis is the world's choice for governance solutions. We enable institutional investors and publicly listed companies to make informed decisions based on research and data. We cover 30,000+ meetings each year, across approximately 100 global markets. Our team has been providing in-depth analysis of companies since 2003, relying solely on publicly available information to inform its policies, research, and voting recommendations.

Our customers include the majority of the world's largest pension plans, mutual funds, and asset managers, collectively managing over \$40 trillion in assets. We have teams located across the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific giving us global reach with a local perspective on the important governance issues.

Investors around the world depend on Glass Lewis' [Viewpoint](#) platform to manage their proxy voting, policy implementation, recordkeeping, and reporting. Our industry leading [Proxy Paper](#) product provides comprehensive environmental, social, and governance research and voting recommendations weeks ahead of voting deadlines. Public companies can also use our innovative [Report Feedback Statement](#) to deliver their opinion on our proxy research directly to the voting decision makers at every investor client in time for voting decisions to be made or changed.

The research team engages extensively with public companies, investors, regulators, and other industry stakeholders to gain relevant context into the realities surrounding companies, sectors, and the market in general. This enables us to provide the most comprehensive and pragmatic insights to our customers.

Join the Conversation

Glass Lewis is committed to ongoing engagement with all market participants.

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Introduction & Process

This document includes a summary of all key updates made to our market-based benchmark policy guidelines for 2024, covering regions with a H1 “proxy season.” A detailed overview of the policies we apply in each market is available on [our website](#).

These benchmark policy guidelines form the basis of our analysis and voting recommendations for companies traded in each applicable geographic region. They generally reflect the current, predominant views of institutional investor clients on corporate governance best practices and incorporate the evaluation of material environmental and social issues through the lens of long-term shareholder value. In conducting our analysis, we also review each company and proposal on a case-by-case basis, considering the company’s performance, industry, stock exchange, place of incorporation and other factors.

Glass Lewis Benchmark Policy Updates

Glass Lewis evaluates the benchmark policy guidelines on an ongoing basis. We update them annually, and when material changes to regulation or market practice occur during the year. For markets that conduct their proxy season in the first half of the calendar year, annual policy updates are published in November and December, taking effect at the start of the next calendar year. For markets that hold their proxy season later in the calendar year (Australia, India, New Zealand and South Africa), annual policy updates are published one-to-two months ahead of the season.

In developing our policies, we consider a diverse range of perspectives and inputs, with ongoing analysis of regulatory developments, academic research and evolving market practices as a starting point. We incorporate insights gained from discussions with institutional investors, trade groups and other market participants, as well as meetings of the Glass Lewis Research Advisory Council. Further, our public company engagement program helps to shape our guidelines by adding essential market- and industry-specific context.

This year, we augmented our policy review process by offering all Glass Lewis institutional investor clients, as well as corporate and other subscribers to our research, the opportunity to weigh in on various corporate governance matters. The goal of this survey was to formalize our existing processes for incorporating client and market perspectives, with a focus on policy areas where we have recently observed new practices or where our previous discussions and engagements with investors, corporate issuers and other stakeholders have not yielded a clear consensus. We are pleased that in its first year, the Glass Lewis Client Policy Survey generated strong interest from a range of market participants, with over 500 total responses.

Beyond the Benchmark

It is important to note that the Glass Lewis benchmark policy is just one voting option Glass Lewis clients can choose, either to adopt as their own or to use as a starting point for the creation of their own custom policy.

Glass Lewis serves a global client base with a broad range of views on corporate governance issues. For this reason, Glass Lewis offers its clients a menu of other “thematic” policy options, which are distinct from the benchmark policy, and which reflect different perspectives on investment and share ownership strategies.

For more information on our thematic voting policy options or to inquire about implementing your own custom policy, please [contact us](#).

Americas

Argentina

Director Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

As of 2023, Glass Lewis included a new discussion on director accountability for climate related issues. In particular, we believe that clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding climate risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen, should be provided by those companies whose own GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Accordingly, for companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe they should provide thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

While this policy was applied to the largest, most significant emitters in 2023, beginning in 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to the most large-cap companies operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that companies' GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have expanded our policy on cyber risk oversight to outline our belief that, where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates communicating the company's ongoing process towards resolving and remediating the impact of the attack.

In instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosures concerning cybersecurity-related issues to be insufficient, or not provided to shareholders.

Interlocking Directorships

We have expanded our policy on interlocking directorships to specify that we consider both public and private companies. Further, we have specified that we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships on a case-by-case basis, and review multiple board interlocks among non-insiders for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

Director Attendance

We have clarified that in our assessment of director attendance, we typically recommend voting against the re-election of directors that attended fewer than (i) 75% of board meetings; or (ii) an aggregate of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings. We will continue to typically grant exceptions to directors in their first year of service on a board or when the company discloses mitigating circumstances for a director's poor attendance record.

Accounts and Reports

We have clarified that, on a case-by-case basis, we may recommend that shareholders vote against proposals to approve or acknowledge a company's accounts and reports in instances where the statutory auditor has refused to provide an unqualified opinion on the financial statements. In these circumstances, we will assess the reasoning provided by the statutory auditor as well as any relevant disclosure from the company.

Further, we have clarified that in cases where the statutory auditor has included an emphasis of matter or raised concerns regarding the going concern basis of a company in its report on the financial statements, this will generally not lead to a recommendation to vote against proposals to approve or acknowledge a company's accounts and reports unless there are other legitimate concerns regarding the integrity of the financial statements and reports.

Brazil

Director Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

Beginning in 2023, Glass Lewis included a new discussion on director accountability for climate related issues. In particular, we believe that clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding climate risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen, should be provided by those companies whose own GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

For companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe they should provide thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

While this policy was applied to the largest, most significant emitters in 2023, beginning in 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to most large-cap companies operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that companies' GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have expanded our policy on cyber risk oversight to outline our belief that, where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates communicating the company's ongoing process towards resolving and remediating the impact of the attack.

In instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosures concerning cybersecurity-related issues to be insufficient, or not provided to shareholders.

Interlocking Directorships

We have expanded our policy on interlocking directorships to specify that we consider both public and private companies. Further, we have specified that we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships on a case-by-case basis, and review multiple board interlocks among non-insiders for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

Director Attendance

We have clarified that in our assessment of director attendance, we typically recommend voting against the re-election of directors that attended fewer than (i) 75% of board meetings; or (ii) an aggregate of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings. We will continue to typically grant exceptions to directors in their first year of service on a board or when the company discloses mitigating circumstances for a director's poor attendance record.

Accounts and Reports

We have clarified that, on a case-by-case basis, we may recommend that shareholders vote against proposals to approve or acknowledge a company's accounts and reports in instances where the statutory auditor has refused to provide an unqualified opinion on the financial statements. In these circumstances, we will assess the reasoning provided by the statutory auditor as well as any relevant disclosure from the company.

Further, we have clarified that in cases where the statutory auditor has included an emphasis of matter or raised concerns regarding the going concern basis of a company in its report on the financial statements, this will generally not lead to a recommendation to vote against proposals to approve or acknowledge a company's accounts and reports unless there are other legitimate concerns regarding the integrity of the financial statements and reports.

Canada

Board Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

Beginning in 2023, Glass Lewis included a new discussion on director accountability for climate-related issues. In particular, we believe that clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding climate risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen, should be provided by those companies whose own GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Accordingly, for companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe they should provide thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

While this policy was applied to the largest, most significant emitters in 2023, beginning in 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to TSX 60 companies operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that companies' GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Human Capital Management

We have updated our guidelines to state that in egregious cases where a board has failed to respond to legitimate concerns with a company's human capital management practices, we may recommend voting against the chair of the committee tasked with oversight of the company's environmental and/or social issues, the chair of the governance committee or the chair of the board, as applicable.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have expanded our policy on cyber risk oversight to outline our belief that, where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates communicating the company's ongoing process towards resolving and remediating the impact of the attack.

In instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosures concerning cybersecurity-related issues to be insufficient or not clearly outlined to shareholders.

Interlocking Directorships

We have expanded our policy on interlocking directorships to specify that we consider both public and private companies. Further, we have specified that we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships on a case-by-case basis and review multiple board interlocks among non-insiders for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

Audit Financial Expert Designation

We have revised the criteria by which we designate a director as an "audit financial expert". Specifically, we would generally expect company disclosure of such a director's experience as one or more of the following: (i) a chartered accountant; (ii) a certified public accountant; (iii) a former or current CFO of a public company or corporate controller of similar experience; (iv) a current or former partner of an audit company; or (v) having similar demonstrably meaningful audit experience. We now consider the audit financial expert designation distinctly from the financial skill in our skills matrix, which encompasses more generalized financial professional experience beyond accounting or audit experience.

Clawback Provisions

We have updated our policy on the utility of clawback provisions to reflect that the negative impacts of excessive risk-taking do not always result in financial restatements but may nonetheless prove harmful to shareholder value. We believe effective clawback policies should provide companies with the power to recoup incentive compensation from an executive when there is evidence of problematic decisions or actions, such as material misconduct, a material reputational failure, material risk management failure, or a material operational failure, the consequences of which have not already been reflected in incentive payments and where recovery is warranted. Such power to recoup should be provided regardless of whether the employment of the executive officer was terminated with or without cause. In these circumstances, rationale should be provided if the company determines ultimately to refrain from recouping compensation as well as disclosure of alternative measures that are instead pursued, such as the exercise of negative discretion on future payments.

Executive Ownership Guidelines

In a new section of these guidelines, we have added a discussion to formally outline our approach to executive ownership guidelines. We believe that companies should facilitate an alignment between the interests of the executive leadership with those of long-term shareholders by adopting and enforcing minimum share ownership rules for its named executive officers. Companies should provide clear disclosure in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis section of the proxy statement of their executive share ownership requirements and how various outstanding equity awards are treated when determining an executive's level of ownership.

In the process of determining an executive's level of share ownership, counting unearned performance-based full value awards and/or unvested/unexercised stock options is inappropriate. Companies should provide a cogent rationale should they count these awards towards shares held by an executive.

Proposals for Equity Awards for Shareholders

Regarding proposals seeking approval for individual equity awards, we have expanded our section on front-loaded awards to include discussion on provisions requiring the non-vote or vote of abstention from a shareholder if the shareholder is also the recipient of the proposed grant. Such provisions help to address potential conflict of interest issues and provide disinterested shareholders with more equal say over the proposal. The inclusion of such provisions will be viewed positively during our holistic analysis, especially when a vote from the recipient of the proposed grant would materially influence the passage of the proposal.

Clarifying Amendments

The following clarifications of our existing policies are included this year:

Nominating and/or Corporate Governance Committees

In Canada, the committees that are charged with nominating and corporate governance responsibilities may be combined or separate. Therefore, to clearly delineate our expectations for each committee in cases where they are not combined, we have separated the previous "Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Performance" section into individual sections for "Nominating Committee Performance" and "Corporate Governance Committee Performance".

Governance Following an IPO, Spin-Off or Direct Listing

We have expanded our section on how we examine governance following an IPO, spin-off or direct listing to note that, while we generally refrains from issuing voting recommendations on the basis of corporate governance best practices in such cases, where we determine that the board has approved overly restrictive governing documents, we may recommend voting against members of the governance committee (or the board chair, in the absence of this committee). Moreover, we have clarified in this section that in the case of a board that adopts a multi-class share structure in connection with an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year, we will generally recommend against the chair of the governance committee or most senior representative of the major shareholder up for election if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting the multi-class structure to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class structure (generally seven years or less).

Reconciliation of Accounting Standards

We have expanded the discussion of our approach to the use of non-IFRS/GAAP measures in incentive programs to emphasize the need for thorough and transparent disclosure in the proxy statement that will assist shareholders in reconciling the difference between non-IFRS/GAAP results used for incentive payout determinations and reported IFRS/GAAP results. Particularly in situations where significant adjustments were applied, the lack of such disclosure will impact Glass Lewis' assessment of the quality of executive pay disclosure and may be a factor in our recommendation for the say-on-pay.

MILA (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru)

No Material Changes

While we have updated certain sections of these guidelines to reflect recent regulatory developments, for the 2024 year we have made no noteworthy revisions and will continue to apply our guidelines taking into account the market's regulations as well as international best practices.

United States

Material Weaknesses

We have included a new discussion on our approach to material weaknesses. Effective internal controls over financial reporting should ensure the integrity of companies' accounting and financial reporting. A material weakness occurs when a company identifies a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal controls over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.

We believe it is the responsibility of audit committees to ensure that material weaknesses are remediated in a timely manner and that companies disclose remediation plans that include detailed steps to resolve a given material weakness.

When a material weakness is reported and the company has not disclosed a remediation plan, or when a material weakness has been ongoing for more than one year and the company has not disclosed an updated remediation plan that clearly outlines the company's progress toward remediating the material weakness, we will consider recommending that shareholders vote against all members of a company's audit committee who served on the committee during the time when the material weakness was identified.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have updated our discussion on our approach to cyber risk oversight. On July 26, 2023, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced rules requiring public companies to report cybersecurity incidents deemed material within four days of identifying them; furthermore, in annual reports, they must disclose their processes for assessing, identifying, and managing material cybersecurity risks, along with their material effects and past incidents' impacts. Similar rules were also adopted for foreign private issuers. The final rules became effective on September 5, 2023. Given the continued regulatory focus on and the potential adverse outcomes from cyber-related issues, it is our view that cyber risk is material for all companies.

In the absence of material cybersecurity incidents, we will generally not make voting recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues. However, in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders, we will closely evaluate the board's oversight of cybersecurity as well as the company's response and disclosures.

Moreover, in instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we believe shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates from the company communicating its ongoing progress towards resolving and remediating the impact of the cyber-attack. These disclosures should focus on the company's response to address the impacts to affected stakeholders and should not reveal specific and/or

technical details that could impede the company's response or remediation of the incident or that could assist threat actors.

In instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosures concerning cybersecurity-related issues to be insufficient or are not provided to shareholders.

Board Oversight of Environmental and Social Issues

We have updated our discussion of board oversight of environmental and social issues. Given the importance of the board's role in overseeing environmental and social risks, we believe that this responsibility should be formally designated and codified in the appropriate committee charters or other governing documents.

When evaluating the board's role in overseeing environmental and/or social issues, we will examine a company's committee charters and governing documents to determine if the company has codified a meaningful level of oversight of and accountability for a company's material environmental and social impacts.

Board Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

We have updated our discussion of board accountability for climate-related issues, and how our policy is applied. In 2023, our policy on this topic was applied to the largest, most significant emitters; however beginning in 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to companies in the S&P 500 index operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that the companies' GHG emissions represent a financially material risk, as well as companies where we believe emissions or climate impacts, or stakeholder scrutiny thereof, represent an outsized, financially material risk.

We will assess whether such companies have produced disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We have further clarified that we will also assess whether these companies have disclosed explicit and clearly defined board-level oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. In instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

Clawback Provisions

In light of new NYSE and Nasdaq listing requirements to comply with SEC Rule 10D-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Glass Lewis has updated our views on the utility of clawback provisions. Although the negative impacts of excessive risk-taking do not always result in financial restatements, they may nonetheless prove harmful to shareholder value. In addition to meeting listing requirements, effective clawback policies should provide companies with the power to recoup incentive compensation from an executive when there is evidence of problematic decisions or actions, such as material misconduct, a material reputational failure, material risk management failure, or a material operational failure, the consequences of which have not already been reflected in incentive payments and where recovery is warranted. Such power to recoup should be provided regardless of whether the employment of the executive officer was terminated with or without cause. In these circumstances, rationale should be provided if the company determines ultimately to refrain from recouping compensation as well as disclosure of alternative measures that are instead pursued, such as the exercise of negative discretion on future payments.

Executive Ownership Guidelines

We have added a discussion to formally outline our approach to executive ownership guidelines. We believe that companies should facilitate an alignment between the interests of the executive leadership with those of long-term shareholders by adopting and enforcing minimum share ownership rules for their named executive officers. Companies should provide clear disclosure in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis section of the proxy statement of their executive share ownership requirements and how various outstanding equity awards are treated when determining an executive's level of ownership.

In the process of determining an executive's level of share ownership, counting unearned performance-based full value awards and/or unexercised stock options is inappropriate. Companies should provide a cogent rationale should they count these awards towards shares held by an executive.

Proposals for Equity Awards for Shareholders

Regarding proposals seeking approval for individual equity awards, we have included new discussion of provisions that require a non-vote, or vote of abstention, from a shareholder if the shareholder is also the recipient of the proposed grant. Such provisions help to address potential conflict of interest issues and provide disinterested shareholders with more meaningful say over the proposal. The inclusion of such provisions will be viewed positively during our holistic analysis, especially when a vote from the recipient of the proposed grant would materially influence the passage of the proposal.

Net Operating Loss (NOL) Pills

We have updated our discussion of NOL pills to include our concerns with acting in concert provisions. Over the past several years, the terms and structures of NOL pills have evolved to include features such as acting in concert provisions, among other concerning terms, that may disempower shareholders and insulate the board and management. When acting in concert provisions are present within the terms of a NOL pill, we believe this may raise concerns as to the true objective of the pill.

Acting in concert provisions broaden the definition of beneficial ownership to prohibit parallel conduct, or multiple shareholders party to a formal or informal agreement collaborating to influence the board and management of a company, and aggregate the ownership of such shareholders towards the triggering threshold.

As such, we have added the inclusion of an acting in concert provision and whether the pill is implemented following the filing of a Schedule 13D by a shareholder or there is evidence of hostile activity or shareholder activism as part of our considerations to recommend shareholders vote against a management proposed NOL pill.

Control Share Statutes

We have added a new discussion outlining our approach to control share statutes. Certain states, including Delaware, have adopted control share acquisition statutes as an anti-takeover defense for certain closed-end investment companies and business development companies. Control share statutes may prevent changes in control by limiting voting rights of a person that acquires the ownership of "control shares." Control shares are shares of stock equal to or exceeding specified percentages of company voting power, and a control share statute prevents shares in excess of the specified percentage from being voted, unless: (i) the board approves

them to be voted; or (ii) the holder of the “control shares” receives approval from a supermajority of “non-interested” shareholders.

Depending on the state of incorporation, companies may automatically rely on control share statutes unless the fund’s board of trustees eliminates the application of the control share statute to any or all fund share acquisitions, through adoption of a provision in the fund’s governing instrument or by fund board action alone. In certain other states, companies must adopt control share statutes.

In our view, control share statutes disenfranchise shareholders by reducing their voting power to a level less than their economic interest and effectively function as an anti-takeover device. We believe all shareholders should have an opportunity to vote all of their shares. Moreover, we generally believe anti-takeover measures prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock.

As such, we will generally recommend voting for proposals to opt out of control share acquisition statutes, unless doing so would allow the completion of a takeover that is not in the best interests of shareholders; and recommend voting against proposals to amend the charter to include control share acquisition provisions.

Further, in cases where a closed-end fund or business development company has received a public buyout offer and has relied on a control share statute as a defense mechanism in the prior year, we will generally recommend shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating and governance committee, absent a compelling rationale as to why a rejected acquisition was not in the best interests of shareholders.

Clarifying Amendments

The following clarifications of our existing policies are included this year:

Board Responsiveness

We have clarified our discussion of board responsiveness to remove a reference to shareholder proposals from our discussion of when 20% or more of shareholders vote contrary to management. In addition, we have clarified that our calculation of opposition includes votes cast as either AGAINST and/or ABSTAIN.

Interlocking Directorships

We have clarified our policy on interlocking directorships to reference that, on a case-by-case basis, we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships, such as interlocks with close family members of executives or within group companies.

Board Gender Diversity

We have clarified our policy on board gender diversity to emphasize that when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company’s disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline of when the board intends to appoint additional gender diverse directors (generally by the next annual meeting or as soon as is reasonably practicable).

Underrepresented Community Diversity

We have clarified our policy on underrepresented community diversity to emphasize that when making these voting recommendations, we will carefully review a company's disclosure of its diversity considerations and may refrain from recommending that shareholders vote against directors when boards have provided a sufficient rationale or plan to address the lack of diversity on the board, including a timeline of when the board intends to appoint additional directors from an underrepresented community (generally by the next annual meeting or as soon as is reasonably practicable).

Furthermore, we have revised our definition of "underrepresented community director" to replace our reference to an individual who self-identifies as gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender with an individual who self-identifies as a member of the LGBTQIA+ community.

Non-GAAP to GAAP Reconciliation Disclosure

We have expanded the discussion of our approach to the use of non-GAAP measures in incentive programs in order to emphasize the need for thorough and transparent disclosure in the proxy statement that will assist shareholders in reconciling the difference between non-GAAP results used for incentive payout determinations and reported GAAP results. Particularly in situations where significant adjustments were applied and materially impacts incentive pay outcomes, the lack of such disclosure will impact Glass Lewis' assessment of the quality of executive pay disclosure and may be a factor in our recommendation for the say-on-pay.

Pay-Versus-Performance Disclosure

We have revised our discussion of the pay-for-performance analysis to note that the pay-versus-performance disclosure mandated by the SEC may be used as part of our supplemental quantitative assessments supporting our primary pay-for-performance grade.

Company Responsiveness for Say-on-Pay Opposition

For increased clarity, we amended our discussion of company responsiveness to significant levels of say-on-pay opposition to note that our calculation of opposition includes votes cast as either AGAINST and/or ABSTAIN, with opposition of 20% or higher treated as significant.

Asia

China

Cumulative Voting

We have added a new paragraph to reflect China's voting practice for the election of directors and supervisors.

Director Commitments

We have updated our policy on board commitments for directors who also serve as executives. From 2024, we have reduced our overcommitment threshold for directors who also serve as executives to a total of two directorships (previously three).

In addition, we previously refrained from recommending a vote against overcommitted executives at the company where they serve as an executive. Going forward, we will generally recommend voting against an overcommitted executive at the company where they serve as an executive if they hold more than four directorships.

Postponement of Director Elections

We have added new content regarding the postponement of the reelection of directors.

Independent Director Board Tenure

We have added new content on the reappointment of independent directors who have served six consecutive years and are reappointed after a 3-year gap. Without reasonable explanation, we will classify such an independent director nominee as affiliated.

Audit Committee Performance

We will recommend voting for audit committee chair and members appointed in the current fiscal year when the fees paid to the auditor were not disclosed, the breakdown of the fees was not disclosed or the fees paid to the auditor were considered excessive in last fiscal year.

Nominating Committee Performance

We have altered our policy to recommend voting for the nominating committee chair even if the committee failed to meet at least once during the previous financial year.

Local Environmental & Social Disclosure Practices

We have added new content to reflect recent developments in local environmental & social disclosure practices.

Allocation of Profits/Dividends

We have added a new paragraph to reflect China's latest regulation on the allocation of profits/dividends for listed companies.

Equity-Based Compensation Plans

We have added new content on the eligibility of participants of equity-based compensation plans. We also updated our policy regarding the minimum vesting period. From 2024, we will recommend voting for equity-based compensation plans with a minimum vesting period of between one and two years provided that such plans incorporate a clawback and/or malus mechanism.

Issuance of Shares and/or Convertible Securities

We have added a new paragraph to reflect recent developments in local practice regarding preferred share issuance.

Issuance of Debt Instruments

We have updated our discussion on how we evaluate debt issuance authority proposals.

Hong Kong

Director Commitments

We have updated our director overcommitment thresholds for executives, and directorships across a single group of companies.

From 2024, we will recommend that shareholders vote against a director who serves as an executive officer of any public company while serving on more than one additional external public company board.

In addition, we have expanded our discussion on potential overcommitment with regard to group companies. From 2024, we will cap the total number of group public company boards a director may serve on at ten boards before we consider that director to be overboarded.

Director Fees

We have expanded our discussion on director's compensation to address additional compensation apart from directors' fees.

Equity-Based Compensation Plans

We have revised our policy on the granting of equity-based compensation awards to external participants. From 2024, we will refrain from recommending voting against the granting of equity-based compensation awards to external participants whose nature of work is akin to that of a company's employees, provided that the company provides sufficient disclosure of the participant's work scope.

We have also updated our policy regarding the minimum vesting period for equity awards. From 2024, we will refrain from recommending voting against equity-based compensation plans with a minimum vesting period of under two years but not less than one year (12 months) provided that such plans incorporate a clawback and/or malus mechanism.

We have also expanded our discussion and updated our policy for restricted share plans.

Amendments to Procedural Rules/Management Systems

We have updated our policy to include discussions around the amendments to procedural rules and management systems.

Issuance of Shares and Convertible Securities

We have expanded our discussion on the issuance of shares and convertible securities with and without preemptive rights.

Issuance of Debt Instruments

We have expanded our discussion on how we evaluate debt issuance authority proposals.

Related Party Transactions

We have updated our policy to include specific criteria on how we evaluate related party transactions.

Local Environmental & Social Disclosure Practices

We have updated our discussion around the HKEX's 2022 Analysis of ESG Practice Disclosure, and its recent consultation on enhancement of climate disclosures under the ESG framework.

Indonesia

Director Commitments on Group Companies

We have updated how we evaluate the director's commitments for group companies. When considering the number of boards that directors can serve on, we reserve the right to exempt individual who serves on boards of group companies from our over boarded policy based on several mitigating factors.

Approval of Fees Paid to the Board of Directors and/or Commissioners

We have updated our guidelines to incorporate the level of past disclosure details as a factor in determining our vote recommendations for the approval of fees and remuneration paid to the Board of Directors and/or Commissioners.

Japan

Board Gender Diversity

From shareholder meetings held on or after February 2024, we will no longer provide an exemption to our policy guidelines for Prime Market-listed companies in cases where they fail to meet the requisite board gender diversity requirements.

Furthermore, beginning in 2026, we will require Prime Market-listed companies to have a board comprised of at least 20% gender diverse directors. We will generally recommend voting against the chair of the board under a two-tier board or one-tier with one-committee structure; or the nominating committee chair under a one-tier with three-committee structure of a board that does not meet this requirement.

Excessive Strategic Shareholding

Beginning in 2025, we will implement stricter requirements for companies when providing an exemption to our policy guidelines for this issue.

From 2025, we may refrain from recommending shareholders vote against directors for this issue in cases where the company has disclosed a clear plan that outlines the specific scale and timeframe for reducing the size of its strategic shareholdings to 20% or less of its net assets within the next five years.

Additionally, we may also refrain from recommending voting against directors for this issue when the company has posted an average return on equity (ROE) of 8% or more over the past five fiscal years, or 8% or more in the most recent fiscal year¹, if the size of strategic shares held by the company falls in the range between 10% and 20% of its net assets.

Board Composition and Refreshment

Beginning in 2025, we will implement a new policy on board composition and refreshment for companies that have displayed a significant lack of commitment to the area of board refreshment.

We may recommend voting against the chair of the board under a two-tier board or one-tier with one-committee structure; or the nominating committee chair under a one-tier with three-committee structure of a board when all outside directors, or all external statutory auditors under a two-tier board structure, have a tenure in excess of 12 consecutive years of service.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have included a new discussion on our approach to cyber risk oversight. Given the potential adverse outcomes from cyber-related issues, it is our view that cyber risk is material for all companies.

We, therefore, believe that it is critical that companies evaluate and mitigate these risks to the greatest extent possible. With that view, we encourage all issuers to provide clear disclosure concerning the role of the board in overseeing issues related to cybersecurity. We also believe that disclosure concerning how companies are

² Ito Review published by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2014 included a target of 8% in ROE for Japanese companies ("[Ito Review of Competitiveness and Incentives for Sustainable Growth](#)". METI. August 2014).

ensuring directors are fully versed on this rapidly evolving and dynamic issue can help shareholders understand the seriousness with which companies take this issue.

We will generally not make recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues. However, we will closely evaluate a company's disclosure in this regard in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders and may recommend against appropriate directors should we find such disclosure or oversight to be insufficient.

Board Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

We have updated our discussion of board accountability for climate-related issues, and how our policy is applied. In 2023, our policy on this topic was applied to the largest, most significant emitters; however beginning in February 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to companies in the Nikkei 225 index operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that the companies' GHG emissions represent a financially material risk, as well as companies where we believe emissions or climate impacts, or stakeholder scrutiny thereof, represent an outsized, financially material risk.

We will assess whether such companies have produced disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We have further clarified that we will also assess whether these companies have disclosed explicit and clearly defined board-level oversight responsibilities for climate related issues. In instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

Korea

Classification of Employee Representative

The appointment of an employee representative in the government-owned companies board is mandated by the Act on the Management of Public Institutions. While the Act requires an employee representative to be appointed as non-executive director, the commercial law allows non-executive directors to be registered only as independent or non-independent, lacking a classification for employee representative. Consequently, this has led to confusion on their classification. As for GL classification, we will align it with the company classification, and given the characteristic of labor directors defined by the public institutional law, we do not vote against this candidate for board independence.

Enhancement of Gender Diversity

We have revised our approach to gender diversity in the Korea market. With increasing domestic and foreign investor demands for the board diversity, we have shifted from a fixed numerical approach to a percentage-based approach. At Large Companies which are subject to the mandatory gender quota, we will recommend voting against the nominating committee chair (or the board chair in the absence of nomination committee) if the board is not at least 10 percent gender diverse. However, for large companies already satisfying the one-female-director gender quota, we will carefully review their disclosures on diversity plans or considerations, and we may not recommend voting against the nominating committee chair, if a sufficient rationale or plan is provided.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have included a new discussion on our approach to cyber risk oversight. Given current regulatory focus on and the potential adverse outcomes from cyber-related issues, it is our view that cyber risk is material for all companies. We, therefore, believe that it is critical that companies evaluate and mitigate these risks to the greatest extent possible. With that view, we encourage all issuers to provide clear disclosure concerning the role of the board in overseeing issues related to cybersecurity. We also believe that disclosure concerning how companies are ensuring directors are fully versed on this rapidly evolving and dynamic issue can help shareholders understand the seriousness with which companies take this issue.

We will generally not make recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues. However, we will closely evaluate a company's disclosure in this regard in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders and may recommend against appropriate directors should we find such disclosure or oversight to be insufficient.

Amendments to the Articles: Virtual-Only Meeting

We expect companies proposing to amend their articles of incorporation to allow for virtual-only meetings to, at a minimum, include details on procedures, requirements and other necessary information in the proposed amendments or in the supporting documents. However, for companies incorporated in jurisdictions in which the aforementioned organizational and disclosure aspects are already required by applicable legislation, the burden to explain their approach is lower.

In the case of Korea, the Ministry of Justice pre-announced legislation on virtual-only meetings in August 2023, and the legislation is expected to be announced at the end of the year, including details on procedures and requirements. Therefore, if such details can be identified under the law, we will recommend that shareholders support amendments despite the absence of detailed information on their proposed amendments regarding virtual-only meetings. We will continue monitoring the ongoing introduction of the legislation.

Approval of Annual Financial Statements

In Korea, the notice and circular for convocation of a general meeting are dispatched in writing or electronically to shareholders at least 14 days prior to the meeting date, as mandated by the Commercial Act. Separately, the Commercial Act states a listed company shall make public notice of its audited financial statements at least seven days prior to the annual general meeting.

In general, annual financial statements are not available when investors review the proposal regarding approval of financial statements due to the discrepancy in the timing of disclosures of meeting materials and an audit report in the Korean market. Given the importance of auditor's opinion in financial statements and the availability of financial statements, with respect to financial statements, we have recommended voting against financial statement proposals, if the audit opinion is not disclosed at the timing of our publication. However, after comprehensive research on market circumstances and data, along with discussions with investors and issuers, we are updating our policy to better align with market practices and regulations and to prevent unintentional preference to companies disclosing meeting materials at the last minute over companies disclosing materials early but without an audit report.

In 2024, we will review companies' past three years' financial statements and audit opinion when we review relevant proposals. If we do not identify any issues raised by independent auditors and/or accounting practices during the three-year period, we will recommend voting for the financial statement proposal. However, for

companies receiving opinions other than "unqualified" in the last three years, we will advise shareholders to oppose the adoption of financial statements, unless the company discloses its auditor's report before our publication. Nonetheless, we strongly encourage companies to provide transparent and timely audit opinions on financial statements to shareholders.

Malaysia

Director Commitments on Group Companies

We have updated how we evaluate the director's commitments for group companies. When considering the number of boards that directors can serve on, we reserve the right to exempt individual who serves on boards of group companies from our over boarded policy and based on several mitigating factors.

Independent Director Board Tenure

We have updated our guidelines in relation to the tenure of independent directors. From 2024, we will re-classify independent directors who have served nine or more cumulative years as affiliated.

Board Gender Diversity

We have updated our guidelines in relation to the issue of board gender diversity. From 2024, we will require all companies, regardless of size, to have a minimum of 30% of the board composed of gender diverse directors.

Philippines

Director Commitments on Group Companies

We have updated how we evaluate the director's commitments for group companies. When considering the number of boards that directors can serve on, we reserve the right to exempt individual who serves on boards of group companies from our over boarded policy based on several mitigating factors.

Local Environmental & Social Disclosure Practices

We have included discussion of the SEC's ongoing reassessment of sustainability reporting frameworks for use by publicly listed companies.

Singapore

Director Commitments on Group Companies

We have updated how we evaluate the director's commitments for group companies. When considering the number of boards that directors can serve on, we reserve the right to exempt individual who serves on boards of group companies from our over boarded policy based on several mitigating factors.

Independent Director Board Tenure

We have updated our guidelines based on the latest regulatory update. The prior two-tier vote mechanism has been removed, and from 2024 onwards we will reclassify all independent directors serving for more than 9 years as affiliated directors.

Board Gender Diversity

We have updated our guidelines to reflect the importance of gender diversity for Singaporean companies. From 2024, we will recommend shareholders vote against the nomination committee chair if the board is not at least 15% gender diverse.

Remuneration Committee Performance

We have updated this section to address additional disclosure practices mandated by the regulator. From 2024 we will start to note the company's remuneration committee level of disclosure, and from 2025 will start to recommend that shareholders vote against the remuneration committee chair if the total remuneration and breakdown of amounts paid to the directors and CEO are not disclosed in the annual report.

South Asia

Board Size & Formation of Risk Management Committee

We have incorporated the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka's requirement that banks and finance companies falling under the Central Bank's supervision set a board size maximum of 13 directors and minimum of 7 directors, and convene a risk management committee.

Taiwan

Election of the Board of Directors and Supervisors

As of June 2023, all 1,791 listed companies on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the main board of Taipei Exchange have established audit committees to replace the supervisor system. Thus, we have removed content related to the election of supervisors and independence of supervisors.

Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Independence

We have removed content regarding the slate election of directors and supervisors.

Director Commitments

We have updated our policy on board commitments for directors who also serve as executives. From 2024, we have reduced our overcommitment threshold for directors who also serve as executives to a total of two directorships (previously three).

In addition, we previously refrained from recommending a vote against overcommitted executives at the company where they serve as an executive. Going forward, we will generally recommend voting against an overcommitted executive at the company where they serve as an executive if they hold more than four directorships.

In accordance with local regulatory requirements, we also removed our maximum director commitments policy on financial companies' independent directors.

Independent Director Board Tenure

In 2024, the board tenure limitation for independent directors, which is 12 consecutive years, will remain unchanged. However, we plan to lower it to 9 consecutive years in 2025.

Director Bonuses

We have added new content regarding director bonuses.

Equity-Based Compensation Plans

We have updated our policy regarding the minimum vesting period. From 2024, we will no longer recommend voting against equity-based compensation plans with a minimum vesting period of between one to two years provided that such plan incorporate a clawback and/or malus mechanism. We have also expanded the cases in which we may recommended against individual equity grants.

Non-Compete Restrictions

We have removed the exemption for directors who either represent the same legal entity on other boards or are employed by the same legal entity's subsidiaries.

Virtual Shareholder Meetings

We have added a new paragraph to reflect local regulatory amendments on virtual or hybrid shareholder meetings.

Thailand

Director Commitments on Group Companies

We have updated how we evaluate the director's commitments for group companies. When considering the number of boards that directors can serve on, we reserve the right to exempt individual who serves on boards of group companies from our over boarded policy based on several mitigating factors.

Vietnam

Board Independence

We have updated our policy and voting recommendations regarding board independence. In line with the prevailing regulations, we will no longer recommend voting against the election/re-election of directors based on the one-third board independence threshold. Instead, we will now require at least one independent director for a board size of 3 to 5 members; two independent directors for a board size of 6 to 8 members; and three independent directors for a for a board size of 9 to 11 members.

Director Experience

We have updated requirements on director experience and how we will evaluate the election/re-election of directors based on the director's experience.

Director Commitments

We have updated our guidelines to address how we will evaluate director commitments for positions within a consolidated group. We may refrain from recommending voting against directors serving a potentially excessive number of board within a consolidated group of companies.

Equity-Based Compensation Plan

We have revised and updated our criteria for evaluating equity-based compensation plans.

Environmental and Social Risk Oversight

We have included the recent regulatory requirements for disclosure of ESG applicable to public companies, and updated our views and voting recommendations based upon these changes.

Issuance of Debt-Instruments

We have updated our policy to include our views on evaluating and providing voting recommendations for the issuance of debt-instruments.

Europe

Continental Europe

Vote on Non-Financial Reporting

In a new section of these guidelines, we have introduced a policy for the assessment of proposals to approve a company's non-financial reporting, which large Spanish and Swiss companies are required to include on the agenda of their annual general meetings.

We have clarified that we will generally recommend that shareholders approve these proposals unless any of the following apply: (i) the company has failed to make the report publicly-available with sufficient time for shareholder review; (ii) the company has failed to provide a sufficient response to material controversies in its reporting; (iii) there are material concerns regarding the completeness and/or quality of the reporting; or (iv) the company is listed on a blue-chip or mid-cap index and has failed to disclose its Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions.

We have also clarified that in some cases we may extend our "Environmental and Social Risk Oversight" policy to recommend a vote against the approval of a company's non-financial reporting in addition to, or instead of, a recommendation to vote against accountable directors of large-cap companies and other companies with material ESG oversight concerns that have failed to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board's role in overseeing material ESG issues.

Director Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

Beginning in 2023, Glass Lewis included a new discussion on director accountability for climate related issues. In particular, we believe that clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding climate risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen, should be provided by those companies whose own GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Accordingly, for companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe they should provide thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

While this policy was applied to the largest, most significant emitters in 2023, beginning in 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to most large-cap companies operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that companies' GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have expanded our policy on cyber risk oversight to outline our belief that, where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates communicating the company's ongoing process towards resolving and remediating the impact of the attack.

In instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosures concerning cybersecurity-related issues to be insufficient, or not provided to shareholders.

Exclusive Forum Provisions

In a new section of these guidelines, we have outlined our approach to reviewing proposals that request amendments to a company's articles of association to specify that the exclusive place of jurisdiction for all proceedings against the company (and affiliated entities) is at the registered office of the company and that local laws shall apply.

We will generally recommend that shareholders vote against such proposals unless the company provides a compelling argument on why the provision would directly benefit shareholders.

Interlocking Directorships

We have expanded our policy on interlocking directorships to specify that we consider both public and private companies. Further, we have specified that we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships on a case-by-case basis, and review multiple board interlocks among non-insiders for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

Executive Shareholding Requirements

In a new section of these guidelines, we have outlined our belief that companies should generally adopt minimum executive share ownership requirements that should apply for the duration of an executive's tenure, and our view that additional post-vesting/post-termination holding requirements may serve to further align executives' interests with those of long-term free-float shareholders.

Clarifying Amendments

The following clarifications of our existing policies are included this year:

Remuneration Relative to Peers

We have expanded this section of our guidelines to clarify our expectation that companies disclose their peer group utilised for pay benchmarking, as well as the criteria utilised in the selection process – particularly in cases where companies consider U.S.-based peers.

Further, we have clarified that we generally believe companies should provide supporting disclosure where key elements of their executive pay plan deviates from prevailing market practice – particularly in cases where multiple exchange listings or other company-specific situation leads a company to benchmark its pay-setting across multiple jurisdictions.

Remuneration Relative to Ownership Structure

We have expanded this section of our guidelines to outline a number of company practices that may serve to mitigate concerns when a significant equity award is made to an executive that is also a major shareholder. These include the inclusion of challenging targets attached to a diverse set of performance metrics, meaningful

disclosure on the company's engagement with free-float shareholders on the topic, or a policy that the shareholder executive will not participate in voting on the award.

Severance Payments

We have clarified our belief that unvested long-term awards should be proportionately reduced to the time served until an executive's termination and that deviation from this practice should be accompanied by supporting disclosure.

Director Attendance

We have clarified that in our assessment of director attendance, we typically recommend voting against the re-election of directors that attended fewer than (i) 75% of board meetings; or (ii) an aggregate of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings. We will continue to typically grant exceptions to directors in their first year of service on a board or when the company discloses mitigating circumstances for a director's poor attendance record.

Accounts and Reports

We have clarified that, on a case-by-case basis, we may recommend that shareholders vote against proposals to approve or acknowledge a company's accounts and reports in instances where the statutory auditor has refused to provide an unqualified opinion on the financial statements. In these circumstances, we will assess the reasoning provided by the statutory auditor as well as any relevant disclosure from the company.

Further, we have clarified that in cases where the statutory auditor has included an emphasis of matter or raised concerns regarding the going concern basis of a company in its report on the financial statements, this will generally not lead to a recommendation to vote against proposals to approve or acknowledge a company's accounts and reports unless there are other legitimate concerns regarding the integrity of the financial statements and reports.

'Overperformance' Resulting in Pay-for-Performance Concerns

We have clarified that in cases where maximum vesting occurs even if the threshold hurdle for one or more performance metrics was missed (due to the structure of the incentive plan and above-target performance against other metrics), which results in a clear pay-for-performance disconnect, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against a company's remuneration report.

Capital Authorities to Service Equity Programmes

We have clarified that where a company proposes a capital authority to service an equity programme that includes participants beyond the executive committee, we generally believe that the authority should not exceed 10% of a company's issued share capital. Where a company proposes a capital authority to service an equity programme that is exclusively for executive directors, we continue to believe that the authority should not exceed 5% of a company's issued share capital.

Austria

Implementation of New Remuneration Policy

We have updated the “Remuneration Policy” section of these guidelines to reinforce our view that we favour the simultaneous implementation of a new or amended remuneration policy into all active management board members’ contracts. In particular, we have further clarified that a staggered implementation – occurring only upon renewal of each executive’s multi-year contract – may not only hinder transparency, but also represent a disservice to minority shareholders when the new policy was aimed at addressing structural concerns they had previously expressed.

Accordingly, we believe companies should provide specific disclosure supporting the board’s decision-making process in this regard.

Disclosure of Earned/Paid Remuneration

We have updated the “Remuneration Report” section of these guidelines to reflect our stance on the disclosure of individual remuneration allocated to management board members. In particular, we have clarified that we may recommend shareholders to vote against a remuneration report where information about awards *earned* (or *vested*) for performance (or the performance cycle ended) in the year under review is omitted, absent a supporting and compelling rationale and in the presence of other factors compounding our concerns.

Virtual Meetings

We have introduced a new section into these guidelines to outline our expectations with respect to the new Austrian legislation on virtual meetings. Our policies in this regard are aligned with the *Continental European Policy Guidelines*.

Belgium

Director Attendance Records

We have added this section to the guidelines to reflect the recommendation by the Belgian Code on Corporate Governance that directors’ attendance at board and committee meetings be disclosed annually, in line with Glass Lewis’ view that meeting attendance is a core responsibility of directors.

Accordingly, absent such disclosure, we will consider recommending a vote against the re-election of the governance committee chair (or equivalent).

Share Price Hurdle

We have expanded the “Short- and Long-Term Incentives” section of these guidelines to clarify that, for companies that opt to offer executives a stock option plan without attaching performance conditions, the inclusion of a share price hurdle is viewed positively.

Denmark

Disclosure of General Meeting Vote Results

As previously announced, from 2024, we will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the re-election of the chair of the governance committee or equivalent (i.e. board chair or Lead Independent Director) at companies included in OMX Nordic 120 that did not disclose vote results from their previous annual meeting.

The Link Between Pay and Performance

We have restructured and expanded this section of the guidelines in line with our Continental European Policy Guidelines and Danish market practice in order to provide further insight into our assessment of executive remuneration.

Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria

We have outlined our current guidance on the use of E&S metrics in the variable incentive programmes for executive directors in line with our *Continental European Policy Guidelines*.

Although we are strongly supportive of companies' incorporation of material E&S risks and opportunities in their long-term strategic planning, we believe that the inclusion of E&S metrics in remuneration plans should be predicated on each company's unique circumstances.

Companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that clearly lay out the rationale for selecting specific E&S metrics, the target-setting process, and corresponding payout opportunities. Further, in our view shareholders of companies that have not included explicit environmental or social indicators in their incentive plans would benefit from additional disclosure on how the company's executive pay strategy is otherwise aligned with its sustainability strategy.

Finland

Disclosure of General Meeting Vote Results

As previously announced, from 2024, we will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the re-election of the chair of the governance committee or equivalent (i.e., board chair or lead independent director) at companies included in OMX Nordic 120 that did not disclose vote results from their previous annual meeting.

The Link Between Pay and Performance

We have restructured and expanded this section of the guidelines in line with our Continental European Policy Guidelines and Finnish market practice in order to provide further insight into our assessment of executive remuneration.

Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria

We have outlined our current guidance on the use of E&S metrics in the variable incentive programmes for executive directors in line with our *Continental European Policy Guidelines*.

Although we are strongly supportive of companies' incorporation of material E&S risks and opportunities in their long-term strategic planning, we believe that the inclusion of E&S metrics in remuneration plans should be determined by the company based on its own unique circumstances.

Companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that clearly lay out the rationale for selecting specific E&S metrics, the target-setting process, and corresponding payout opportunities. Further, in our view shareholders of companies that have not included explicit environmental or social indicators in their incentive plans would benefit from additional disclosure on how the company's executive pay strategy is otherwise aligned with its sustainability strategy.

Clarifying Changes

We have included in the guidelines new sections regarding "Accounts and Reports", "Appointment of Auditor and Authority to Set Fees", "Authority to Cancel Shares and Reduce Capital", "Bundled Proposals" and "Nominating Committee" that describe the market practice and clarify our current approach.

France

Metrics Related to Company's Social and Environmental Stakes

We have updated these guidelines, in line with the updated recommendation of the AFEP-MEDEF code, to clarify that variable remuneration should be based on multiple metrics that are related to the most important social and environmental stakes of the company. Further, we generally believe that quantifiable metrics are generally preferable.

Previously, our expectations were limited to the presence of at least one metric related to the company's social and environmental responsibility.

Employee Shareholder Representatives

We have updated our guidelines to clarify our approach when a company puts up for shareholder approval the election of multiple employee shareholder representatives that are competing for a single seat on the board. In this case, we generally recommend in favour of a single candidate. Our recommendation takes into consideration the stake held in the company of the employee fund proposing the candidate, the candidates' individual skills, their previous role on the board as well as the board recommendation, if available.

Equity-Based Incentive Plan Proposals

We have updated our guidelines to clarify that no discount should be applied to the exercise price of the options granted to the corporate officers. We will generally recommend against authorities granting discounted options to the aforementioned beneficiaries.

Germany

Implementation of New Remuneration Policy

We have updated the “Management Board Remuneration Policy” section of these guidelines to reinforce our view that we favour the simultaneous implementation of a new or amended remuneration policy into all active management board members’ contracts. In particular, we have further clarified that a staggered implementation – occurring only upon renewal of each executive’s multi-year contract – may not only hinder transparency, but also represent a disservice to minority shareholders when the new policy was aimed at addressing structural concerns they had previously expressed.

Accordingly, we believe companies should provide specific disclosure supporting the board’s decision-making process in this regard.

Disclosure of Earned/Paid Remuneration

We have updated the “Management Board Remuneration Report” section of these guidelines to reflect evolving market practice on the disclosure of individual remuneration allocated to management board members. In particular, we have clarified that, despite the absence of clear mandatory or recommended templates, best practice has developed towards a voluntary disclosure of both earned and paid variable pay elements and the addition of a preface to the relevant tables, detailing what variable pay elements are included and in reference to what performance period.

Accordingly, we may recommend shareholders to vote against a remuneration report where information about awards *earned* (or *vested*) for performance (or the performance cycle ended) in the year under review is omitted, absent a supporting and compelling rationale.

Greece

Election of Audit Committee

We have updated these guidelines to clarify our approach to the election of the audit committee as an independent body. Specifically, we will recommend against the election of the audit committee where a company fails to disclose fees paid to the auditor in the previous fiscal year, the audit committee is elected as an independent body and the previous audit committee chair is being re-elected.

Equity Remuneration

We have updated these guidelines, in line with our *Continental Europe Benchmark Policy Guidelines*, to clarify that where a company proposes a capital authority to service an equity programme that is exclusively for executive directors, we believe that the authority should not exceed 5% of a company’s issued share capital. However, we will evaluate each proposal on a case-by-case basis in light of the proposed number of company executives participating in the remuneration plan and will recommend shareholders vote against proposals where proposed dilution exceeds the recommended 5% threshold if no disclosure about the number of executive beneficiaries was provided.

Ireland

Gender Diversity

We have updated these guidelines to clarify that we will generally recommend against the chair of the nomination committee at any ISEQ 20 board that has failed to meet the 33% board gender diversity target set out by the Balance for Better Business review and has failed to provide clear and compelling disclosure for why it has been unable to do so. We may apply limited exceptions to this policy.

Clarifying Amendments

The following clarifications of our existing policies are included this year:

Director Classification

We have updated the “Independence” section of the guidelines to reflect that, in line with the UK Guidelines, Glass Lewis considers uncles, aunts, cousins, nieces and nephews as being relevant familial relationships.

Further, in line with the UK Guidelines, we have included a discussion of the impact of director tenure and interim management positions on director independence.

Accounts and Reports

We have clarified that, on a case-by-case basis, we may recommend that shareholders vote against proposals to approve or acknowledge a company’s accounts and reports in instances where the statutory auditor did not provide an unqualified opinion on the financial statements. In these circumstances, we will assess the reasoning provided by the statutory auditor as well as any relevant disclosure from the company.

Italy

No Material Changes

While we have updated certain sections of these guidelines to reflect recent regulatory developments, for the 2024 year we have made no noteworthy revisions and will continue to apply our guidelines taking into account the market’s regulations as well as international best practices.

Middle East & North Africa (MENA)

Regulatory Updates

We have updated our policy guidelines to reflect the updated Commercial Law in Morocco (Law No. 17-95 Relating to Public Limited Companies, and its amendments) and the Corporate Governance Code in Saudi Arabia (Corporate Governance Regulations of Capital Markets Authority (2017) amended in 2023). In addition to the

issuance of the supplementary regulation to the Commercial Law in Saudi Arabia (Implementing Regulation of the Companies Law for Listed Joint Stock Companies (2023)).

Further, we have applied the relevant amendments and updates to other codes and laws. Minor edits of a housekeeping nature have been made, mainly consisting of updating outdated references, in order to enhance clarity and readability.

Environmental and Social Risk Oversight

In a new section of these guidelines, we have outlined our view that environmental and social risk are material for all companies and that a company's stakeholders would benefit from clear disclosure regarding the role of the board in overseeing these issues.

In situations where we believe that a company has not properly managed or mitigated environmental or social risks to the detriment of shareholder value, or when such mismanagement has threatened shareholder value, Glass Lewis may recommend that shareholders vote against the members of the board who are responsible for oversight of environmental and social risks. Please refer to the "Environmental and Social Risk Oversight" section of these guidelines for further information.

Cyber Risk Oversight

In a new section of these guidelines, we have outlined our belief that cyber risk is material for all companies and that a company's stakeholders would benefit from clear disclosure regarding the role of the board in overseeing issues related to cybersecurity. Further we have clarified that, while we will generally not make recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues, we may recommend against appropriate directors in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders, and we find the company's disclosure or oversight to be insufficient.

Netherlands

Director Attendance Records

We have added this section to the guidelines to reflect the recommendation by the Dutch Corporate Governance Code that directors' attendance at board and committee meetings be disclosed annually, in line with Glass Lewis' view that meeting attendance is a core responsibility of directors.

Accordingly, absent such disclosure, we will consider recommending a vote against the re-election of the governance committee chair (or equivalent).

Remuneration Relative to Peers

In line with our *Continental Europe Policy Guidelines*, we have added a section to these guidelines to clarify our expectation that companies disclose their peer group utilised for pay benchmarking, as well as the criteria utilised in the selection process – particularly in cases where companies consider U.S.-based peers.

Further, we have clarified that we generally believe companies should provide supporting disclosure where key elements of their executive pay plan deviate from prevailing market practice. This is particularly relevant in cases

where multiple exchange listings or another company-specific situation leads a company to benchmark its pay-setting across multiple jurisdictions.

Norway

Disclosure of General Meeting Vote Results

As previously announced, from 2024, we will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the re-election of the chair of the governance committee or equivalent (i.e., board chair or lead independent director) at companies included in the Euronext 100 and Next 150 indices that did not disclose vote results from their previous annual meeting.

The Link Between Pay and Performance

We have restructured and expanded this section of the guidelines in line with our Continental European Policy Guidelines and Norwegian market practice in order to provide further insight into our assessment of executive remuneration.

Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria

We have outlined our current guidance on the use of E&S metrics in the variable incentive programmes for executive directors in line with our *Continental European Policy Guidelines*.

Although we are strongly supportive of companies' incorporation of material E&S risks and opportunities in their long-term strategic planning, we believe that the inclusion of E&S metrics in remuneration plans should be determined by the company based on its own unique circumstances.

Companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that clearly lay out the rationale for selecting specific E&S metrics, the target-setting process, and corresponding payout opportunities. Further, in our view shareholders of companies that have not included explicit environmental or social indicators in their incentive plans would benefit from additional disclosure on how the company's executive pay strategy is otherwise aligned with its sustainability strategy.

Poland

Classified Supervisory Boards and Term Lengths

We have amended this section of the guidelines to introduce a policy regarding the use of lengthy appointment terms. While Polish law allows for director terms of up to five years, market practice has been evolving towards shorter terms, of three to four years. As we believe more frequent (re-)elections improve directors' accountability to shareholders, we will consider recommending against a director's (re-)election in case of a proposed appointment term of five years, absent supporting disclosure and/or sufficient board refreshment. In case of a slate election, we would note a concern in our analysis, and only recommend against the whole slate in egregious cases of poor board refreshment or composition.

Portugal

No Material Changes

While we have updated certain sections of these guidelines to reflect recent regulatory developments, for the 2024 year we have made no noteworthy revisions and will continue to apply our guidelines taking into account the market's regulations as well as international best practices.

Russia

Director Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

Beginning in 2023, Glass Lewis included a new discussion on director accountability for climate related issues. In particular, we believe that clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding climate risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen, should be provided by those companies whose own GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Accordingly, for companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe they should provide thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

While this policy was applied to the largest, most significant emitters in 2023, beginning in 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to most large-cap companies operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that companies' GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have expanded our policy on cyber risk oversight to outline our belief that, where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates communicating the company's ongoing process towards resolving and remediating the impact of the attack.

In instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosures concerning cybersecurity-related issues to be insufficient, or are not provided to shareholders.

Interlocking Directorships

We have expanded our policy on interlocking directorships to specify that we consider both public and private companies. Further, we have specified that we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships on a case-by-case basis, and review multiple board interlocks among non-insiders for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

Director Attendance

We have clarified that in our assessment of director attendance, we typically recommend voting against the re-election of directors that attended fewer than (i) 75% of board meetings; or (ii) an aggregate of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings. We will continue to typically grant exceptions to directors in their first year of service on a board or when the company discloses mitigating circumstances for a director's poor attendance record.

Accounts and Reports

We have clarified that, on a case-by-case basis, we may recommend that shareholders vote against proposals to approve or acknowledge a company's accounts and reports in instances where the statutory auditor has refused to provide an unqualified opinion on the financial statements. In these circumstances, we will assess the reasoning provided by the statutory auditor as well as any relevant disclosure from the company.

Further, we have clarified that in cases where the statutory auditor has included an emphasis of matter or raised concerns regarding the going concern basis of a company in its report on the financial statements, this will generally not lead to a recommendation to vote against proposals to approve or acknowledge a company's accounts and reports unless there are other legitimate concerns regarding the integrity of the financial statements and reports.

Spain

Vote on Non-Financial Reporting

We have clarified that we will generally recommend that shareholders approve proposals to approve a company's non-financial reporting unless any of the following apply: (i) the company has failed to make the report publicly-available with sufficient time for shareholder review; (ii) the company has failed to provide a sufficient response to material controversies in its reporting; (iii) there are material concerns regarding the completeness and/or quality of the reporting; or (iv) the company is listed on a blue-chip or mid-cap index and has failed to disclose its Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions.

We have also clarified that in some cases we may extend our "Environmental and Social Risk Oversight" policy to recommend a vote against the approval of a company's non-financial reporting in addition to, or instead of, a recommendation to vote against accountable directors of large-cap companies and other companies with material ESG oversight concerns that have failed to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board's role in overseeing material ESG issues.

Remuneration Relative to Ownership Structure

We have expanded this section of our guidelines to outline a number of company practices that may serve to mitigate concerns when a significant equity award is made to an executive that is also a major shareholder. These include the inclusion of challenging targets attached to a diverse set of performance metrics, meaningful disclosure on the company's engagement with free-float shareholders on the topic, or a policy that the shareholder executive will not participate in voting on the award.

Sweden

Disclosure of General Meeting Vote Results

As previously announced, from 2024, we will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the re-election of the chair of the governance committee or equivalent (i.e., board chair or Lead Independent Director) at companies included in OMX Nordic 120 that did not disclose vote results from their previous annual meeting.

The Link Between Pay and Performance

We have restructured and expanded this section of the guidelines in line with our Continental European Policy Guidelines and Swedish market practice in order to provide further insight into our assessment of executive remuneration.

Linking Executive Pay to Environmental and Social Criteria

We have outlined our current guidance on the use of E&S metrics in the variable incentive programmes for executive directors in line with our *Continental European Policy Guidelines*.

Although we are strongly supportive of companies' incorporation of material E&S risks and opportunities in their long-term strategic planning, we believe that the inclusion of E&S metrics in remuneration plans should be predicated on each company's unique circumstances.

Companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that clearly lay out the rationale for selecting specific E&S metrics, the target-setting process, and corresponding payout opportunities. Further, in our view shareholders of companies that have not included explicit environmental or social indicators in their incentive plans would benefit from additional disclosure on how the company's executive pay strategy is otherwise aligned with its sustainability strategy.

Switzerland

Vote on the Non-Financial Report

In the "Non-Financial Reporting" section of these guidelines, we have introduced a policy for the assessment of proposals to approve a company's non-financial reporting, which Swiss companies are now required to include on the agenda of their annual general meetings.

We have clarified that we will generally recommend that shareholders approve these proposals unless any of the following apply: (i) the company has failed to make the report publicly-available with sufficient time for shareholder review; (ii) the company has failed to provide a sufficient response to material controversies in its reporting; (iii) there are material concerns regarding the completeness and/or quality of the reporting; or (iv) the company is listed on a blue-chip or mid-cap index and has failed to disclose its Scope 1 and 2 greenhouse gas emissions.

We have also clarified that in some cases we may extend our "Environmental and Social Risk Oversight" policy to recommend a vote against the approval of a company's non-financial reporting in addition to, or instead of, a

recommendation to vote against accountable directors of large-cap companies and other companies with material ESG oversight concerns that have failed to provide explicit disclosure concerning the board's role in overseeing material ESG issues.

Türkiye

Country Name Change

In line with the Turkish government's decision, Turkish Foreign Ministry submitted a letter to the United Nations on June 1, 2022, requesting the use of "Türkiye" as the country's name instead of "Turkey", for all affairs. The United Nations confirmed the name change effective from the moment the letter was received.

Accordingly, we will use Türkiye from 2024 as the name of the country instead of Turkey in all our communications.

Charitable Donations

Announced in the wake of the February 6, 2023 earthquakes that severely affected southern and central provinces of the country, the CMB's decision no. 8/174 allowed companies the discretion to exceed their existing charitable donation limits for the purpose of donating to earthquake relief efforts. Given that the total cost of the natural disaster was then unaccounted for, we believed that companies may not have been able to predict the relevant limits of their charitable donations for the upcoming fiscal year. Therefore, we applied some leniency to companies' lack of forward-looking disclosure in this matter, noting that we would review disclosure of 2023 financial year donations in their next annual filings.

If evidence exists that this authority has been abused to the detriment of shareholders, we may recommend shareholder action against the audit committee chair.

In addition, in line with our policy prior to 2023, we may recommend voting against proposals asking for shareholder approval of charitable donations limit for the next fiscal year where the relevant limit is not disclosed. Further, starting 2024, as a step forward in charitable donations disclosure practices, we will expect all companies to transparently disclose their previous years' charitable donations, including the breakdown of recipients of such donations. In case of lack of such disclosure, we may recommend a vote against the audit committee chair.

Please refer to the "Charitable Donations" section of these guidelines for further information.

Independent Audit Fees

The Public Oversight, Accounting and Auditing Standards Authority of Türkiye (KGK) had announced their decision for Turkish public companies to start disclosing their payments to independent audit firms, starting with the 2021 financial year, on March 26, 2021. Accordingly, we have reviewed our approach to auditor appointment proposals and audit committee performance. Considering that the audit mandates in the past financial year were already in progress when the new decision was passed, we found it would be disproportionate to recommend that shareholders vote against the auditor appointment for companies that are disclosing their fees for the first time in 2022, even when non-audit fees appeared excessive. Thus, we granted exemptions for excessive non-audit fees during this observation phase for annual general meetings in 2022.

From 2023, we expect companies to disclose the audit and non-audit fees they have paid to independent audit firms for the relevant financial year, including the sum total and the categorical breakdown of such fees. In the case of lack of such disclosure, we recommend a vote against the audit committee chair as well as the re-appointment of the independent auditor, where applicable.

Starting in 2024, in cases where non-audit fees have exceeded 50% of total fees paid to the independent auditor without a compelling reason, we may vote against the re-appointment of the independent auditor where applicable. Further, in cases where this concern has persisted for at least two years in a row without justification, we may recommend a vote against the audit committee chair.

Please refer to the “Audit Committee Performance” and “Appointment of Auditor” sections of these guidelines for further information.

Ceiling for Material Related Party Transactions

In line with the increase in Consumer Price Index (CPI) in Türkiye, we have updated our policy to increase the ceiling for transactions that are not to be deemed material from (i) TRY560,000 to TRY900,000 for NEDs who receive remuneration for a service they have agreed to perform for the company, outside of their service as a director, including professional or other services; and (ii) TRY1,120,000 to TRY1,800,000 for those NEDs employed by a professional services firm such as an accounting firm, consulting firm, law firm or investment bank, where the firm is paid for services, but not to the individual directly.

Please refer to “Independence” in the “A Board of Directors that Serves the Interest of Shareholders” section of these guidelines for further information.

Governance Committee Independence

In line with the local law, many companies in Türkiye have a single governance committee in place of separate compensation or nominating committees. Having an executive on the committee responsible for compensation may bring about situations in which executives have a say in their own remuneration, which may create conflicts of interest between management and shareholder interests. As such, in cases where the company does not have a separate compensation committee and the relevant duties are undertaken by the governance committee, we object to executive directors’ and senior executives’ membership in the governance committee (we make exceptions for investor relations department personnel with legally required certificates).

As a transitional measure, during 2023 we highlighted our concern with executive directors’ and senior executives’ membership in governance committees which review executive compensation. Beginning in 2024, as signaled in our 2023 voting guidelines, we will vote against the governance committee chair in these cases.

Please refer to the “Nominating or Corporate Governance Committee Performance” and “Compensation or Corporate Governance Committee Performance” sections of these guidelines for further information.

Interlocking Directorships

We have expanded our policy on interlocking directorships to specify that we consider both public and private companies. Further, we have specified that we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships on a case-by-case basis and review multiple board interlocks among non-insiders for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

Please refer to the “Conflicts of Interest” section of these guidelines for further information.

Director Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

We believe that clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding climate risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen, should be provided by those companies whose own greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions represent a financially material risk.

Accordingly, for companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe they should provide thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

Beginning in 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to most large-cap companies operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that companies' GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Please refer to the "Director Accountability for Climate-Related Issues" section of these guidelines for further information.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have updated our policy on cyber risk oversight to outline our belief that, where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates communicating the company's ongoing process towards resolving and remediating the impact of the attack.

In instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board's oversight, response or disclosures concerning cybersecurity related issues to be insufficient, or not provided to shareholders.

United Kingdom

Director Attendance

We have clarified that in our assessment of director attendance, we typically recommend voting against the re-election of directors that failed to attend either: at least 75% of board meetings; or an aggregate of 75% of board and applicable committee meetings. We will continue to typically grant exceptions to directors in their first year of service on a board or when the company discloses mitigating circumstances for a director's poor attendance record.

Please refer to the "Voting Recommendations on the Basis of Performance and Experience" section of these guidelines for further information.

Interlocking Directorships

We have expanded our policy on interlocking directorships to specify that we consider both public and private companies. Further, we have specified that we evaluate other types of interlocking relationships on a case-by-case basis, and review multiple board interlocks among non-insiders for evidence of a pattern of poor oversight.

Please refer to the “Conflicts of Interest” section of these guidelines for further information.

Director Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

Beginning in 2023, Glass Lewis included a new discussion on director accountability for climate related issues. In particular, we believe that clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding climate risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen, should be provided by those companies whose own GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Accordingly, for companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe they should provide thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

While this policy was applied to the largest, most significant emitters in 2023, beginning in 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to FTSE 100 companies operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that companies’ GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Please refer to the “Director Accountability for Climate-Related Issues” section of these guidelines for further information.

Cyber Risk Oversight

We have expanded our policy on cyber risk oversight to outline our belief that, where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, shareholders can reasonably expect periodic updates communicating the company’s ongoing process towards resolving and remediating the impact of the attack.

In instances where a company has been materially impacted by a cyber-attack, we may recommend against appropriate directors should we find the board’s oversight, response or disclosures concerning cybersecurity-related issues to be insufficient, or not provided to shareholders.

Please refer to the “Cyber Risk Oversight” section of these guidelines for further information.

Clarifying Amendments

The following clarifications of our existing policies are included this year:

Accounts and Reports

We have clarified that, on a case-by-case basis, we may recommend that shareholders vote against proposals to approve or acknowledge a company’s accounts and reports in instances where the auditor did not provide an unqualified opinion on the financial statements. In these circumstances, we will assess the reasoning provided by the statutory auditor as well as any relevant disclosure from the company.

Please refer to the “Accounts and Reports” section of these guidelines for further information.

Executive Remuneration Voting Considerations

Within the “Vote on Remuneration Policy”, “Vote on Remuneration Report”, and “Long-Term Incentives — Structure and Duration” sections of these guidelines, we have clarified certain structural elements that we consider to be best practice and specific circumstances which may lead us to recommend against the company’s remuneration policy and/or report.

Please refer to “The Link Between Pay and Performance” section of these guidelines for further information.

Executive Shareholding Requirements

In a new section of these guidelines, we have outlined our belief that companies should generally adopt minimum executive share ownership requirements that should apply for the duration of an executive’s tenure, and for a period of time post-employment.

Please refer to the “Shareholding Requirements” section of these guidelines for further information.

Remuneration Relative to Ownership Structure

We have expanded this section of our guidelines to outline a number of company practices that may serve to mitigate concerns when a significant equity award is made to an executive that is also a major shareholder. These include the inclusion of challenging targets attached to a diverse set of performance metrics, meaningful disclosure on the company’s engagement with free-float shareholders on the topic, or a policy that the shareholder executive will not participate in voting on the award.

Please refer to the “Remuneration Relative to Ownership Structure” section of these guidelines for further information.

Remuneration Relative to Peers

In a new section of our guidelines, we have outlined our expectations surrounding setting remuneration levels relative to peers. Further, we have clarified that we welcome companies to disclose the peer group utilised, including the criteria used in the selection process, for pay benchmarking – particularly in cases where companies consider U.S.-based peers.

Further, we have clarified that we generally believe companies should provide supporting disclosure where key elements of their executive pay plan deviate from prevailing market practice – particularly in cases where multiple exchange listings or other company-specific situation lead a company to benchmark its pay-setting across multiple jurisdictions.

Please refer to the “Remuneration Relative to Peers” section of these guidelines for further information.

Standard Listed Companies

We have clarified that, for companies listed on the standard segment of the main market of the London Stock Exchange, we generally apply our policies as they pertain to AIM-traded companies. However, in light of the varied market capitalisation and complexity of standard listed companies, we approach this on a case-by-case basis.

Shareholder Proposals & ESG-Related Issues Initiatives

Board Accountability for Climate-Related Issues

Beginning in 2023, Glass Lewis included a new discussion on director accountability for climate related issues. In particular, we believe that clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding climate risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen, should be provided by those companies whose own GHG emissions represent a financially material risk. Accordingly, for companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe they should provide thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”). We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against responsible directors.

While this policy was applied to the largest, most significant emitters in 2023, beginning in 2024, Glass Lewis will apply this policy to most large-cap companies operating in industries where the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has determined that companies’ GHG emissions represent a financially material risk.

Engagement Considerations

We have updated our “Overall Approach” section to include consideration for engagement between companies and investors. Specifically, as part of our broader evaluation of a company’s governance risks when making a recommendation on a shareholder proposal, we will look to publicly available disclosures made by both the company and shareholder proponents concerning engagement between the two parties. In instances where there is compelling disclosure that either party has failed to engage in good faith, we may take such information into account when making recommendations on these resolutions.

We also believe that companies should make a concerted effort to provide disclosure in their proxy statements concerning their engagements with their broader shareholder bases on issues raised by shareholder proposals. Particularly in cases where companies receive repeat shareholder proposals, we may consider a company’s disclosure of its engagement efforts on related topics in our analysis and recommendations, especially in cases where such repeat proposals have received significant support from shareholders. While we do not necessarily expect companies to take action on proposals that receive less than majority shareholder support, we do expect them to ensure that they are soliciting feedback from shareholders concerning the topics raised by the proposals and communicating the feedback they have received in their proxy disclosures with a particular focus on responding to such feedback. Such disclosure will also be strongly considered when we are evaluating whether companies have sufficiently responded to majority-supported shareholder proposals.

Non-Financial Reporting

We have updated our guidelines on management-proposed ESG resolutions to reflect our approach to mandatory proposals in Spain and Switzerland asking shareholders to approve non-financial reporting. In these cases, we will generally recommend that shareholders vote for proposals to approve a company's non-financial reporting, unless any of the following apply: (i) the company has failed to make the report publicly-available with sufficient time for shareholder review prior to the general meeting; (ii) the company has failed to provide a sufficient response to material controversies in its reporting; (iii) there are material concerns regarding the completeness and/or quality of the reporting; or (iv) the company is listed on a blue-chip or mid-cap index and has failed to disclose its Scope 1 and 2 emissions.

In addition, for large-cap companies and in instances where we identify material ESG oversight concerns, we will review the manner in which the board oversees ESG issues. In instances where the board has failed to provide explicit disclosure concerning its role in overseeing material ESG issues, we may recommend that shareholders vote against the approval of a company's non-financial reporting instead of or in addition to a recommendation to vote against accountable directors.

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International



GLASS LEWIS

Proxy Paper Policy Guidelines

An Overview of Glass Lewis' Approach to Proxy Advice
2023

www.glasslewis.com

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About Glass Lewis

Glass Lewis is the world's choice for governance solutions. We enable institutional investors and publicly listed companies to make sustainable decisions based on research and data. We cover 30,000+ meetings each year, across approximately 100 global markets. Our team has been providing in-depth analysis of companies since 2003, relying solely on publicly available information to inform its policies, research, and voting recommendations.

Our customers include the majority of the world's largest pension plans, mutual funds, and asset managers, collectively managing over \$40 trillion in assets. We have teams located across the United States, Europe, and Asia-Pacific giving us global reach with a local perspective on the important governance issues.

Investors around the world depend on Glass Lewis' [Viewpoint](#) platform to manage their proxy voting, policy implementation, recordkeeping, and reporting. Our industry leading [Proxy Paper](#) product provides comprehensive environmental, social, and governance research and voting recommendations weeks ahead of voting deadlines. Public companies can also use our innovative [Report Feedback Statement](#) to deliver their opinion on our proxy research directly to the voting decision makers at every investor client in time for voting decisions to be made or changed.

The research team engages extensively with public companies, investors, regulators, and other industry stakeholders to gain relevant context into the realities surrounding companies, sectors, and the market in general. This enables us to provide the most comprehensive and pragmatic insights to our customers.

Join the Conversation

Glass Lewis is committed to ongoing engagement with all market participants.

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Introduction

These guidelines provide a general overview of the Glass Lewis approach to proxy advice globally. Glass Lewis publishes separate, detailed policy guidelines for all major global markets, which are publicly available on the Glass Lewis website. Glass Lewis policies are largely based on the regulations, listing rules, codes of best practice and other relevant standards set in each country. While these guidelines provide a high-level overview of our general policy approach, implementation varies in accordance with relevant requirements or best practices in each market. For detailed information on the implementation of the policy approach described below, refer to the Glass Lewis policy guidelines for the relevant country.

Summary of Changes for 2023

Board Accountability for Climate-related Issues

In a new section of these guidelines, we have outlined that where companies with increased climate risk exposure have not provided thorough TCFD-aligned climate-related disclosure and/or have not explicitly and clearly defined board oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues, we may recommend voting against a responsible member of the board or other relevant agenda item.

Please refer to the “Board Accountability for Climate-related Issues” section of these guidelines for further information.

Cyber Risk Oversight

In a new section of these guidelines, we have outlined our belief that cyber risk is material for all companies and that a company’s stakeholders would benefit from clear disclosure regarding the role of the board in overseeing issues related to cybersecurity. Further we have clarified that, while we will generally not make recommendations on the basis of a company’s oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues, we may recommend against appropriate directors in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders and we find the company’s disclosure or oversight to be insufficient.

Please refer to the “Cyber Risk Oversight” section of these guidelines for further information.

Board Responsiveness

We have clarified that, in assessing board responsiveness, we take into account a company’s shareholder and capital structure, carefully examining the level of disapproval on prior year agenda items attributable to minority shareholders.

Please refer to the “Board Responsiveness” section of these guidelines for further information.

Board Diversity

We have clarified that we generally expect the boards of main market companies in most major global markets to comprise at least one gender diverse director and that for boards listed on blue-chip or mid-cap indices in Europe or North America, we expect gender diverse directors to hold at least 30% of board seats. We will continue to apply a higher standard where best practice recommendations or listing regulations set a higher target.

Please refer to the “Board Diversity” section of these guidelines for further information.

Multi-Class Share Structures

We have outlined that we will generally recommend that shareholders vote against (a) certain director(s) and/or other relevant agenda items at a North American or European company that adopts a multi-class share structure with unequal voting rights in connection with an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting the multi-class structure to a shareholder vote at the company’s first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class structure (generally seven years or less).

Further, we have clarified that our approach toward companies with existing multi-class share structures with unequal voting varies between regions and is dependent on, inter alia, local market practice and legislation, as well as our assessment of whether evidence exists that the share structure is contributing to poor governance or the suppression of minority shareholder concerns.

Please refer to the “Multi-Class Share Structures” section of these guidelines for further information.

Election of Directors

Board of Directors

Boards are put in place to represent shareholders and protect their interests. Glass Lewis seeks boards with a proven record of protecting shareholders and delivering value over the medium- and long-term. In our view, boards working to protect and enhance the best interests of shareholders typically include some independent directors (the percentage will vary by local market practice and regulations), boast a record of positive performance, have directors with diverse backgrounds, and appoint directors with a breadth and depth of experience.

Board Composition

We look at each individual on the board and examine his or her relationships with the company, the company's executives and with other board members. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether pre-existing personal, familial or financial relationships are likely to impact the decisions of that board member.

Where the company does not disclose the names or backgrounds of director nominees with sufficient time in advance of the shareholder meeting to evaluate their independence, performance or skills we will consider recommending voting against or abstaining from voting on the directors' election.

We recommend voting in favor of governance structures that will drive positive performance and enhance shareholder value. The most crucial test of a board's commitment to the company and to its shareholders is the performance of the board and its members. The performance of directors in their capacity as board members and as executives of the company, when applicable, and in their roles at other companies where they serve is critical to this evaluation. We generally believe that a board will be most effective in protecting shareholders' interests when a majority of shareholder representatives on the board are independent, although we set higher and lower thresholds in some markets on the basis of local best practice recommendations and prevailing market practice. We typically accept the presence of representatives of a company's major shareholder(s) on the board in line with their stake in a company's issued share capital or voting rights, so long as there is a sufficient number of independent directors to represent free-float shareholders and allow for the formation of sufficiently independent board committees.

We believe a director is independent if they have no material financial, familial or other current relationships with the company, its executives or other board members except for service on the board and standard fees paid for that service. Relationships that have existed within the three to five years, dependent on the nature of the relationship, prior to the inquiry are usually considered to be "current" for purposes of this test.

In our view, a director is affiliated if they have a material financial, familial or other relationship with the company or its executives, but are not an employee of the company. This includes directors whose employers have a material financial relationship with the Company. This also includes a director who owns or controls, directly or indirectly, 10% or more of the company's voting stock (except where local regulations or best practice set a different threshold).

We define an inside director as one who simultaneously serves as a director and as an employee of the company. This category may include a board chair who acts as an employee of the company or is paid as an employee of the company.

Although we typically recommend that shareholders support the election of independent directors, we will recommend voting against directors for the following reasons:

- A director who attends less than 75% of the board and applicable committee meetings.
- A director who is also the CEO of a company where a serious restatement has occurred after the CEO certified the pre-restatement financial statements.
- An affiliated director where the board is not sufficiently independent in accordance with market best practice standards.
- There are substantial concerns regarding the performance and/or skills and experience of a director.

We also feel that the following conflicts of interest may hinder a director's performance and will therefore recommend voting against a:

- Director who presently sits on an excessive number of boards.
- Director who, or a director whose immediate family member, provides material professional services to the company at any time during the past three years.
- Director who, or a director whose immediate family member, engages in airplane, real estate or other similar deals, including perquisite type grants from the company.
- Director with an interlocking directorship.

Slate Elections

In some countries, companies elect their board members as a slate, whereby shareholders are unable to vote on the election of each individual director, but rather are limited to voting for or against the board as a whole. In countries where slate elections are common market practice, we will not recommend that shareholders oppose an election on the basis of this election method alone.

We will generally recommend that shareholders support a director slate, unless we have identified independence or performance concerns. When the proposed slate raises concerns regarding board or committee independence, we will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the slate. In egregious cases where we have identified concerns regarding the performance and/or experience of the board, its committees, and/or individual directors, we will similarly recommend that shareholders vote against the director slate.

Board Committee Composition

We believe that independent directors should serve on a company's audit, compensation, nominating and governance committees. We will support boards with such a structure and encourage change where this is not the case. We generally recommend that shareholders oppose the presence of executive directors on the audit and compensation committee given the risks for conflicts of interest. We generally believe that the majority of shareholder representatives on key board committees should be independent, although we set higher and lower thresholds in some markets on the basis of local best practice recommendations and prevailing market practice.

Review of Risk Management Controls

We believe companies, particularly financial firms, should have a dedicated risk committee, or a committee of the board charged with risk oversight, as well as a chief risk officer who reports directly to that committee, not to the CEO or another executive. In cases where a company has disclosed a sizable loss or writedown, and where a reasonable analysis indicates that the company's board-level risk committee should be held accountable for poor oversight, we would recommend that shareholders vote against such committee members on that basis. In addition, in cases where a company maintains a significant level of financial risk exposure but fails to disclose any explicit form of board-level risk oversight (committee or otherwise), we will consider recommending to vote against the chairman of the board on that basis.

Classified Boards

Glass Lewis favors the repeal of staggered boards in favor of the annual election of directors. We believe that staggered boards are less accountable to shareholders than annually elected boards. Furthermore, we feel that the annual election of directors encourages board members to focus on protecting the interests of shareholders.

Board Tenure and Refreshment

Glass Lewis strongly supports routine director evaluation, including independent external reviews, and periodic board refreshment to foster the sharing of diverse perspectives in the boardroom and the generation of new ideas and business strategies. In our view, a director's experience can be a valuable asset to shareholders because of the complex, critical issues that boards face. This said, we recognize a lack of refreshment can contribute to a lack of board responsiveness to poor company performance. We may consider recommending voting against directors with a lengthy tenure (e.g. over 12 years) when we identify significant performance or governance concerns indicating that a fresh perspective would be beneficial and we find no evidence of board refreshment.

Where a board has established an age or term limit, we believe these should generally be applied equally for all members of the board. If a board waives its age/term limits, Glass Lewis will consider recommending shareholders vote against the chair of the nominating committee or equivalent, unless compelling rationale is provided for why the board is proposing to waive this rule through an election/re-election.

Board Diversity

Glass Lewis values the importance of board diversity, believing there are a number of benefits from having individuals with a variety of backgrounds serving on boards. We consider the diversity of gender, backgrounds, skills and experience of directors when evaluating board diversity. If a board has failed to address material concerns regarding the mix of skills and experience of the non-executive directors or when it fails to meet legal requirements or the best practice standard prevalent in the market for gender quotas and has not disclosed any cogent explanation or plan regarding its approach to board diversity, we will consider recommending voting against the chair of the nominating committee. We expect boards of main market companies listed in most major global markets (e.g. Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan, United Kingdom and United States), to comprise at least one gender diverse director (women, or directors that identify with a gender other than male or female).

For European and North American companies listed on a blue-chip or mid-cap index (e.g. Russell 3000, TSX, FTSE 350, etc.), we expect at least 30% of the board to be composed of gender diverse directors. We apply a higher standard where best practice recommendations or listing regulations set a higher target.

We also monitor company disclosure on ethnic diversity at board level. We expect large companies in markets with legal requirements or best practice recommendations in this area (e.g. United States; United Kingdom) to provide clear disclosure on the board's performance or transition plans.

Environmental and Social Risk Oversight

Glass Lewis recognizes the importance of ensuring the sustainability of companies' operations. We believe that insufficient oversight of material environmental and social issues can present direct legal, financial, regulatory and reputational risks that could serve to harm shareholder interests. Therefore, we believe that these issues should be carefully monitored and managed by companies, and that companies should have an appropriate oversight structure in place to ensure that they are mitigating attendant risks and capitalizing on related opportunities to the best extent possible. From 2022, Glass Lewis will generally recommend that shareholders vote against the chair of the governance committee (or equivalent) of companies listed on a major blue-chip index in key global markets that do not provide clear disclosure concerning the board-level oversight afforded to material environmental and/or social issues.

Board Accountability for Climate-related Issues

We believe that companies with increased climate risk exposure, such as those companies identified by groups including Climate Action 100+, should provide clear and comprehensive disclosure regarding these risks, including how they are being mitigated and overseen. We believe such information is crucial to allow investors to understand the company's management of this issue, as well as the impact of a lower carbon future on the company's operations.

Accordingly, for such companies with material exposure to climate risk stemming from their own operations, we believe thorough climate-related disclosures in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Disclosures ("TCFD") should be provided to shareholders. We also believe the boards of these companies should have explicit and clearly defined oversight responsibilities for climate-related issues. As such, in instances where we find either (or both) of these disclosures to be absent or significantly lacking, we may recommend voting against the chair of the committee (or board) charged with oversight of climate-related issues, or if no committee has been charged with such oversight, the chair of the governance committee. Further, we may extend our recommendation on this basis to additional members of the responsible committee in cases where the committee chair is not standing for election due to a classified board, or based on other factors, including the company's size and industry and its overall governance profile. In instances where appropriate directors are not standing for election, we may instead recommend shareholders vote against other matters that are up for a vote, such as the ratification of board acts, or the accounts and reports proposal.

Cyber Risk Oversight

Given the regulatory focus on, and the potential adverse outcomes from, cyber-related issues, it is our view that cyber risk is material for all companies. We therefore believe that it is critical that companies evaluate and

mitigate these risks to the greatest extent possible. With that view, we encourage all issuers to provide clear disclosure concerning the role of the board in overseeing issues related to cybersecurity. We also believe that disclosure concerning how companies are ensuring directors are fully versed on this rapidly evolving and dynamic issue can help shareholders understand the seriousness with which companies take this issue.

We will generally not make voting recommendations on the basis of a company's oversight or disclosure concerning cyber-related issues. However, we will closely evaluate a company's disclosure in this regard in instances where cyber-attacks have caused significant harm to shareholders and may recommend against appropriate directors should we find such disclosure or oversight to be insufficient.

Board Responsiveness

Glass Lewis believes that any time 20% or more of shareholders vote contrary to the recommendation of management, the board should, depending on the issue, demonstrate some level of responsiveness to address the concerns of shareholders, particularly in the case of a compensation or director election proposal. While the 20% threshold alone will not automatically generate a negative vote recommendation from Glass Lewis on a future proposal (e.g., to recommend against a director nominee, against a remuneration proposal, etc.), it will be a contributing factor to recommend a vote against management's recommendation in the event we determine that the board did not respond appropriately. In the case of companies with a controlling shareholder and/or with a multi-class share structure, we will carefully examine the level of disapproval attributable to minority shareholders.

As a general framework, our evaluation of board responsiveness involves a review of the publicly available disclosures released following the date of the company's last annual meeting up through the publication date of our most current Proxy Paper.

Separation of the Roles of Chair and CEO

Glass Lewis believes that separating the roles of corporate officers and the chair of the board is a better governance structure than a combined executive/chair position. The role of executives is to manage the business on the basis of the course charted by the board. Executives should be in the position of reporting and answering to the board for their performance in achieving the goals set out by such board. This becomes much more complicated when management actually sits on, or chairs, the board.

We view an independent chair as better able to oversee the executives of the company and set a pro-shareholder agenda without the management conflicts that a CEO and other executive insiders often face. This, in turn, leads to a more proactive and effective board of directors that is looking out for the interests of shareholders above all else.

In the absence of an independent chair, we support the appointment of a presiding or lead director with authority to set the agenda for the meetings and to lead sessions outside the presence of the insider chair.

We may recommend voting against the chair of the nominating committee when the chair and CEO roles are combined and the board has not appointed an independent presiding or lead director.

Financial Reporting

Accounts and Reports

Many countries require companies to submit the annual financial statements, director reports and independent auditors' reports to shareholders at a general meeting. We will usually recommend voting in favor of these proposals except when there are concerns about the integrity of the statements/reports. However, should the audited financial statements, auditor's report and/or annual report not be published at the writing of our report, we will recommend that shareholders abstain from voting on this proposal.

Income Allocation (Distribution of Dividends)

In many countries, companies must submit the allocation of income for shareholder approval. We will generally recommend voting for such a proposal. However, we will give particular scrutiny to cases where the company's dividend payout ratio is exceptionally low or excessively high relative to its peers, or the proposed distribution represents a substantial departure from a company's disclosed dividend policy, and the company has not provided a satisfactory explanation.

Appointment of Auditors and Authority to Set Fees

We believe that role of the auditor is crucial in protecting shareholder value. Like directors, auditors should be free from conflicts of interest and should assiduously avoid situations that require them to make choices between their own interests and the interests of the shareholders. We generally support management's recommendation regarding the selection of an auditor and support granting the board the authority to fix auditor fees except in cases where we believe the independence of an incumbent auditor or the integrity of the audit has been compromised. However, we generally recommend voting against ratification of the auditor and/or authorizing the board to set auditor fees for the following reasons:

- When audit fees added to audit-related fees total less than one-half of total fees.
- When there have been any recent restatements or late filings by the company where the auditor bears some responsibility for the restatement or late filing (e.g., a restatement due to a reporting error).
- When the company has aggressive accounting policies.
- When the company has poor disclosure or lack of transparency in financial statements.
- When there are other relationships or issues of concern with the auditor that might suggest a conflict between the interest of the auditor and the interests of shareholders.
- When the company is changing auditors as a result of a disagreement between the company and the auditor on a matter of accounting principles or practices, financial statement disclosure or auditing scope or procedures.
- Where the auditor's tenure is lengthy (e.g. over 10 years) and when we identify any ongoing litigation or significant controversies which call into question an auditor's effectiveness

Compensation

Compensation Report/Compensation Policy

We closely review companies' remuneration practices and disclosure as outlined in company filings to evaluate management-submitted advisory compensation report and policy vote proposals. In evaluating these proposals, which can be binding or non-binding depending on the country, we examine how well the company has disclosed information pertinent to its compensation programs, the extent to which overall compensation is tied to performance, the performance metrics selected by the company and the levels of remuneration in comparison to company performance and that of its peers.

We will usually recommend voting against approval of the compensation report or policy when the following occur:

- Gross disconnect between pay and performance;
- Gross disconnect between remuneration outcomes and the experience of shareholders and other key stakeholders (in particular company employees) in the year under review;
- Performance goals and metrics are inappropriate or insufficiently challenging;
- Lack of disclosure regarding performance metrics and goals as well as the extent to which the performance metrics, targets and goals are implemented to enhance company performance and encourage prudent risk-taking;
- Excessive weighting of short-term (e.g., generally less than three year) performance measurement in incentive plans;
- Excessive discretion afforded to or exercised by management or the compensation committee to deviate from defined performance metrics and goals in making awards;
- Ex gratia or other non-contractual payments have been made and the reasons for making the payments have not been fully explained or the explanation is unconvincing;
- Guaranteed bonuses are established;
- Egregious or excessive bonuses, equity awards or severance payments;
- Excessive increases (e.g. over 10%) in fixed payments such as salary or pension entitlements that are not adequately justified

In addition, we look for the presence of other structural safeguards, such as clawback and malus policies for incentive plans. The absence of such safeguards may contribute to a negative recommendation. In particularly egregious cases where we conclude that the compensation committee has substantially failed to fulfill its duty to shareholders, we may also recommend that shareholders vote against the chair, senior members, or all members of the committee, depending on the seriousness and persistence of the issues identified.

Long-Term Incentive Plans

Glass Lewis recognizes the value of equity-based incentive programs. When used appropriately, they can provide a vehicle for linking an employee's pay to a company's performance, thereby aligning their interests

with those of shareholders. Tying a portion of an employee's compensation to the performance of the Company provides an incentive to maximize share value. In addition, equity-based compensation is an effective way to attract, retain and motivate key employees. In order to allow for meaningful shareholder review, we believe that incentive programs should generally include: (i) specific and appropriate performance goals; (ii) a maximum award pool; and (iii) a maximum award amount per employee. In addition, the payments made should be reasonable relative to the performance of the business and total compensation to those covered by the plan should be in line with compensation paid by the Company's peers.

Performance-Based Equity Compensation

Glass Lewis believes in performance-based equity compensation plans for senior executives. We feel that executives should be compensated with equity when their performance and that of the company warrants such rewards. While we do not believe that equity-based compensation plans for all employees need to be based on overall company performance, we do support such limitations for grants to senior executives (although even some equity-based compensation of senior executives without performance criteria is acceptable, such as in the case of moderate incentive grants made in an initial offer of employment). Boards often argue that such a proposal would hinder them in attracting talent. We believe that boards can develop a consistent, reliable approach, as boards of many companies have, that would still attract executives who believe in their ability to guide the company to achieve its targets.

We generally recommend that shareholders vote in favor of performance-based option requirements. There should be no retesting of performance conditions for all share- and option- based incentive schemes. We will generally recommend that shareholders vote against performance-based equity compensation plans that allow for re-testing. We pay particular attention to awards to major shareholders that serve as senior executives, mindful of the natural alignment between shareholders' and the executive's interests and the potential for such grants to further consolidate the executive's ownership level.

Director Compensation

Glass Lewis believes that non-employee directors should receive appropriate types and levels of compensation for the time and effort they spend serving on the board and its committees. Director fees should be reasonable in order to retain and attract qualified individuals. We support compensation plans that include non performance-based equity awards. Glass Lewis compares the costs of these plans to the plans of peer companies with similar market capitalizations in the same country to help inform its judgment on this issue.

Retirement Benefits for Directors

We will typically recommend voting against proposals to grant retirement benefits to non-executive directors. Such extended payments can impair the objectivity and independence of these board members. Directors should receive adequate compensation for their board service through initial and annual fees.

Governance Structure

Amendments to the Articles of Association

We will evaluate proposed amendments to a company's articles of association on a case-by-case basis. We are opposed to the practice of bundling several amendments under a single proposal because it prevents shareholders from evaluating each amendment on its own merits. In such cases, we will analyze each change individually and will recommend voting for the proposal only when we believe that the amendments on balance are in the best interests of shareholders.

Virtual Meetings

Glass Lewis unequivocally supports companies facilitating the virtual participation of shareholders in general meetings. We believe that virtual meeting technology can be a useful complement to a traditional, in-person shareholder meeting by expanding participation of shareholders who are unable to attend a shareholder meeting in person (i.e. a "hybrid meeting"). However, we also believe that virtual-only shareholder meetings can curb the ability of a company's shareholders to participate in the meeting and meaningfully communicate with company management and directors.

Where companies are convening a meeting at which in-person attendance of shareholders is limited, we expect companies to set and disclose clear procedures at the time of convocation regarding:

- i) When, where, and how shareholders will have an opportunity to ask questions related to the subjects normally discussed at the annual meeting, including a timeline for submitting questions, types of appropriate questions, and rules for how questions and comments will be recognized and disclosed to shareholders;
- ii) In particular where there are restrictions on the ability of shareholders to question the board during the meeting - the manner in which appropriate questions received during the meeting will be addressed by the board; this should include a commitment that questions which meet the board's guidelines are answered in a format that is accessible by all shareholders, such as on the company's AGM or investor relations website;
- iii) The procedure and requirements to participate in the meeting and access the meeting platform; and
- iv) Technical support that is available to shareholders prior to and during the meeting. In egregious cases where inadequate disclosure of the aforementioned has been provided to shareholders at the time of convocation, we will generally recommend that shareholders hold the board or relevant directors accountable.

Depending on a company's governance structure, country of incorporation, and the agenda of the meeting, this may lead to recommendations that shareholders vote against members of the governance committee (or equivalent; if up for re-election); the chair of the board (if up for re-election); and/or other agenda items concerning board composition and performance as applicable (e.g. ratification of board acts). We will always take into account emerging local laws, best practices, and disclosure standards when assessing a company's performance on this issue.

Anti-Takeover Measures

Multi-Class Share Structures

Glass Lewis believes multi-class voting structures are typically not in the best interests of common shareholders. We believe the economic stake of each shareholder should match their voting power and that no small group of shareholders, family or otherwise, should have voting rights different from those of other shareholders.

We generally consider a multi-class share structure to reflect negatively on a company's overall corporate governance. Because we believe that allowing one vote per share best protects the interests of shareholders, we typically recommend that shareholders vote in favor of recapitalization proposals to eliminate multi-class share structures. Similarly, we will generally recommend voting against proposals to adopt a new class of common stock.

Glass Lewis will generally recommend that shareholders vote against (a) certain director(s) and/or other relevant agenda items at a North American or European company that adopts a multi-class share structure with unequal voting rights in connection with an IPO, spin-off, or direct listing within the past year if the board: (i) did not also commit to submitting the multi-class structure to a shareholder vote at the company's first shareholder meeting following the IPO; or (ii) did not provide for a reasonable sunset of the multi-class structure (generally seven years or less). Our approach toward companies with existing multi-class share structures with unequal voting varies between regions and is dependent on, inter alia, local market practice and legislation, as well as our assessment on whether evidence exists that the share structure is contributing to poor governance or the suppression of minority shareholder concerns.

Poison Pills (Shareholder Rights Plans)

Glass Lewis believes that poison pill plans generally are not in the best interests of shareholders. Specifically, they can reduce management accountability by substantially limiting opportunities for corporate takeovers. Rights plans can thus prevent shareholders from receiving a buy-out premium for their stock. We believe that boards should be given wide latitude in directing the activities of the company and charting the company's course. However, on an issue such as this where the link between the financial interests of shareholders and their right to consider and accept buyout offers is so substantial, we believe that shareholders should be allowed to vote on whether or not they support such a plan's implementation. In certain limited circumstances, we will support a limited poison pill to accomplish a particular objective, such as the closing of an important merger, or a pill that contains what we believe to be a reasonable 'qualifying offer' clause.

Supermajority Vote Requirements

Glass Lewis favors a simple majority voting structure except where a supermajority voting requirement is explicitly intended to protect the rights of minority shareholders in a controlled company. In the case of noncontrolled companies, supermajority vote requirements act as impediments to shareholder action on ballot items that are critical to their interests. One key example is in the takeover context where supermajority vote requirements can strongly limit shareholders' input in making decisions on such crucial matters as selling the business.

Increase in Authorized Shares

Glass Lewis believes that having adequate capital stock available for issuance is important to the operation of a company. We will generally support proposals when a company could reasonably use the requested shares for financing, stock splits and stock dividends. While we believe that having adequate shares to allow management to make quick decisions and effectively operate the business is critical, we prefer that, for significant transactions, management come to shareholders to justify their use of additional shares rather than providing a blank check in the form of large pools of unallocated shares available for any purpose.

In general, we will support proposals to increase authorized shares up to 100% of the number of shares currently authorized unless, after the increase the company would be left with less than 30% of its authorized shares outstanding. In markets where such authorities typically also authorize the board to issue new shares without separate shareholder approval, we apply the policy described below on the issuance of shares.

Issuance of Shares

Issuing additional shares can dilute existing holders in some circumstances. Further, the availability of additional shares, where the board has discretion to implement a poison pill, can often serve as a deterrent to interested suitors. Accordingly, where we find that the company has not disclosed a detailed plan for use of the proposed shares, or where the number of shares requested are excessive, we typically recommend against the issuance. In the case of a private placement, we will also consider whether the company is offering a discount to its share price.

In general, we will support proposals to authorize the board to issue shares (with pre-emption rights) when the requested increase is equal to or less than the current issued share capital. This authority should generally not exceed five years. In accordance with differing market best practice, in some countries, if a proposal seeks to issue shares exceeding 33% of issued share capital, the company should explain the specific rationale, which we analyze on a case-by-case basis.

We will also generally support proposals to suspend pre-emption rights for a maximum of 5-20% of the issued ordinary share capital of the company, depending on best practice in the country in which the company is located. This authority should not exceed five years, or less for some countries.

Repurchase of Shares

We will recommend voting in favor of a proposal to repurchase shares when the plan includes the following provisions: (i) a maximum number of shares which may be purchased (typically not more than 10-20% of the issued share capital); and (ii) a maximum price which may be paid for each share (as a percentage of the market price). We may support a larger proposed repurchase program where the terms of the program stipulate that repurchased shares must be cancelled.

Shareholder Proposals

Glass Lewis believes that shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders, support effective ESG oversight and reporting, and encourage director accountability. Accordingly, Glass Lewis places a significant emphasis on promoting transparency, robust governance structures and companies' responsiveness to and engagement with shareholders. We also believe that companies should be transparent on how they are mitigating material ESG risks, including those related to climate change, human capital management, and stakeholder relations.

To that end, we evaluate all shareholder proposals on a case-by-case basis with a view to promoting long-term shareholder value. While we are generally supportive of those that promote board accountability, shareholder rights, and transparency, we consider all proposals in the context of a company's unique operations and risk profile.

For a detailed review of our policies concerning compensation, environmental, social, and governance shareholder proposals, please refer to our comprehensive *Proxy Paper Guidelines for Environmental, Social & Governance Initiatives*, available at www.glasslewis.com/voting-policies-current/.

Overall Approach to Environmental, Social & Governance

Glass Lewis evaluates all environmental and social issues through the lens of long-term shareholder value. We believe that companies should be considering material environmental and social factors in all aspects of their operations and that companies should provide shareholders with disclosures that allow them to understand how these factors are being considered and how attendant risks are being mitigated. We also are of the view that governance is a critical factor in how companies manage environmental and social risks and opportunities and that a well-governed company will be generally managing these issues better than one without a governance structure that promotes board independence and accountability.

We believe part of the board's role is to ensure that management conducts a complete risk analysis of company operations, including those that have material environmental and social implications. We believe that directors should monitor management's performance in both capitalizing on environmental and social opportunities and mitigating environmental and social risks related to operations in order to best serve the interests of shareholders. Companies face significant financial, legal and reputational risks resulting from poor environmental and social practices, or negligent oversight thereof. Therefore, in cases where the board or management has neglected to take action on a pressing issue that could negatively impact shareholder value, we believe that shareholders should take necessary action in order to effect changes that will safeguard their financial interests.

Given the importance of the role of the board in executing a sustainable business strategy that allows for the realization of environmental and social opportunities and the mitigation of related risks, relating to environmental risks and opportunities, we believe shareholders should seek to promote governance structures that protect shareholders and promote director accountability. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental or social risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental and social risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. In such instances, we will generally recommend against responsible members of the board that are specifically charged with oversight of the issue in question.

When evaluating environmental and social factors that may be relevant to a given company, Glass Lewis does so in the context of the financial materiality of the issue to the company's operations. We believe that all companies face risks associated with environmental and social issues. However, we recognize that these risks manifest themselves differently at each company as a result of a company's operations, workforce, structure, and geography, among other factors. Accordingly, we place a significant emphasis on the financial implications of a company's actions with regard to impacts on its stakeholders and the environment.

When evaluating environmental and social issues, Glass Lewis examines companies':

Direct environmental and social risk — Companies should evaluate financial exposure to direct environmental risks associated with their operations. Examples of direct environmental risks include those associated with oil or gas spills, contamination, hazardous leakages, explosions, or reduced water or air quality, among others.

Social risks may include non-inclusive employment policies, inadequate human rights policies, or issues that

adversely affect the company's stakeholders. Further, we believe that firms should consider their exposure to risks emanating from a broad range of issues, over which they may have no or only limited control, such as insurance companies being affected by increased storm severity and frequency resulting from climate change or membership in trade associations with controversial political ties.

Risk due to legislation and regulation — Companies should evaluate their exposure to changes or potential changes in regulation that affect current and planned operations. Regulation should be carefully monitored in all jurisdictions in which the company operates. We look closely at relevant and proposed legislation and evaluate whether the company has responded proactively.

Legal and reputational risk — Failure to take action on important environmental or social issues may carry the risk of inciting negative publicity and potentially costly litigation. While the effect of high-profile campaigns on shareholder value may not be directly measurable, we believe it is prudent for companies to carefully evaluate the potential impacts of the public perception of their impacts on stakeholders and the environment. When considering investigations and lawsuits, Glass Lewis is mindful that such matters may involve unadjudicated allegations or other charges that have not been resolved. Glass Lewis does not assume the truth of such allegations or charges or that the law has been violated. Instead, Glass Lewis focuses more broadly on whether, under the particular facts and circumstances presented, the nature and number of such concerns, lawsuits or investigations reflects on the risk profile of the company or suggests that appropriate risk mitigation measures may be warranted.

Governance risk — Inadequate oversight of environmental and social issues carries significant risks to companies. When leadership is ineffective or fails to thoroughly consider potential risks, such risks are likely unmitigated and could thus present substantial risks to the company, ultimately leading to loss of shareholder value.

Glass Lewis believes that one of the most crucial factors in analyzing the risks presented to companies in the form of environmental and social issues is the level and quality of oversight over such issues. When management and the board have displayed disregard for environmental risks, have engaged in egregious or illegal conduct, or have failed to adequately respond to current or imminent environmental risks that threaten shareholder value, we believe shareholders should consider holding directors accountable. When companies have not provided for explicit, board-level oversight of environmental and social matters and/or when a substantial environmental or social risk has been ignored or inadequately addressed, we may recommend voting against members of the board. In addition, or alternatively, depending on the proposals presented, we may also consider recommending voting in favor of relevant shareholder proposals or against other relevant management-proposed items, such as the ratification of auditor, a company's accounts and reports, or ratification of management and board acts.

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